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FIRST AMENDMENT EQUAL PROTECTION: 
ON DISCRETION, INEQUALITY, AND 
PARTICIPATION 
Daniel P. Tokaji* 
[A]n ordinance which ... makes the peaceful enjoyment of freedoms 
which the Constitution guarantees contingent upon the uncontrolled will of 
an official - as by requiring a permit or license which may be granted or 
denied in the discretion of such official - is an unconstitutional censor­
ship or prior restraint upon the enjoyment of those freedoms. 
- Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham1 
In light of the safeguards designed to minimize racial bias in the process, 
the fundamental value of jury trial in our criminal justice system, and the 
benefits that discretion provides to criminal defendants . . . the Baldus 
study does not demonstrate a constitutionally significant risk of racial bias 
affecting the Georgia capital sentencing process. 
-McCleskey v. Kemp2 
The recount mechanisms implemented in response to the decisions of the 
Florida Supreme Court do not satisfy the minimum requirements for non­
arbitrary treatment of voters .... The formulation of uniform rules to de­
termine [voter] intent ... is practicable and, we conclude, necessary. 
· 
-Bush v. Gore3 
INTRODUCTION 
The tension between equality and discretion lies at the heart of 
some of the most vexing questions of constitutional law. The consider­
able discretion that many official decisionmakers wield raises the 
spectre that violations of equality norms will sometimes escape detec-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Moritz College of Law, Ohio State University. A.B. 1989, 
Harvard; J.D. 1994, Yale. - Ed. I wish to thank David Barron, Susie Blumenthal, Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Amina El-Sayad, Rick Hasen, Ken Karst, Heather Gerken, Mark Rosen­
baum, Bill Rubenstein, and David Schwartz for their comments and encouragement. Special 
thanks to Erin Bernstein for her exceptional research assistance. This Article also benefited 
from comments made during law school faculty workshops at Santa Clara, Loyola-Chicago, 
Seton Hall, Villanova, University of Houston, Washington & Lee, and Ohio State Univer­
sity. Any errors are of course mine alone. 
1. 394 U.S. 147, 151 (1969) (quoting Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 322 (1958)). 
2. 481 U.S. 279, 313 (1987) (footnote omitted). 
3. 531 U.S. 98, 105-06 (2000). 
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tion. This is true in a variety of settings, whether discretion lies over 
speakers' access to public fora, implementation of the death penalty, 
or the recounting of votes. Is the First Amendment4 violated, for 
example, when a city ordinance gives local officials broad discretion to 
determine the conditions under which political demonstrations may 
take place?5 Is equal protection denied where the absence of uniform 
standards for vote recounts gives low-level bureaucrats wide latitude 
in determining which votes to count?6 
The subject of this Article is the role of the courts in policing the 
distorting effects of discretion upon constitutional equality, particu­
larly where rights of political participation are at stake. It uses the 
term "First Amendment Equal Protection" to refer to those cases 
applying an especially searching mode of analysis where the govern­
ment threatens to undermine equality in the realm of expression.7 
At the core of First Amendment Equal Protection, I argue, is the 
democratic ideal that all citizens should have an equal opportunity to 
participate in public discourse. The cases that I include under this 
rubric exhibit a heightened sensitivity to the threat to equality posed 
by excessive official discretion,.8 This sensitivity has led to stringent 
4. Although using the term "First Amendment" throughout, this Article does not ad­
dress the religion clauses of the First Amendment but instead focuses on cases involving the 
speech, press, assembly, and petition clauses. This should not be taken as denying that the 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses have an egalitarian component. See Newdow v. 
United States Congress, 292 F.3d 597, 607-08 (9th Cir. 2002) (concluding that the words "un­
der God" in the Pledge of Allegiance violate the Establishment Clause's requirement of 
neutrality), amended by 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted sub nom. Elk Grove Uni­
fied Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 384 (Oct. 14, 2003). The egalitarian aspects of the First 
Amendment's religion clauses, however, present a subject for another day. 
5. See, e.g. , Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 91 -92 (1940); Hague v. Comm. for Indus. 
Org., 307 U.S. 496, 501 (1939). 
6. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 102-03. 
7. The use of this term is meant to recall Professor Monaghan's use of the term "First 
Amendment 'Due Process' " in his article of the same title. Henry P. Monaghan, First 
Amendment "Due Process, "  83 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1970). While Professor Monaghan 
focused on the special procedural rules that were at the time developing to safeguard liberty 
of expression, this Article focuses upon the egalitarian component of the First Amendment. 
lt takes up Kenneth Karst's insight that "the principle of equal liberty lies at the heart of the 
first amendment's protections against government regulation of the content of speech." 
Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 
20, 21 (1975) [hereinafter Karst, Equality in the First Amendment]. 
8. While libertarian rhetoric often surrounds First Amendment discourse, see, e.g. , 
Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 225 (1992); David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 
COLUM. L. REV. 334 (1991), implicit in my argument is that the egalitarian component of the 
freedom of speech has always been prominent. It thus takes issue with those who argue that 
equality "should be banished from moral and legal discourse as an explanatory norm," see, 
e.g. , Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 542 (1982), as well as 
those who contend that "the constitutional doctrine of free speech has developed without 
taking equality seriously," see, e.g. , CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 71 (1993). 
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tests designed to "smoke out" illicit motivations.9 Among the 
doctrines developed to cabin discretion in the realm of speech are 
rules requiring exceptionally clear standards where government re­
quires permission to speak in public places, and liberal rules regarding 
facial challenges, justiciability, and appellate factfinding.10 These safe­
guards against inequality in the realm of speech have for the most part 
endured, despite the changing makeup of the Court and judicial 
philosophies of its members. 
This searching mode of analysis contrasts sharply with the standard 
applied where nonspeech forms of equality are at issue. Outside the 
area of free speech, the Court generally exhibits a much greater toler­
ance for schemes that vest broad discretion in government officials. 
That is true even where the existence of such discretion may allow 
intentional group-based discrimination, including race discrimination, 
to persist undetected and thereby defy judicial remedy.11 Cases such as 
Washington v. Davis12 and McCleskey v. Kemp,13 for example, rest on a 
presumption that decisionmakers will generally exercise their discre­
tion free from racial bias. Even in the face of evidence showing a 
statistically significant disparate impact on those of a particular racial 
or ethnic group,14 the Court is loathe to find an equal protection viola­
tion without "smoking gun" evidence of illicit motive.15 Put simply, the 
Court exhibits a much greater willingness to trust government 
decisionmakers - to assume that they will exercise their discretion in 
a fair and unbiased manner - where race is concerned, than where 
speech is concerned. 
9. Cf David A. Strauss, Affirmative Action and the Public Interest, 1995 SUP. Cr. REV. 
1, 26 (describing strict scrutiny as a means by which to "smoke out" illicit motivations). 
10. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court 1996 Term - Foreword: Implement­
ing the Constitution, 111  HARV. L. REV. 54, 96-97 (1997) [hereinafter Fallon, Implementing 
the Constitution) (identifying strict First Amendment rules for licensing schemes as a means 
by which to prevent discrimination on forbidden bases); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Note, The 
Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 75 (1960) ("[T]he 
doctrine of unconstitutional indefiniteness has been used by the Supreme Court almost in­
variably for the creation of an insulating buffer zone of added protection at the peripheries 
of several Bill of Rights freedoms."). 
1 1 .  Throughout this Article, I use the term "race" to include both race and ethnicity. 
12. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
13. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
14. See, e.g. , McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 312-13 (holding that Georgia's capital sentencing 
system did not deny equal protection, despite disparities that "appear[] to correlate with 
race"). 
15. This Article does not quarrel with the general requirement that discriminatory 
intent must be shown in order to establish an equal protection violation. Indeed, it argues 
that a concern with intentional discrimination lies not only at the heart of equal protection 
cases in the area of race, but also at the root of First Amendment cases involving discretion­
ary schemes of speech regulation. 
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The critical distinction between First Amendment Equal Protec­
tion and Conventional Equal Protection lies not so much in how they 
answer the theoretical question of what constitutes a violation. The 
difference lies instead in their answer to the question of how to 
prevent and remedy such violations. 16 Thus, it is important to consider 
why these mechanisms for dealing with discretion differ so dramati­
cally. 
In considering this question, it is instructive to examine three lines 
of equal protection jurisprudence that depart from the norm: specifi­
cally, those involving jury exclusion,17 political restructuring,18 and the 
"one person, one vote" standard.19 These areas exhibit modes of 
analysis similar though not identical to First Amendment Equal Pro­
tection, reflecting the importance of safeguarding equality in realms of 
democratic participation. Even without clear evidence of discrimina­
tory intent, the Court has been willing to find an equal protection 
violation in these areas.20 
This Article argues that the decision whether to cabin official 
discretion, or, alternatively, to adopt a more deferential test in a given 
context reflects a judgment, usually a silent one, about the relative 
value of discretion and equality. The First Amendment Equal 
Protection cases suggest a new gloss on inequalities that have not 
traditionally been viewed as serious equal protection problems. These 
include not only the electoral inequalities that have received consider­
able attention in the wake of Bush v. Gore,21 but also practices such as 
incumbent-preferential gerrymandering schemes and viewpoint-based 
peremptory challenges. Considering such practices in the light cast by 
First Amendment Equal Protection cases should, I argue, cause courts 
16. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 243 (1998) ("[C]onstitutional text 
does not specify precisely which institutional, procedural, and doctrinal rules best implement 
the First Amendment's substantive values."); Guido Calabresi, The Supreme Court 1990 
Term - Foreword: Antidiscrimination and Constitutional Accountability (What the Bork­
Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARV. L. REV. 80, 84 (1991) ("[T]he definition of fundamen­
tal rights and the judicial enforcement of those rights are two very different inquiries."); 
Fallon, Implementing the Constitution, supra note 10, at 57, 60 (stating that the role of courts 
is not simply to articulate constitutional norms but also to define how those norms should be 
implemented). 
17. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977). 
18. See, e.g. , Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982). 
19. See, e.g. , Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
20. As explained in Part III.B, I view these three sets of cases as "soft purpose" cases, 
designed to smoke out intentional discrimination in cases where the existence of government 
discretion makes it hard to detect. Cf. Vikram D. Amar & Evan H. Caminker, Equal Protec­
tion, Unequal Political Burdens, and the CCRI, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1019, 1035 (1996) 
(arguing that equal protection cases involving unequal restructuring of political process are 
not best understood as "soft intent" cases). 
21. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
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to view the exercise of official discretion in these contexts more skep­
tically than Conventional Equal Protection doctrine would demand. 
* * * * 
Part I of this Article assesses various areas in which official and 
quasi-official22 decisionmakers are called upon to exercise discretion, 
and describes two equality norms that may be threatened by such 
discretion: racial equality and expressive equality. Part II traces the 
development of First Amendment Equal Protection and shows how its 
special doctrinal rules are rooted in concerns that public officials will 
misuse their discretion to suppress dissenting viewpoints. 
Part III contrasts First Amendment Equal Protection with 
"Conventional Equal Protection," a term I use to refer to the less 
searching mode of analysis generally applied to official discretion 
outside the realm of speech. Part IV discusses three areas, collectively 
referred to as "Unconventional Equal Protection,"23 which represent 
exceptions to this general rule. In these cases, the Court has adopted 
different modes of analysis, which place a higher premium on elimi­
nating inequality even where it requires some diminution of official 
discretion. 
Part V attempts to explain these divergent approaches to the 
problem of equality and discretion, noting that the equal protection 
cases that most closely resemble the First Amendment model are 
those concerning inequalities in the realm of political participation. I 
argue that this heightened sensitivity suggests a First Amendment-like 
dimension to questions of political equality that have traditionally 
been examined under the lens of the Equal Protection Clause. The 
Article closes by suggesting a new analytic framework within which to 
examine such problems as inequalities in voting systems, incumbent 
gerrymandering, and peremptory challenges, drawing from the 
approach to official discretion developed in First Amendment Equal 
Protection cases. 
22. I use the term "quasi-official" or "quasi-governmental" to include jurors, public 
defenders, civil litigants, and others who, though not generally thought of as government 
officials, are in some contexts deemed state actors and therefore subject to the constraints of 
the Constitution. See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. , 500 U.S. 614, 631 (1991) 
(holding that private litigants exercising peremptory challenges are state actors). 
23. Joel Swift uses the term "unconventional equal protection" to describe the mode of 
analysis applied by the Supreme Court in assessing discrimination in the exercise of peremp­
tory challenges. Joel H. Swift, The Unconventional Equal Protection Jurisprudence of Jury 
Selection, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 295, 296-97 (1996). This Article agrees that this area presents 
a prime example in which the Supreme Court has departed from its ordinary equal protec­
tion analysis, and attempts to explain its relationship to other areas in which the Court has 
looked with skepticism on discretionary schemes that threaten either racial or expressive 
equality. 
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I. DISCRETION AND INEQUALITY 
Discretion pervades our systems of government, from the actions 
of police officers on the beat, to verdicts handed down by juries, to 
decisions made by innumerable administrative agencies, to the manner 
in which states and localities choose to structure their political 
processes. Any system aspiring to individualized justice depends upon 
placing some degree of discretionary decisionmaking authority in 
public or quasi-public officials.24 Discretion to determine how the law 
should be applied - and to decide when not to apply the law - is 
therefore an integral component of our systems of justice.25 
This Part begins by examining the literature regarding official 
discretion in various spheres. It then provides an overview of two 
types of equality that the misuse of official discretion jeopardizes: 
expressive equality and racial equality. As I shall attempt to show, 
First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence is 
centrally occupied with how best to curb intentional discrimination 
without unduly infringing on official discretion. 
A. Defining Discretion 
Roscoe Pound defined discretion as "an authority conferred by law 
to act in certain conditions or situations in accordance with an offi­
cial's or an official agency's own considered judgment and 
conscience. "26 In a similar vein, Kenneth Culp Davis stated that " [a] 
public officer has discretion whenever the effective limits on his power 
leave him free to make a choice among possible courses of action or 
inaction. "27 
24. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Discretion, Dispensation, and Mitigation: The Problem of 
the Individual Special Case, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 925, 927 (1960) ("[T)he life of today is too 
complex and its circumstances are too varied and too variable to make possible, in practice, 
reduction to rules of everything with which the regime of justice according to law must 
deal."). 
25. See, e.g. , Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 380 (2d Cir. 
1973): 
In the absence of statutorily defined standards governing reviewability, or regulatory or 
statutory policies of prosecution, the problems inherent in the task of supervising prosecuto­
rial decisions do not lend themselves to resolution by the judiciary. The reviewing courts 
would be placed in the undesirable and injudicious posture of becoming "superprosecutors. " 
In the normal case of review of executive acts of discretion, the administrative record is 
open, public and reviewable on the basis of what it contains. The decision not to prosecute, 
on the other hand, may be based upon the insufficiency of the available evidence, in which 
event the secrecy of the grand jury and of the prosecutor's file may serve to protect the ac­
cused's reputation . . . .  
26. Pound, supra note 24, at 926. 
27. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 4 (1969). Davis's thesis was that 
" [w]here law ends, discretion begins." Id. at 3. 
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The common thread running through these two definitions is the 
idea that discretion exists where the law leaves public officials free to 
exercise their judgment. So defined, discretion permeates virtually 
every aspect of governmental functioning.28 Police officers, for 
example, enjoy considerable discretion in deciding which of the many 
drivers speeding through an intersection to stop. But discretion does 
not only come into play where the law ends. It also exists where it is 
unclear what the law prescribes and where there are no effective 
means to ensure that the law's prescription is followed. One such 
example is a jury's discretion to acquit a criminal defendant, even in 
the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt. If jurors refuse to follow 
the law and acquit despite an instruction that would in the face of the 
evidence require a guilty verdict, there is no check upon the jury's 
decision. The jury therefore enjoys discretion to acquit, even though 
the law mandates the opposite outcome. And of course, the modern 
administrative state - with its countless agencies at the local, state, 
and national level - is critically dependent upon the exercise of offi­
cial discretion to engage in both quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial 
functions.29 
Vesting discretion in public and quasi-public officials allows those 
officials to base their decisions on circumstances that by their very 
nature are impossible to codify.3° For this reason, official discretion is 
vital to ensuring "individualized justice," the ability of decisionmakers 
to take particular circumstances into account in order to achieve a fair 
28. See HANS KELSEN, THE PURE THEORY OF LAW 349 (Max Knight trans., Univ. of 
Cal. Press 1970) (1934) ("Even the most detailed command must leave to the individual exe­
cuting the command some discretion."); Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality: A 
Reply to Professor Westen, 81 MICH. L. REV. 575, 581 (1983) ("Discretion is inevitable in 
enforcing any law."). A substantial body of literature examines both the benefits and dan­
gers of official discretion. See, e.g. , DA VIS, supra note 27; Burton Atkins & Mark Pogrebin, 
Introduction: Discretionary Decision-Making in the Administration of Justice, in THE 
INVISIBLE JUSTICE SYSTEM: DISCRETION AND THE LAW (Burton Adkins & Mark Pogrebin 
eds., 2nd ed. 1982); Pound, supra note 24, at 926. 
29. Jerry Mashaw describes the tension between the enforcement of legal rights and the 
administration of policy as follows: 
In a legal culture largely oriented toward court enforcement of individual legal rights, "ad­
ministration" has always seemed as antithetical to "law" as "bureaucracy" is to "justice." 
Law focuses on rights, administration on policy. Rights, if enforced, must limit policy, 
thereby stifling administration. When policy is wanted, the law's typical response is to create 
no-right, no-law policy enclaves where discretion can flourish. But permitting uncontrolled 
discretion generates a demand for law, and the competitive cycle of law and policy begins 
anew. 
JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 1 (1983). 
30. See, e.g. , Atkins & Pogrebin, supra note 28, at 3 ("[D]iscretion is important because 
it maintains a flexible, individualized system of justice. Nevertheless it is a system vulnerable 
to abuse."). 
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result.31 Nevertheless, the existence of discretion creates a substantial 
risk that government actors will contravene equality norms. Left to 
their own devices, the various entities that exercise discretionary 
decisionmaking authority - including police officers, bureaucrats, 
judges, juries, and even the electorate - may base their decisions on 
improper considerations. 
From a constitutional standpoint, two such considerations warrant 
special attention. The first is that public officials may misuse their 
discretion either to target speech based on the messages or ideas 
sought to be conveyed. The second is that official decisionmakers may 
misuse their discretion to discriminate based on race or ethnicity. In 
both contexts, requiring greater precision in the criteria that guide 
decisionmakers' judgment decreases the likelihood that they will base 
their decisions on constitutionally impermissible considerations.32 Yet, 
in some circumstances, it may be impossible or imprudent to demand 
such precise standards because of the need to preserve official discre­
tion. In those cases, the pertinent question becomes how discretion 
can be managed or cabined so as to minimize the threat of inequality. 
The governmental and quasi-governmental players vested with 
discretion that is subject to misuse include: 
• Prosecutors deciding whether to bring charges and whether to en­
ter into a plea bargain:33 May prosecutors exercise their charging 
discretion to target only those draft dodgers who are vocal in 
their opposition, in an effort to suppress dissent?34 May they ex-
31. Id.; see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991 Term - Foreword: The 
Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58-59 (1992) (noting that the 
rules/standards debate turns on how much discretion is afforded to decisionmakers). 
32. See Spencer Overton, Rule�� Standards, and Bush v. Gore: Form and the Law of 
Democracy, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 65, 65 (2002) ("More flexible standards give deci­
sionmakers the discretion to protect political participation in particular contexts, but this 
discretion may also allow a decisionmaker's biases to enter the political process."). 
33. There is an abundance of scholarship regarding the benefits and dangers of prosecu­
torial discretion. See, e.g. , Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 
U. CHI. L. REV. 50 (1968) (discussing hazards posed by prosecutorial discretion in plea bar­
gaining process); Richard Bloom, Prosecutorial Discretion, 87 GEO. L.J. 1267 (1999) (sum­
marizing case authority on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion); Peter J. Hennig, Prose­
cutorial Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 713, 722-27 (1999) 
(analyzing tests for determining whether prosecutors have exercised their broad authority in 
an unconstitutional manner, and arguing that subjective intent should be irrelevant to this 
inquiry); Wayne Lafave, The Prosecutor's Discretion in The United States, 18 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 532 (1970) (examining prosecutorial discretion and dangers of misuse); Cynthia Kwei 
Yung Lee, Prosecutorial Discretion, Substantial Assistance, and the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 42 UCLA L. REV. 105, 121-30 (1994) (criticizing the Sentencing Guidelines' 
grant of discretionary power to prosecutors); Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in 
an Adversary System, 1992 BYU L. REV. 669, 704 (asserting that while prosecutorial discre­
tion is both "unavoidable and desirable," prosecutors must impose upon themselves a re­
sponsibility to exercise that discretion only where they are assured of guilt beyond a reason' 
able doubt). 
34. In Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985), the Supreme Court rejected a 
selective-prosecution challenge to "a passive enforcement policy under which the 
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ercise their discretion to investigate and prosecute only African 
Americans for cocaine trafficking offenses because they believe 
that African Americans are more likely to be convicted?35 
• Police officers determining whom among the many violating the 
traffic laws should be stopped and arrested:36 May police officers 
stop speeding drivers based upon a racial profile showing that 
Latinos on that interstate are more likely to be trafficking in 
drugs?37 May they choose, out of a sense of patriotism, to refrain 
from stopping those with American flags flying from their 
antennas? 
• Judges determining what sentences should be given to people 
convicted of crimes: May judges give enhanced sentences to those 
who harbor political views hostile to the United States 
Government? May a judge give a particularly harsh sentence to a 
white teenager from an affluent suburb, viewing his conduct to be 
inexcusable in light of the advantages he has enjoyed?38 
• Civil attorneys deciding how to exercise peremptory challenges to 
prospective jurors: May a civil defendant strike black jurors on 
the belief that they tend to favor more generous judgments 
against large corporations? May a plaintiff strike all libertarian 
Government prosecutes only those who report themselves as having violated the law, or who 
are reported by others." Id. at 600. Relying on the "broad discretion" of the government to 
decide whom to prosecute, the Court held that the policy violated neither the Equal Protec­
tion Clause nor the First Amendment. Id. at 607-14. 
35. In United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996), the Supreme Court reversed an 
order requiring discovery in a selective prosecution claim. The district court had permitted 
discovery, where the Federal Public Defenders office provided evidence that all of the 
twenty-four crack cocaine cases tried by the U.S. Attorney's Office in 1991 involved African 
Americans. The Supreme Court held that, in order to obtain discovery on a selective­
prosecution claim, the defendant must show that the government did not prosecute similarly 
situated persons of a different race. Id. at 470. 
36. The subject of police discretion to enforce and to choose not to enforce the laws is 
one that has received considerable scholarly attention. See, e.g. , Joseph Goldstein, Police 
Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration 
of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543 (1960) (explaining how police wield discretionary power through 
their decisions whether to enforce the criminal law). Other scholars have emphasized the 
values served by police officers' exercise of "common sense" discretion. See, e.g. , KENNETH 
CULP DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION 62 (1975). For more recent studies of how the exercise of 
necessary police discretion may be subjected to more effective public scrutiny, see Debra 
Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, 
and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551 (1997), and Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 
85 IOWA L. REV. 1107 (2000). 
37. See, e.g. , Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 620 (7th Cir. 2001). 
38. For a discussion of the discretion allowed to judges sentencing criminal defendants 
under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, see Ian Weinstein, The Discontinuous Tradition of 
Sentencing Discretion: Koon's Failure to Recognize the Reshaping of Judicial Discretion Un­
der the Guidelines, 79 B.U. L. REV. 493, 506-15 (1999). 
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jurors out of belief that they tend to favor corporate interests 
over those of consumers?39 
• Juries deciding guilt and meting out punishment:40 May jurors 
consider the race of the victim in determining whether to impose 
the death penalty? May they choose not to impose the death 
penalty where the defendant and the victim are both white, 
because they do not view that crime to be as egregious as a cross­
race murder?41 
• The president of the United States deciding whether to grant 
pardons: May the potential pardonees' race or their support for 
the president's political party play a role in his decision?42 
• Municipalities determining whether to close streets for marches 
and parades, and what fees to impose for those events: May they 
choose to target for protection racial minorities marching in the 
streets without a required permit? May they charge greater fees 
for a white supremacist group preaching a message of racial in­
tolerance, likely to generate a hostile response?43 
• Administrative agencies charged with setting policy and with 
applying policies to individual cases:44 May an administrative law 
39. See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 769 (1995) (per curiam) ("[A) 'legitimate reason' 
[to strike a juror) is not a reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not deny equal 
protection."). 
40. For a discussion of the dangers of placing unguided capital-sentencing discretion in 
juries, see Scott E. Erlich, Comment, The Jury Override: A Blend of Politics and Death, 45 
AM. U. L. REV. 1403 (1996). Much of the contemporary scholarly debate regarding the dis­
cretion vested in juries relates to jury nullification (i.e., the power of juries to disregard laws 
they believe to be unjust and to make decisions in accordance with their collective con­
science). See, e.g. , Nancy J. King, Silencing Nullification Advocacy Inside the Jury Room and 
Outside the Courtroom, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 433 (1998); Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury 
Nullification, 82 VA. L. REV. 253, 257-58 (1996); Alan Scheflin & Jon Van Dyke, Jury Nulli­
fication: The Contours of a Controversy, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1980, at 51 ;  
Ran Zev Schijanovich, Note, The Second Circuit's Attack on Jury Nullification in United 
States v. Thomas: In Disregard of the Law and the Evidence, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 1275 
(1999). 
41. See Chaka M. Patterson, Race and the Death Penalty: The Tension Between Indi­
vidualized Justice and Racially Neutral Standards, 2 TEX. WESLEY AN L. REV. 45, 80-94 
(1995). 
42. See, e.g., Greg B. Smith, Clinton Library Fundraiser Helped Perjurer Get Pardon, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2001, at A2 (" 'I was aware of the . . .  rule(s), but I was also aware that 
the president has discretion,' said (former White House counsel Bernard) Nussbaum, who 
handled the case for free."). 
43. See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992). 
44. There is a voluminous body of scholarship addressing the forms of discretion exer­
cised by administrative agencies and the ways in which that discretion may be managed. See, 
e.g., GARY C. BRYNER, BUREAUCRATIC DISCRETION: LAW AND POLICY IN FEDERAL 
REGULATORY AGENCIES 6 (1987) (defining "two basic kinds of discretionary authority 
given to administrative agencies: (1) authority to make legislative-like policy decisions, and. 
(2) authority to decide how general policies apply to specific cases"); DAVIS, supra note 27, 
at 23-24 (describing problems of discretionary justice that arise in both administrative adju-
June 2003] First Amendment Equal Protection 2419 
judge's racial biases be allowed to affect the determination 
whether social security benefits should be awarded?45 May agen­
cies exercise their rulemaking discretion to craft policies designed 
to benefit politically well-connected interest groups?46 
• The electorate or legislature determining how to structure the 
government: May the people enact a referendum imposing spe­
cial barriers on those who seek to enact race-remedial programs, 
such as school desegregation?47 May the legislature impose spe­
cial barriers on those who wish to engage in certain forms of 
speech, such as "raves" known to be associated with drug activ­
ity?4s 
These examples suggest the range of areas in which discretion may 
lead to inequality, and elucidate the difficulties in policing the exercise 
of official discretion. For even if one believes that the answer to some 
of the above questions is no - and even if one believes that a no 
answer is constitutionally mandated - the question of how to enforce 
such a prohibition must still be answered. 
In perhaps no other area has there been greater scholarly attention 
to the relationship between discretion and inequality than in the litera­
ture examining the operation of the criminal justice system. More than 
forty years ago, Joseph Goldstein described the enormous discretion­
ary power that street-level law enforcement officers wield through 
their decisions whether to enforce the criminal law.49 While there is 
now consensus that vesting some degree of discretion in police agen-
dication and rulemaking); JOEL F. HANDLER, THE CONDITIONS OF DISCRETION 1 1-12 
(1986) (arguing that achieving just administration depends not only on the existence of dis­
cretion, but on using it to promote "shared decision making between autonomous, responsi­
ble participants"); ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION AND PUBLIC POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 
(Douglas H. Shumavon & H. Kenneth Hibbeln eds., 1986) (collection of articles studying 
administrative discretion and attempts to control its misuse). 
45. See LINDA G. MILLS, A PENCHANT FOR PREJUDICE: UNRA YEUNG BIAS IN 
JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 4-5 (1999) (finding bias based on race and poverty in adminis­
trative law judge decisions regarding social security disability benefits). See generally 
MASHAW, supra note 29 (assessing the quality of justice in social security disability adjudica­
tions). 
46. See BRYNER, supra note 44, at 10 ("Administrative rule making . . .  represents the 
kind of administrative action that is most in need of external checks and constraints, because 
of its legislative nature. It has become a focal point for criticisms for government regulation 
and the broad discretionary powers enjoyed by administrative bodies."). 
47. See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 487 (1982) (striking down a 
Washington initiative prohibiting local school districts from maintaining voluntary desegre­
gation programs); Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 110 F.3d 1431, 1448 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(upholding a California initiative prohibiting local governmental entities from maintaining 
voluntary affirmative action programs), amended by 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997). 
· 
48. See Assembly Bill 1941, 2001-2002 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002) (imposing special permit 
requirements on promoters of any "rave party"). 
49 . .  Goldstein, supra note 36. 
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cies is both desirable and unavoidable,50 more recent scholarship has 
argued that mechanisms should exist to hold police agencies account­
able for the exercise of their discretion. Erik Luna, for example, 
emphasizes that the legitimacy of democratic government depends on 
police discretion being exercised in a manner that is "open to the elec­
torate."51 For police departments to operate behind a veil of secrecy 
contravenes fundamental principles of self-governance and threatens 
the rights of minorities.52 The debate over racial profiling - and the , 
means by which to stop it - reflects increasing concern with the 
discriminatory enforcement of criminal laws by police officers vested 
with broad discretion over whom to stop, detain, and arrest.53 
Because the power to be lenient encompasses the power to 
discriminate,54 one might ask why discretion in each of these areas 
should not be eliminated entirely. If specific enough rules were 
prescribed to dictate how discretion should be exercised, one might 
argue, the potentially discriminatory exercise of discretion could be 
curtailed if not eliminated. The problem with this argument is the 
impossibility of crafting rules specific enough to deal with the many 
50. See SAMUEL WALKER, THE POLICE IN AMERICA 209 (2d ed. 1992) (stating that 
while Goldstein concluded that police discretion should be eliminated, "[v]irtually all other 
experts have rejected the idea of abolishing discretion"). 
51. Luna, supra note 36, at 1 108. 
52. Id. at 1132. Professor Luna's two c;oncerns regarding the consequences of police de­
partments operating under the radar screen recall those upon which Madison focuses in , 
Federalist 51 : first, that government cannot be held accountable to the electorate it is sup­
posed to serve; and, second, that the rights of numerical minorities will be placed in jeop­
ardy. THE FEDERALIST No. 51,  at 291 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2d ed. 1999); 
see also AMAR, supra note 16, at 21, 237 (describing the twin concerns of Federalist 51 as 
"protecting the people against unrepresentative government" and "protecting minorities 
from 'factional' majority tyranny"). 
53. See, e.g., DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE 16-62 (1999) (surveying evidence of ra­
cial discrimination by police and arguing that courts have failed to exercise adequate over­
sight); SAMUEL WALKER ET AL., THE COLOR OF JUSTICE 100 (1996) (finding evidence of 
discrimination against African Americans in making arrests); John R. Hepburn, Race and 
the Decision to Arrest: An Analysis of Warrants Issued, 15 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 54, 66-
69 (1978) (finding racial disparity in arrests between whites and nonwhites); Sheri Lynn 
Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214 (1983); Tracy Maclin, 
Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 344-54 (1998) (analyzing evidence 
that police officers disproportionately target African-American and Latino motorists); 
Douglas A. Smith et al., Equity and Discretionary Justice: The Influence of Race on Police 
Arrest Decisions, 75 J, CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 234, 246-49 (1984) (finding police are 
generally more likely to take action when the victim is white than black, but finding no dif­
ference based on the race of the suspect); Christopher Hall, Note, Challenging Selective En­
forcement of Traffic Regulations After the Disharmonic Convergence: Whren v. United 
States, United States v. Armstrong, and the Evolution of Police Discretion, 76 TEXAS L. 
REV. 1083, 1116-23 (1998) (proposing an application of exclusionary rule to police practices 
that have a discriminatory effect); Carl J. Schifferle, Note, After Whren v. United States: 
Applying the Equal Protection Clause to Racially Discriminatory Enforcement of the Law, 2 ' 
MICH. L. & POL'Y REV. 159, 161-62 (1997) (explaining how broad police discretion gives rise 
to a specter of discriminatory enforcement against racial minorities). 
54. DAVIS, supra note 27, at 231-32. 
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different factual scenarios that official decisionmakers confront. Even 
if one believes that the answer to most, if not all, of the above ques­
tions should be no - i.e., that the government entities in question 
should not exercise their discretion in the ways indicated - the ques­
tion of how to ensure that such discretion is not exercised remains. 
Many discretionary decisions seem, by their very nature, to defy 
judicial review. And too closely circumscribing the exercise of discre­
tion, even if possible, would risk missing aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances that call for special treatment in the individual case.ss 
Preserving some discretion therefore is essential not only to the 
efficient operation of government, but also to the promotion of indi­
vidualized justice.s6 Entrusting public officials with the power to make 
individualized judgments comes at a great price, however, where risks 
of racial bias or the suppression of disfavored ideas are at play.s7 Thus, 
there must be some limitation placed upon the exercise of official 
discretion.s8 But in what circumstances should courts restrict official 
discretion? And how should they enforce such restrictions? 
B. Two Kinds of Equality 
While the exercise of governmental discretion may lead to various 
evils, the focus of this Article is upon two that are of special concern: 
first, that discretion will lead to intentional discrimination against 
speakers based upon their ideas or message; and second, that it will 
lead to intentional discrimination based upon race.s9 There are 
substantial differences of opinion over the character of the equality 
that the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause demand, 
differences that correspond to conflicting theories of what values these 
constitutional mandates should serve.60 It is not my purpose, at this 
point, to adjudicate these differences. What is important, for my 
55. See Sullivan, supra note 31, at 66-69. 
56. E.g. , Patterson, supra note 41, at 53. 
57. See id . 
. 
58. See Pound, supra note 24, at 927 ("[C)areful limitation of the cases in which discre­
tion may be resorted to is clearly indicated."). 
59. I limit my discussion here to racial discrimination because it is often understood as 
the archetype of group-based discrimination forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause. The 
insights this Article attempts to draw regarding racial discrimination, however, may be 
applicable to other forms of discrimination as well. 
60. For an extensive discussion of the constitutional ideal of equality that considers both 
expressive and racial equality, see generally Kenneth Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. 
REV. 245 (1983). Professor Karst traces the development of constitutional equality, stressing 
the "'moral ideal' of equal citizenship" as a guiding force. Id. at 288 (citation omitted); see 
also KENNETH KARST, LAW'S PROMISE, LAW'S EXPRESSION 189 (1993) (viewing the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 , preservation of abortion rights, and limitations on school prayer as "re­
flecting the centrality and the endurance of the principle of equal citizenship in American 
law and the American civic culture"). 
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purposes, is to recognize that these contrasting theories share a com­
mitment to some form of equality, in the realms of both race and 
speech. At least for the moment, a relatively thin conception of what 
these equalities entail will suffice.61 
The limitation of this approach, as I explain below, is that it cannot 
deal with problems upon which differing conceptions of constitutional 
equality come into conflict. For example, it cannot resolve the conflict 
over affirmative action, between those who see the Equal Protection 
Clause's core command as colorblindness and those who see it as anti­
subordination. Nor can it resolve the conflict over limits on campaign 
expenditures, between those who see the First Amendment's under­
lying rationale as protection of individual autonomy and those who 
see its rationale as promotion of a more balanced public discourse. 
This approach is nevertheless adequate for my present purposes, 
which is to define broadly shared equality norms, and then to consider 
how these norms are to be reconciled with the countervailing values 
served by discretion.62 
1. Racial Equality 
Race discrimination is the archetype of the group-based discrimi­
nations that the Equal Protection Clause was enacted to forbid. Since 
Korematsu v. United States,63 the Supreme Court has held that racial 
classifications are subject to "the most rigid scrutiny."64 There are of 
course profoundly different visions of what the Fourteenth Amend­
ment's commandment of racial equality requires and, accordingly, of 
whether the Equal Protection Clause requires heightened scrutiny of 
all race-based classifications. At one end of the spectrum, some would 
view virtually any race-conscious government action as constitution-
61. The approach taken here to the development of constitutional principles draws upon 
John Rawls's idea of "overlapping consensus." See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 
15 (1993) [hereinafter RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM]; see also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY 
OF JUSTICE 340 (rev. ed. 1999) (hereinafter RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE]. Rawls endeav­
ors to develop principles of justice that would be deemed acceptable by those adhering to a 
wide range of comprehensive moral, religious, and philosophical doctrines. RAWLS, 
POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra, at 15. Similarly, my starting point is to articulate norms of 
equality upon which those adhering to different (and conflicting) constitutional theories 
might agree. I then examine whether and how these norms are enforced when they come 
into conflict with the countervailing values served by official discretion. 
62. See Sullivan, supra note 31 ,  at 62 (describing the argument that rules promote formal 
equality by limiting decisionmakers' discretion to act on bias or arbitrariness). But see id. at 
67 (describing the countervailing argument that more loosely written standards may pro­
mote substantive equality better than rules). 
63. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
64. Race-based classifications that target both whites and people of color, such as mis­
cegenation bans or those which require racial segregation, are also subject to high-level scru­
tiny. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1967) (striking down Virginia's law 
forbidding whites from marrying non-Caucasians). 
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ally infirm, no matter what group is burdened and what the purposes 
of those distinctions might be.65 According to this view, rooted in 
Justice Harlan's famous declaration in Plessy v. Ferguson that the 
"Constitution is color-blind,"66 the fundamental principle underlying 
the Equal Protection Clause is equal treatment regardless of race. 
Proponents of the equal-treatment view would therefore regard race­
conscious affirmative action programs - designed, for example, to 
increase the diversity of universities or to redress the unequal distribu­
tion of public contracts - as inherently invidious, because they violate 
the equal treatment principle. 
At the other end of the spectrum are those who hold that the 
essential principle underlying the Equal Protection Clause is a prohibi­
tion against subordination.67 If equal treatment is the core principle 
underlying the first view of equal protection, then equal status might 
be viewed as the core principle animating the second view. Proponents 
of the antisubordination view would therefore look much more 
favorably on race-conscious affirmative action or desegregation pro­
grams aimed at redressing existing inequalities in the opportunities 
available to persons of color.68 
Despite the differences between the two theories of equal protec­
tion - one focused on colorblindness and the other on antisubordina­
tion - there is broad consensus that intentional race discrimination is 
highly suspect if not always impermissible.69 There is, for example, 
65. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring 
in the judgment) (disagreeing with the plurality's suggestion that "state and local govern­
ments may in some circumstances discriminate on the basis of race in order (in a broad 
sense) 'to ameliorate the effects of past discrimination' " (internal citation omitted)). 
66. 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
67. See, e.g. , Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 107, 146 (1976); Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal 
Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1007 (1986); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Consti­
tution ls Co/or-Blind", 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 ,  63 (1991); Allan David Freeman, Legitimizing 
Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court 
Doctrine, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE 
MOVEMENT 29, 35 (1995). 
68. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 361 (1978) (Brennan, J., concur­
ring in part and dissenting in part) (stating the view that race-conscious affirmative action 
should be permitted so long as there is "an important and articulated purpose for its use"). 
The focus of this Article is not on the cases, such as those involving affirmative action or 
"majority-minority" voting districts, in which these two theories of racial equality conflict. It 
is instead on those cases in which the equal protection norm that these two conceptions 
share comes into conflict with the countervailing value of preserving official discretion. 
69. Of course, many would argue that the Equal Protection Clause should prohibit not 
only intentional discrimination, but also practices having a disparate impact. See, e.g. , Theo­
dore Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adju­
dication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36, 40-41 (1977). This Article does not take up this theoretical 
debate. It instead assumes that the Equal Protection Clause proscribes intentional discrimi­
nation, while leaving open the question whether it should also be read to proscribe other 
practices. 
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agreement that government should not exclude citizens from jury 
venires on the basis of ethnicity; that it should not pass laws designed 
to handicap racial minorities' access to the political process; and that 
police officers should not selectively target those of a certain race for 
enforcement of traffic laws. 
Of course, defining the constitutional presumption against inten­
tional race discrimination tells us nothing about the principal subject 
of my inquiry here: the mechanisms by which this norm should be 
enforced without sacrificing the values served by official discretion.70 It 
also does not answer the important question of how courts should go : 
about determining whether intentional race discrimination is present, 
what sorts of evidence they might consider or whether special 
prophylactic remedies should be developed to stop such discrimina­
tion. 
The dangers and difficulties of policing official discretion are most 
prominent in cases where officials may be engaging in intentional 
discrimination, despite the absence of a facial classification. Settled 
equal protection doctrine subjects to heightened scrutiny government 
action that is intended to disadvantage one group in comparison with 
another. Mere disproportionate impact on people of one racial group 
compared to others is not enough, however, as Washington v. Davis71 
and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Develop­
ment Corp.72 famously hold. 
Determining whether intentional discrimination has occurred can 
be a thorny problem, especially when considered in light of the con­
siderable discretion that public officials wield in the performance of 
their duties. In the absence of smoking gun evidence of intentional 
discrimination, for example, how should courts determine whether 
police officers are exercising their discretion to discriminate against 
drivers of a particular race? How should courts determine whether 
voting districts have been drawn to prevent minorities from electing 
70. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 5 (2001) 
(contending that the Supreme Court's role is not simply to divine the meaning of the 
Constitution, but also to "devise[) and then implement[] strategies for enforcing constitu­
tional values"). 
71. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). In Washington v. Davis, black applicants for employment as 
police officers in the District of Columbia brought suit under the Equal Protection Clause, 
claiming that the District's recruiting procedures, including a written test, were racially dis­
criminatory. Id. at 229, 232-33. Rejecting plaintiffs' claim that the racially disparate impact of 
the test alone could show an equal protection violation, the Court stated "the basic equal 
protection principle that the invidious quality of a Jaw claimed to be racially discriminatory 
must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose." Id. at 240. Washington v. 
Davis famously rejected the argument that disparate impact was sufficient to make out a 
prima facie equal protection case, saying that such evidence was "not irrelevant, but it is not 
the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution." Id. 
at 242. 
72. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
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any candidates? How should courts assess discrimination in a prosecu­
tor's exercise of peremptory challenges? Should evidence of dispro­
portionate impact be sufficient to make out a prima facie case in any 
of these contexts? If so, how should it be measured? And what is 
needed to rebut the prima facie case? 
The norm against intentional race discrimination does not by itself 
answer any of these questions. It does, however, provide a starting 
point for assessing . the dangers to racial equality posed by official 
discretion, and the mechanisms that have been developed to deal with 
this threat. 
2. Expressive Equality 
It may be less obvious that the First Amendment mandates equal­
ity. Yet the general principle that government, when it regulates 
expression, should do so evenhandedly is a staple of First Amendment 
jurisprudence.73 The statement that perhaps best captures the central 
place of First Amendment equality comes from Justice Marshall's 
opinion for the Court in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley: 
" [A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has 
no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its 
subject matter, or its content."74 While this may be an overstatement, 
given the areas in which speech can be regulated based on content,75 
Justice Marshall's words state the general rule of content and view­
point neutrality in the regulation of speech.76 The rationale behind the 
rule is that government discrimination of this sort "raises the specter 
that the government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints 
from the marketplace. "77 
73. See, e.g., RAV v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) ("The First Amendment 
generally prevents government from proscribing speech, or even expressive conduct, 
because of disapproval of the ideas expressed. Content-based regulations are presumptively 
invalid." (internal citations omitted)). 
74. 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (internal citations omitted); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-18, at 941 (2d ed. 1988) (citing Mosley for the 
"basic requirement that the government may not aim at the communicative impact of ex­
pressive conduct without triggering . . .  exacting and usually fatal scrutiny"). 
75. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 32-33 n.13 (1973) ("Obscene material may be 
validly regulated by a State in the exercise of its traditional local power to protect the gen­
eral welfare of its population despite some possible incidental effect on the flow of such 
materials across state lines." (internal citations omitted)); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254, 297-98 (1964) (stating that plaintiffs may be allowed to recover tort damages for 
defamation when a defendant's statements were made either "with knowledge" that they 
were false, or with "reckless disregard" of the statements' veracity). 
76. For a restriction on speech to be considered "content-neutral," it must be "justified 
without reference to the content of the regulated speech." Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976). 
77. Simon & Shuster v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 1 16 
(1991); see also Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) ("Laws of this sort pose 
the inherent risk that the Government seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but 
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Like the Equal Protection Clause, then, the First Amendment · 
looks with disfavor on laws that facially discriminate.7s While the First 
Amendment is not exclusively concerned with equality, there is a 
widely shared consensus that equality - particularly the idea that 
government should not favor some speakers over others because of 
their point of view - lies at its core. As Kenneth Karst has observed, 
"the principle of equal liberty lies at the heart of the first amendment's 
protections against government regulation of the content of speech."79 
While acknowledging that absolute equality in the realm of speech is 
impossible as a practical matter, Professor Karst recognizes that the 
principle of equal liberty lies at the heart of First Amendment deci­
sions limiting government officials' discretion to dictate whether 
speech will be permitted.so 
Just as the Equal Protection Clause frowns on laws that draw · 
express racial classifications, the First Amendment frowns on laws that · 
draw express viewpoint-based distinctions.s1 Beyond that, however, 
considerable disagreement exists over precisely what sort of equality 
the First Amendment demands. 
One theory sees the First Amendment's fundamental purpose as 
the protection of individual autonomy, and views with great skepti-
to suppress unpopular ideas or information or to manipulate the public debate through coer­
cion rather than persuasion."). 
78. Of course, the First Amendment is not exclusively concerned with discrimination 
against disfavored messages or ideas. There are some restrictions on speech, for example, 
that the government may not impose, no matter how evenhandedly it does so. Indeed, the 
classic First Amendment protections are more often conceived of in libertarian rather than 
egalitarian terms - that is, as things that the government may not do to anyone, rather than 
as things they must do (or refrain from doing) equally to all. See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. 
Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (Roberts, J., concurring) ("Wherever the title of streets and 
parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time 
out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thought between citi­
zens, and discussing public questions."); see also Owen M. Fiss, Silence on the Street Corner, 
26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 1-3 (1992) (hereinafter Fiss, Silence on the Street Corner] (dis­
cussing the silencing of the streetcorner speaker as the paradigmatic First Amendment viola­
tion). 
79. Karst, Equality in the First Amendment, supra note 7, at 21. 
80. Id. at 29. 
81 . Even in this area, however, there are significant differences, as RA V v. City of St. 
Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), exemplifies. In that case, the Court struck down a St. Paul ordi­
nance that drew a content-based distinction within a category of generally proscribable 
speech, namely "fighting words." Id. at 395-96. In particular, the ordinance prohibited the 
burning of a cross on private property, if done to convey a message of racial hatred. Id. at 
380. The majority opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, held that the prohibition against 
content-based and viewpoint-based discrimination applies even within categories of gener­
ally proscribable speech, such as defamation, obscenity, and libel. Id. at 390-94. In his con­
curring opinion, Justice Stevens vigorously disagreed, and would have held that the govern­
ment was free to draw content-based (and one would presume even viewpoint-based) 
distinctions within such categories. Id. at 413-26 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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cism any governmental intrusion into this protected sphere.82 Charles 
Fried summarizes this theory's underlying premise as follows: 
"Freedom of expression is properly based on autonomy: the Kantian 
right of each individual to be treated as an end in himself, an equal 
sovereign citizen in the kingdom of ends with a right to the greatest 
liberty compatible with the like liberty of all others."83 Proponents of 
the individual-autonomy school tend to focus on negative liberty -
th�t is, on the idea that freedom of speech is best promoted when the 
government adopts a hands-off approach to the regulation of speech. 
But while this vision of the First Amendment might be characterized 
as libertarian, or more precisely, negative libertarian,84 what is striking 
about Professor Fried's formulation is its emphasis upon equality as 
well as liberty.85 To be sure, Professor Fried's conception of the equal­
ity that the First Amendment requires may well differ from Professor 
Karst's, but equal liberty is integral to both conceptions.86 
A conflicting theory holds that the First Amendment's principal 
purpose is not to protect individual autonomy or liberty, but to 
advance collective self-determination. Associated with Alexander 
Meiklejohn, this theory privileges political speech and affords protec­
tion to other forms of speech only insofar as they must be protected to 
advance the goal of producing an informed electorate.87 It focuses less 
82. See, e.g., Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to 
Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 225, 233-34 (1992); Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of 
Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 212-14 (1972). As Richard Fallon points out, First 
Amendment theorists employ varying conceptions of autonomy. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two 
Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875, 876-79 (1994) [hereinafter Fallon, Two Senses of 
Autonomy]. Professors Scanlon and Fried exemplify the conception that Professor Fallon 
refers to as "negative libertarian." Id. at 880. 
83. Fried, supra note 82, at 233 (emphasis added and internal citation omitted). 
84. See Fallon, Two Senses of Autonomy, supra note 82, at 880-83 (describing negative 
libertarian conceptions of autonomy). 
85. See Charles Fried, Perfect Freedom, Perfect Justice, 78 B.U. L. REV. 717, 735 (1998) 
(defining our shared "capacity to respond to argument and evidence" as the "true marriage 
of reason as equality" underlying the freedom of speech). 
86. For Professor Karst's conception of equality, see Karst, Equality in the First 
Amendment, supra note 7, at 26-35. Professor Karst's approach draws on both conceptions of 
speech equality that I discuss in the text. His insistence that the fundamental value served by 
expressive equality is "the dignity of the individual" suggests an emphasis on the rights of 
individual speakers to be treated as equals, typically an argument of the "autonomy" school. 
On the other hand, there are aspects of Professor Karst's view that seem to emphasize the 
interests of listeners in having access to a marketplace of ideas in which a diversity of views 
are available. He notes, for instance, that the equality principle supports claims of access to 
the media, because they tend to promote a diversity of views, id. at 48, a sentiment more 
characteristic of those who view promotion of a balanced public debate as the First Amend­
ment's preeminent value. 
87. As Alexander Meiklejohn famously put it: "I believe, as a teacher, that the people 
do need novels and dramas and paintings and poems 'because they will be called upon to 
vote.' " Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 
245, 263; see also ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 25-28 (1960) (hereinaf­
ter MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM]. 
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on ensuring each individual the right to speak than on making sure 
that a spectrum of viewpoints are available to the listening audience.BB 
This school understands the First Amendment not simply as a nega­
tive libertarian command that government should butt out where 
speech is concerned, but also as a positive libertarian command that 
governmental action is sometimes necessary to promote a "rich public 
discourse. "B9 
The structure of the debate between these two competing theories 
of expressive equality resembles that of the debate between the two 
competing theories of racial equality. Both areas present a conflict 
between what might be termed an atomistic vision of equality (one 
that tends to focus on differences in the government's treatment of 
individuals) and a systemic vision of equality (one that tends to focus 
on the impact of government action or inaction upon groups, defined 
either by shared race or shared viewpoints).90 
As in the area of racial equality, the two competing theories often 
yield the same conclusion. In the area of race, the colorblindness and 
antisubordination views lead to the same conclusion in dealing with 
traditional equal protection problems, such as Jim Crow segregation, 
miscegenation laws, and employment discrimination, but collide in 
areas such as race-based affirmative action. So too, in the First 
Amendment area, the competing visions of expressive equality lead to 
88. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 87, at 25-28. Jerome Barron took 
up Professor Meiklejohn's emphasis on this point, arguing that a laissez-faire approach to 
speech is inadequate to ensure a robust marketplace of ideas. Jerome A. Barron, Access to 
the Press - A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L REV. 1641, 1656 (1967) ("As a 
constitutional theory for the communication of ideas, laissez faire is manifestly irrelevant."). 
Asserting that the development of the mass media rendered the traditional negative­
libertarian approach to the First Amendment obsolete, Professor Barron argued for the 
creation of a right of access to print and broadcast media, so as to promote the expression of 
diverse viewpoints that would otherwise be repressed. More recently, this view finds expres­
sion in the work of Owen Fiss, who advocates the advancement of a public discourse that, in 
Justice Brennan's words, is "uninhibited, robust, and wide open." Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech 
and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1407 (1986) [hereinafter Fiss, Free Speech and 
Social Structure] (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (internal quo­
tation marks omitted)); see also Owen M. Fiss, Freedom and Feminism, 80 GEO. L.J. 2041, 
2043-46 (1992). Other contemporary exponents of this general theoretical view urge using 
the First Amendment as a means to advance race or gender equality. See, e.g. , CATHARINE 
A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 140 (1987) (suggesting those who really care 
about the First Amendment "should turn their efforts to getting speech for people . . .  who 
have not been able to speak or to get themselves heard"). The relationship between racial 
equality and the First Amendment has also received considerable attention from critical race 
theorist scholars. See, e.g. , MARI MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RAC� 
THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993). 
89. See Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, supra note 88, at 1410. 
90. Greg Magarian uses the terms "public rights" and "private rights" to describe a 
similar distinction in the First Amendment cases addressing regulations of political parties. 
See Gregory P. Magarian, Regulating Political Parties Under a "Public Rights " First Amend­
ment, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1939 (2003). Professor Magarian uses the term "private 
rights" to describe what I here refer to as the "atomistic" conception of the First Amend­
ment, and "public rights" for what I call the "systemic" conception. Id. at 1947, 1972. 
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identical conclusions with respect to traditional free speech problems, 
such as government action that prevents political dissenters from 
expressing their views. Some of the most contentious First Amend­
ment debates, however, arise in areas where the "individual auton­
omy" and "public discourse" theories tend toward opposing conclu­
sions. The debate over campaign finance reform illuminates the clash 
between these competing theories of expressive equality.91 
Without minimizing the significant differences between these 
schools of thought, what is most striking is their shared commitment to 
equality. For Professor Fried, for example, freedom of expression 
is integral to the right of each person to be treated as an "equal 
sovereign citizen;"92 for Professor Meiklejohn, the "reason for this 
equality . . .  lies deep in the very foundation of the self-governing 
process."93 Whatever one's conception of the equality demanded by 
the First Amendment, there is a widely shared consensus on the 
proposition that government should not use its power to suppress 
speech based on the message it seeks to convey. In this respect also, 
free speech jurisprudence bears a noteworthy resemblance to the 
jurisprudence of racial equality. Just as there is a widely shared 
consensus that government should avoid intentional racial discrimina­
tion, it is also recognized that government should act evenhandedly 
when it regulates speech, and avoid disfavoring speakers because of 
their messages or ideas. 
Some of the most pressing difficulties emerge where there is no 
express content- or viewpoint-based law, but there is nevertheless 
reason to believe that government is targeting speakers based on 
disapproval of their messages or ideas. The Supreme Court has long 
91. See Spencer Overton, But Some Are More Equal: Race, Exclusion, and Campaign 
Finance, 80 TEXAS L. REV. 987, 991-1001 (2002) (describing the conflicting visions of free 
speech and democracy animating campaign-finance debate). Proponents of individual 
autonomy are much more likely to look with disfavor on schemes that limit contributions or 
expenditures on behalf of political candidates. See, e.g., Lillian R. Be Vier, Money and Poli­
tics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and Campaign Finance Reform, 73 CAL. L. REV. 
1045, 1046-47 (1985); Daniel R. Ortiz, The Democratic Paradox of Campaign Finance Re­
form, 50 STAN. L. REV. 893, 895 (1998); Martin H. Redish, Free Speech and the Flawed Pos­
tulates of Campaign Finance Reform, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 783, 783-84 (2001). On the other 
hand, proponents of balanced public discourse are much more likely to look favorably on 
such schemes, on the ground that they help give a more equal voice to all citizens. See, e.g. , 
Owen M. Fiss, Money and Politics, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2470, 2479 (1997) (arguing that limits 
on spending may be defended under a democracy-based conception of the First Amend­
ment, because they prevent distortion of public debate); David A. Strauss, Corruption, 
Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1370 (1994) (asserting 
that the objective of campaign finance reform is equality). For a study of the ability of well­
financed groups to influence "direct democracy" (i.e., the exercise of the initiative and refer­
endum power by voters), see Daniel H. Lowenstein, Campaign Spending and Ballot Propo­
sitions: Recent Experience, Public Choice Theory and the First Amendment, 29 UCLA L. 
REV. 505, 517-26 (1982). 
92. Fried, supra note 82, at 233. 
93. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH 26 (1948). 
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recognized that vesting excessive discretion to regulate speech in the 
hands of public officials can be destructive to the equality that the 
First Amendment demands. As Professor Tribe puts it: 
Statutes which open-endedly delegate to administering officials the 
power to decide how and when sanctions are applied or licenses issued 
are overbroad because they grant such officials the power to discriminate 
- to achieve indirectly through selective enforcement a censorship of 
communicative content that is clearly unconstitutional when achieved 
directly.94 
The open-ended delegation of such discretion not only allows public 
officials to discriminate based upon the message or idea expressed, but 
also makes judicial review extremely difficult.95 Absent clearly defined 
rules that limit official decisionmakers' discretion, discrimination 
against unpopular speech may escape detection. In Part II, I shall 
discuss both the development of First Amendment doctrine designed 
to guard against this risk, and the core features of this doctrine as they 
stand today. 
II. DISTRUSTING DISCRETION: FIRST AMENDMENT EQUAL 
PROTECTION 
The development of First Amendment Equal Protection jurispru­
dence reflects a distrust of official discretion. From its earliest speech 
and assembly cases, the Supreme Court has recognized that laws 
vesting broad discretion in official actors to regulate or restrict speech 
threaten the principle of expressive equality and, in particular, the 
imperative that government should not "restrict expression because of 
its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."96 
This Part first examines the cases that developed special First 
Amendment doctrines to guard against the threat to expressive equal­
ity posed by official discretion. It then identifies four prominent fea­
tures of First Amendment doctrine, each of which provides a check on 
excessive discretion in the regulation of speech: (1) more permissive 
standing rules; (2) a suspicion of vague legal standards; (3) a willing­
ness to strike down laws on their face rather than simply as applied; 
and (4) a thorough appellate review of the evidentiary record. This 
94. TRIBE, supra note 74, § 12-28, at 1056 (footnote omitted). Professor Tribe makes a 
related point with respect to the debate between those who take an "absolutist" view of the 
First Amendment versus those who urge "balancing" of competing interests, noting that a 
categorical approach leaves less room for prejudices to affect the decision whether speech is 
to be restricted or regulated. See id. § 12-3, at 794 ("Categorical rules . . .  tend to protect the 
system of free expression better because they are more likely to work in spite of the defects 
in the human machinery on which we must rely to preserve fundamental liberties."). 
95. Id. § 12-38, at 1056-57. 
96. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). 
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Part concludes with a discussion of a recent case presenting a serious 
challenge to this doctrine: Thomas v. Chicago Park District.97 
A. The Genesis of First Amendment Equal Protection 
1 .  Public Fora 
The Supreme Court has long viewed laws requiring speakers to 
obtain permits or licenses before using public fora as "prior 
restraints,"98 and looked with disfavor on schemes vesting officials 
with broad discretion to regulate speech in public fora.99 The limita­
tions upon discretion in this area arise from the risk that public offi­
cials might otherwise give preferences to some and disfavor others for 
constitutionally impermissible reasons - in particular, because of the 
message or ideas expressed.100 
Skepticism of laws granting government broad discretion over the 
licensing of speech in public places can be traced to three cases 
decided between 1938 and 1940 - Lovell v. City of Griffin,101 Hague v. 
Committee for Industrial Organization,102 and Cantwell v. Connecti-
97. 534 U.S. 316 (2002). 
98. Professor Fiss refers to these cases as involving restrictions upon the "street corner 
speaker." See Fiss, Silence on the Street Corner, supra note 78, at 1-2; Owen M. Fiss, Why the 
State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 784-86 (1987) (hereinafter Fiss, Why the State?]. 
99. See, e.g., Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992); Shut­
tlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 
U.S. 268, 271 (1951). For defenses of the heavy presumption of the prior-restraint doctrine, 
see Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L. 
REV. 11 ,  92-93 (1981), and Thomas I. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 648 (1955). For a critique of prior-restraint doctrine, see Martin H. Re­
dish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. 
REV. 53, 53-58 (1984). 
100. Summarizing the state of the law in 1958, the Court in Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 
U.S. 313, 322 (1958), observed: 
It is settled by a long line of recent decisions of this Court that an ordinance which . . .  makes 
the peaceful enjoyment of freedoms which the Constitution guarantees contingent upon the 
uncontrolled will of an official - as by requiring a permit or license which may be granted 
or withheld in the discretion of such official - is an unconstitutional censorship or prior re­
straint upon the exercise of those freedoms. 
Interestingly, the above quotation is not limited to freedom of speech, but also expresses 
concern about laws vesting control over any constitutional freedoms in the "uncontrolled 
will of an official." Notwithstanding this broad language, as explained herein, it is govern­
ment officials' discretion in the area of freedom of speech that the Court has viewed with the 
greatest suspicion. 
101. 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (distributor of religious pamphlets challenged a permit re­
quirement giving broad discretion to city manager). 
102. 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (unions and union members challenged an ordinance regulat­
ing street meetings and public assemblies). 
2432 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 101:2409 
cut. 103 In each of these cases, the Court struck down laws requiring 
official permission to speak subject to vaguely defined standards.104 
The requirement of clear standards for regulating speech served as 
a surrogate for a showing of discriminatory intent, as illustrated by 
Saia v. New York.105 In Saia, a Jehovah's Witness minister challenged 
an ordinance regulating the use of sound-amplification equipment. 
Despite the lack of clear evidence of intentional viewpoint discrimina­
tion, the Court reversed the convictions and held the ordinance 
facially unconstitutional due to the unbridled discretion accorded to 
the police chief.106 The Court explained: "To use a loud-speaker or 
amplifier one has to get a permit from the Chief of Police. There are 
no standards prescribed for the exercise of his discretion."107 This dis­
cretion created an irrebuttable presumption of unconstitutionality 
without demanding any showing that the scheme had been applied in a 
less than evenhanded manner. 108 
By 1951 ,  when the Court decided Kunz v. New York,109 the prohi­
bition upon laws giving broad discretion to grant or deny permits 
to speak in public places was well established. 1 10 In Kunz, a Baptist 
minister's permit to speak had been revoked, allegedly because he had 
ridiculed other religious beliefs. 1 1 1  He was thereafter convicted for 
speaking in a public place without the required permit. 1 12 The Court 
struck down the permit ordinance as unconstitutionally vague, despite 
the fact that the city had introduced evidence that there might well 
have been good reasons for regulating Kunz's activities, specifically, 
103. 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (Jehovah's Witnesses distributing literature challenged a state 
law regulating solicitation). 
104. See also Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 402-04 (1953) (upholding a statute 
because the scheme left administrators with "no discretion as to granting permits" and thus 
"no power to discriminate"). 
105. 334 U.S. 558 (1948). 
106. Saia, 334 U.S. at 559-60. 
107. Id. at 560 (emphasis added). 
108. But see Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88-89 (1949) (plurality opinion) (upholding 
a blanket ban on the use of sound "amplified to a loud and raucous volume"). In City of 
Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. , 486 U.S. 750, 764 (1988), the Court explained the 
difference between Saia and Kovacs as follows: 
In Saia, this Court held that an ordinance prohibiting the use of sound trucks without per­
mission from the Chief of Police was unconstitutional because the licensing official was able 
to exercise unbridled discretion in his decisionmaking, and therefore could, in a calculated 
manner, censor certain viewpoints. Just seven months later the Court held in Kovacs that a 
city could absolutely ban the use of sound trucks. The plurality distinguished Saia precisely 
on the ground that there the ordinance constituted censorship by allowing some to speak, 
but not others; in Kovacs the statute barred a particular manner of speech for all. 
109. 340 U.S. 290 (1951). 
110. Kunz, 340 U.S. at 293-94. 
1 1 1. Id. at 292. 
1 12. Id. at 292-93. 
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evidence that the speaker's meetings had in the past resulted in 
disorder . 1 13 The mere possibility that such discretion might be used to 
discriminate against those with unpopular points of view, even without 
proof of intentional discrimination against disfavored viewpoints, was 
held sufficient to strike down the law on its face. 
2. Censorship of Film and the Printed Word 
Closely related to the Court's early public forum cases are deci­
sions considering laws that vest public officials· with censoring author­
ity over books, newspapers, and motion pictures. In Near v. Minnesota 
ex rel. Olson,114 most commonly invoked for its articulation of the 
prior restraint doctrine,1 15 the Court struck down a state law that 
allowed government attorneys to obtain injunctions against those 
publishing "malicious, scandalous and defamatory" newspapers . 1 16 The 
Court explained: 
If such a statute, authorizing suppression and inj unction on such a basis, 
is constitutionally valid, it would be equally permissible for the legisla­
ture to provide that at any time the publisher of any newspaper could be 
brought before a court, or even an administrative officer (as the constitu­
tional protection may not be regarded as resting on mere procedural de­
tails) and required to produce proof of the truth of his publication, or of 
what he intended to publish, and of his motives, or stand enjoined. If this 
can be done, the legislature may provide machinery for determining in 
the complete exercise of its discretion what are justifiable ends and re­
strain publication accordingly. And it would be but a step to a complete 
system of censorship.117 
One might quibble with Near for underestimating the importance 
of procedural protections for speech,11 8  and for seeming to conflate the 
various entities - including legislators, administrators, and the courts 
- that might exercise discretion to impose prior restraints on speech. 
In fact, the Minnesota system, which at least required a judicial hear­
ing before restraining publication of newspapers, surely provided 
greater protection for speech than a scheme allowing speech to be 
1 13. Id. at 294. 
114.  283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
1 15. See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 99, at 654 (describing Near as "a landmark case" be­
cause it is "the major pronouncement of the Supreme Court on the doctrine of prior 
restraint"). 
1 16. Near, 283 U.S. at 702. The statute allowed any county attorney in the state to go 
into court to "enjoin perpetually the persons committing or maintaining any such nuisance 
from further committing or maintaining it." Id. at 702-03. 
1 17. Id. at 721. 
1 18. See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 7, at 518-20 (describing procedural safeguards that 
the Supreme Court has implemented to protect First Amendment rights). 
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restrained upon the mere whim of an administrative official . 1 1 9  The 
example given by the Court - that of a legislature creating the 
"machinery for determining in the complete exercise of its discretion" 
who may speak - is arguably less problematic than the discretionary 
scheme at issue in Near. For if the legislature creates clear rules 
regulating speech, then those rules can at least be evaluated to assess · 
their fairness; on the other hand, the type of scheme at issue in Near 
(vesting discretion in an administrative official) made it very difficult 
to assess whether expression was being regulated in an evenhanded 
manner. 
Although not described in the most transparent fashion, what the 
Near Court really seems to be concerned with is the possibility of sub 
rosa viewpoint discrimination. The problem with the Minnesota 
statute, the Court suggests, is that it allows government officials to 
determine the "justifiable ends" of speech. This risk is no more toler­
able in a situation where amorphous standards tend to mask viewpoint 
discrimination than it is where the legislature expressly engages in 
viewpoint discrimination by making a law that favors one speaker over 
another. The government's failure to provide sufficiently clear 
guidance as to what speech could be regulated effectively ceded to 
county authorities and judges the power to decide what could be 
published. 
Subsequent cases extended Near's skepticism of official discretion . 
to the censorship of film. In Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,120 the 
Court mandated adamantine precision in government laws giving 
public officials authority to censor "sacrilegious" material. Relying on 
Joseph Burstyn, the Court would thereafter strike down laws from 
other jurisdictions allowing censorship of motion pictures deemed 
"immoral" or "harmful,"121 those portraying "sexual immorality,"122 
and those judged by city authorities to be "prejudicial to the best 
interests of the people of said City."123 In each case, loosely worded 
standards resulted in government officials being granted overly broad 
authority to determine what could be exhibited. 124 
1 19. See, e.g., Manual Enters., Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 519 (1962) (Brennan, J., concur­
ring) (noting that administrative designation of certain materials as "obscene" was constitu­
tionally infirm, in the absence of a "judicial proceeding under closely defined procedural 
safeguards"). 
120. 343 U.S. 495, 504-05 (1952). 
121. Superior Films, Inc. v. Dep't of Educ., 346 U.S. 587, 589 (1954). 
122. Kingsley Int'! Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 687-88 
(1959). 
123. Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960, 960 (1952) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
124. While striking down laws setting amorphous standards for censoring films, thereby 
taking from public officials the discretion to determine which motion pictures the public 
could see, the Court refused to take the additional step of prohibiting all prior restraint 
schemes in this area. The five-to-four decision in Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 
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The Court's distrust of official discretion comes to the fore in a trio 
of opinions authored by Justice Brennan in the early 1960s: Marcus v. 
Search Warrant,125 Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,126 and Freedman v. 
Maryland.127 These decisions contain some of the Supreme Court's 
most extensive discussions of the dangers of schemes vesting unbridled 
discretion to regulate speech in administrators or courts. Marcus 
struck down a Missouri law authorizing searches for and the seizure of 
allegedly "obscene" materials. 128 While recognizing that obscene 
materials do not enjoy protection under the First Amendment, the 
Court struck down the law because it gave executing officers "the 
broadest discretion" to decide what material was "obscene."129 Bantam 
Books extends Marcus's intolerance of unbridled discretion in the area 
of prior restraints to informal censorship schemes.130 Not only did the 
Court broaden standing rules,131 it also recognized that "informal 
censorship may sufficiently inhibit the circulation of publications to 
warrant injunctive relief."132 And in Freedman, the Court set forth 
certain "procedural safeguards" to which censoring bodies must 
adhere, including an "adversary proceeding" and a "prompt final judi­
cial decision."133 The case thus embodies a procedural model for 
cabining official discretion to censor speech.134 
3. The Civil Rights Movement 
The censorship cases pave the way for cases occurring at the nexus 
between racial discrimination and viewpoint discrimination, where 
U.S. 43 (1961), reaffirmed the prohibition against vague and indefinite licensing standards 
for motion pictures, while clarifying that prior restraints on film are not automatically un­
constitutional. The Chicago ordinance challenged in Times Film Corp. required the commis­
sioner to refuse a permit if the film failed to satisfy certain standards. Instead of challenging 
these standards, the petitioner based its constitutional claim on the "complete and absolute 
freedom to exhibit, at least once, any and every kind of motion picture." Id. at 46. The Court 
declined to forbid all prior restraints, explaining that its prior cases were limited to laws set­
ting a " 'vague' or 'indefinite' " standard susceptible to abuse by the decisionmakers. Id. at 
47. 
125. 367 U.S. 717 (1961). 
126. 372 U.S. 58 (1963). 
127. 380 U.S. 51 (1965). 
128. Marcus, 367 U.S. at 719. 
129. Id. at 732. 
130. Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 59-61. 
131. Id. at 64 n.6. 
132. Id. at 67. 
133. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965). 
134. Freedman typifies the approach to protecting speech against censorship which Pro­
fessor Monaghan termed "First Amendment 'Due Process. ' " See Monaghan, supra note 7, 
at 522. 
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First Amendment Equal Protection comes into full bloom. 135 These 
decisions evince a deeper and broader skepticism of official discretion 
than was evident in the permitting and censorship cases, moving be­
yond classic prior restraints to restrictions on expressive associations, 
breach of peace, and jury verdicts. Though couched in libertarian 
terms, these cases are centrally concerned with expressive equality 
and, more specifically, with preventing racial bias from infecting the 
regulation of public discourse. 
Heightened concern with the dangers of official discretion at the 
speech/race nexus actually predates the civil rights movement, figuring 
prominently in Herndon v. Lowry,136 a 1937 case involving a black man 
and member of the Communist Party convicted in Georgia for inciting 
insurrection.137 Although the result in this case may seem obvious from 
a contemporary standpoint,138 the Court's opinion is noteworthy for its 
distrust of juror discretion in the area of political speech, particularly 
when questions of race are at issue - a concern that would reappear 
almost thirty years later in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.139 A 
Fulton County jury had found Herndon guilty of "induc[ing] others to 
join in combined resistance to the lawful authority of the state with in­
tent to deny, to defeat, and to overthrow such authority by open force, 
violent means, and unlawful acts, "140 a crime punishable by death. The 
record, however, contained evidence that Herndon had solicited 
contributions for the Communist party, but not that he had personally 
advocated violent overthrow of the government. 141 
While the Court might have overturned Herndon's conviction 
simply because there was no evidence of imminent violence, it went 
further, striking down the statute on its face because it "license[d] the 
jury to create its own standard in each case." 142 As the Court 
explained: 
[The Georgia statute] amounts merely to a dragnet which may enmesh 
anyone who agitates for a change of government if a j ury can be per-
135. See HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 4 (1965). 
136. 301 U.S. 242 (1937). 
137. For an illuminating discussion of Herndon, see Kendall Thomas, Rouge et Noir 
Reread: A Popular Constitutional History of the Angelo Herndon Case, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 
2599 (1992). 
138. But see ZECHARIAH CHAFFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 397 (4th 
prtg. 1948) ("[Of] all the chief sedition defendants . . . .  all but one seem to me fairly harm­
less. The one exception is Herndon."). 
139. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
1 40. Herndon, 301 U.S. at 245. The law had been enacted as the result of Nat Turner's 
1832 rebellion, but had not been used for almost a century. HARRY KALVEN, JR., A 
WORTHY TRADITION 1 70 (1988). 
141. Herndon, 301 U.S. at 253. 
142. Id. at 263. 
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suaded that he ought to have foreseen his words would have some effect 
in the future conduct of others. No reasonably ascertainable standard of 
guilt is prescribed. So vague and indeterminate are the boundaries thus 
set to the freedom of speech and assembly that the law necessarily vio­
lates the guarantees of liberty einbodied in the Fourteenth Amend­
ment.143 
As obvious as the result in Herndon may seem today, the opinion 
is remarkable in several respects. First, it refuses to defer to the state 
jurors' finding that imminent violence would result from the speech at 
issue, instead undertaking a thorough examination of the record.144 
Second, the opinion does not simply overturn the conviction but also 
strikes down the statute on its face, because it was so loosely written as 
to allow jurors' discretion to impair fair adjudication.145 Third, the 
Court suggests that such discretion may carry special dangers where 
the death penalty may be imposed,146 foreshadowing later cases that 
consider the special dangers of discretion in the context of capital 
punishment.147 Fourth, . the Court's opinion suggests a distrust of jury 
discretion as well as of judicial discretion, in that the Court conducts 
an independent review of the evidence, reverses the conviction, throws 
out the statute, and insists upon clearly written standards less subject 
to judicial manipulation.148 Fifth, the Court evinces special concern for 
the potential infringement of speech given the racial undertones of the 
case, recogmzmg the enhanced dangers of quasi-official discretion 
where racial bias interacts with official authority to suppress disfa­
vored ideas.149 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan150 inherits Herndon's acute con­
cern with the dangers of juror discretion where viewpoint discrimina­
tion and racial discrimination overlap. Though Sullivan is famous for 
holding that public officials may not obtain damages for libel absent 
"actual malice,"151 equally significant is the Court's insistence - also 
implicit in Herndon - that "we must also in proper cases review the 
143. Id. at 263-64. 
144. Id. at 247-53, 259-60. 
145. Id. at 263-64. 
146. Id. at 262 (noting·that under the law, if some causal chain resulting in violence may 
follow from the speaker's words, "he is bound to make the prophesy and abstain [from 
speaking] , under pain of punishment, possibly of execution") . 
147. See infra Part lll .B.2. 
148. Herndon, 301 U.S. at 259-64. 
149. Id. at 245 (noting the indictment described Herndon's "speeches for the purpose of 
organizing and establishing groups and combinations of white and colored persons under the 
name of the Communist Party of Atlanta"); id. at 250-52 (quoting materials found in Hern­
don's possession advocating African Americans' right to self-determination) . 
150. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
151. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 283. 
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evidence to make certain that those [constitutional] principles have 
been constitutionally applied."152 Instead of remanding, the Court en­
gaged in a thorough review of the facts,153 concluding that actual mal­
ice could not be established on the evidence adduced at trial. As 
Professor Monaghan observed, this skepticism of juror discretion can 
be viewed as reflecting a shift in the very meaning of the First 
Amendment, from one "conceived primarily as a guarantee that the 
voice of the people - the majority - would be heard" to one con­
cerned primarily with "protecting unpopular speech." 154 
Concerns about the special dangers presented by official discretion 
when combined with racial bias also figure prominently in NAA CP v. 
Button,155 which struck down on its face a Virginia statute regulating 
the solicitation of legal business. 156 The Court's opinion highlighted the 
danger of unequal administration inherent in loosely worded laws,157 a 
concern that was especially prominent given the backdrop of racial 
bias: "In such circumstances, a statute broadly curtailing group activity 
leading to litigation may easily become a weapon of oppression, 
however evenhanded its terms appear."158 The Court did not expressly 
find that the Virginia statute had been enforced in a discriminatory 
way; rather the possibility that the broad discretion vested in official 
decisionmakers might be abused was enough to warrant facial invali­
dation.159 
Most prominent among the First Amendment Equal Protection 
cases decided during the Civil Rights Movement are a series of cases 
152. Id. at 285; see also Steven Alan Childress, Constitutional Fact and Process: A First 
Amendment Model of Censorial Discretion, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1229, 1254 (1996). 
153. See THOMAS l .  EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 536 (1970) 
(stating that the Sullivan Court "carefully reviewed the evidence and itself drew the conclu­
sions which the jury would be bound to reach"); Childress, supra note 152, at 1256 (arguing 
that the Sullivan Court's "exercise amounted to a virtual reexamination of the facts on 
appeal"). 
154. Monaghan, supra note 7, at 528-29. As Professor Monaghan put it, Sullivan exem­
plifies the Court's concern that "like administrative agencies, the jury cannot be expected to 
be sufficiently sensitive to the first amendment interests involved in any given proceeding." 
Id. at 527-28. Akhil Amar makes the point more directly, noting the Court's implicit concern 
that "a southern jury composed of good old boys" would suppress speech advocating racial 
equality. AMAR, supra note 16, at 243. 
155. 371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
1 56. Button, 371 U.S. at 419-20, 426. 
157. Id. at 433. 
158. Id. at 435-36. 
159. The danger that such a facially neutral statute might be used by the politically 
dominant white majority to suppress the speech of the black minority obviated the need to 
address the NAACP's alternative claim of race discrimination in the application of Virginia's 
law. Id. at 444 ("Because our disposition is rested on the First Amendment . . .  we do not 
reach the considerations of race or racial discrimination which are the predicate of peti­
tioner's challenge to the statute under the Equal Protection Clause."). 
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in which the Court invalidated government attempts to regulate vari­
ous civil rights demonstrations. In Garner v. Louisiana,160 the Court 
reversed the convictions of African Americans prosecuted for 
disturbing the peace by taking seats at a whites-only lunch counter.161 
Following Garner, the Court reversed convictions for refusing to leave 
a whites-only bus depot,162 marching and singing outside the South 
Carolina State House,163 "cheering, clapping and singing" near a 
courthouse,164 demonstrating in front of a department store,165 sitting 
in a library,166 and marching from city hall to the mayor's home.167 
These decisions focus on the broad discretion vested in police, prose­
cutors, and judges to regulate expression - and, specifically, on the 
danger that they will apply such laws in a racially discriminatory 
manner that might escape detection absent facial invalidation. As in 
Herndon and Sullivan, the threat to expressive equality posed by state 
judges' and jurors' discretion leads the Court to insist upon "an inde­
pendent examination of the whole record."168 The cases share a 
concern with white public officials using discretion given to them 
under seemingly neutral laws to target disfavored speech and speak­
ers.169 
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham,110 one of the cases involving 
civil rights demonstrations, represents the apotheosis of the Court's 
concern with the dangers of official discretion to regulate speech 
160. 368 U.S. 157 (1961). 
161. Garner, 368 U.S. at 173-74. 
162. Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U.S. 154, 156 (1962). 
163. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 236-38 (1963). 
164. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 557-58 (1965). 
165. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 89-95 (1965). 
166. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 143 (1966). 
167. Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 1 11 ,  112-13 (1969). 
168. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964) (quoting Edwards, 372 U.S. at 
235). 
169. For example, in the first Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham decision, the Court struck 
down a law that required people to "move on" from any street or public sidewalk when 
asked to do so by police officers. 382 U.S. at 88. In overturning the conviction of a civil rights 
protester who had refused to move along when asked to do so by a policeman, the Court 
emphasized the danger of laws dependent upon "moment-to-moment opinions of a police­
man on his beat" where speech is concerned. Id. at 90 (internal citation omitted). Although 
the ordinance was not focused upon speech activities, the Court's opinion relied on the 
threat to expressive equality in striking it down: " Instinct with its ever-present potential for 
arbitrarily suppressing First Amendment liberties, that kind of law bears the hallmark of a 
police state." Id. at 90-91 (footnote omitted). Cox v. Louisiana likewise exemplifies this con­
cern, citing early permitting and licensing cases for the proposition that "lodging of such 
broad discretion in a public official allows him to determine which expressions of view will 
be permitted" and "thus sanctions a device for the suppression of the communication of 
ideas." 379 U.S. at 557. 
170. 394 U.S. 147 (1969). 
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where racial equality is implicated. Shuttlesworth extends that concern 
from police, commissions, prosecutors, and trial judges to state appel­
late courts. After leading a four-block march from a Birmingham 
church, Reverend Shuttlesworth was convicted of engaging in a 
demonstration without first having obtained the required permit.171 
As written, the Birmingham ordinance under which Shuttlesworth 
was convicted gave the city commission a "virtually unbridled and 
absolute power to prohibit any 'parade,' 'procession,' or 'demonstra­
tion' on the city's streets and public ways."172 Without a narrowing 
construction, therefore, the ordinance would plainly have violated the 
First Amendment.173 The Alabama Supreme Court, however, had 
adopted an extremely narrow construction of the statute, under which 
a permit "must be granted if, after an investigation, it is found that the 
convenience of the public in use of the streets or sidewalks would not 
thereby be unduly disturbed."174 
Despite this narrowing construction, the United States Supreme 
Court reversed. It first held that Reverend Shuttlesworth was free to 
challenge the statute, even though he had not applied for the permit, 
since he challenged the constitutionality of Birmingham's licensing law 
on its face. 175 On the merits, the Court acknowledged that the 
Alabama Supreme Court's narrowing construction left a law providing 
for nothing more than the "even-handed" regulation of traffic.176 The 
Court nevertheless reversed the convictions because, at the time that 
Shuttlesworth was arrested, the law on the books allowed the city 
commission to deny permission to speak on virtually any ground it saw 
fit. 177 Shuttlesworth thus extends the doctrine of allowing facial chal­
lenges to laws infringing on freedom of speech: it requires not only 
clear standards, but clear standards prescribed in advance. In doing so, 
the Court recognizes not merely that policemen may abuse their 
discretion, but also that state judges (both trial and appellate) may do 
so as well. 
The First Amendment Equal Protection cases arising during the 
civil rights movement thus demonstrate a profound distrust of official 
and quasi-official discretion to regulate speech, whether placed in the 
hands of police, administrators, jurors, prosecutors, or even state 
171. Sh11tt/esworth, 394 U.S. at 148-49. 
172. Id. at 150 (footnote omitted). 
173. Id. 
174. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 206 So. 2d 348, 350-52 (Ala. 1 967). 
175. Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. at 151 ("[A] person faced with such an unconstitutional li­
censing law may ignore it and engage with impunity in the exercise of the right of free ex­
pression for which the law purports to require a license." (footnote omitted)). 
176. Id. at 154-55. 
177. Id. at 156. 
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supreme court judges. While the Court does not expressly rely on 
equal protection doctrine to justify the results reached or the legal 
standards articulated, recognition of the dangers to expressive equality 
posed by official and quasi-official racial bias is implicit in these deci­
sions. Absent federal court intervention, racial bias would inevitably 
translate into viewpoint-based discrimination. These cases thus cried 
out for closer supervision of government discretion by the federal 
courts, and demanded the formulation of strict boundaries to ensure 
that officials' prejudices did not result in expressive inequality. 
B. The Features of First Amendment Equal Protection 
Skepticism of official discretion animates the public fora, censor­
ship, and civil rights era cases. For the most part, these cases arise in 
contexts where the Court smelled a rat - that is, where circumstances 
suggested that discrimination against disfavored viewpoints or certain 
speakers was at play, but where that discrimination was difficult to 
substantiate. The special doctrines created in response to this general 
problem have remained relatively stable. This Section describes four 
features of First Amendment Equal Protection, each of which serves 
to limit the threat to expressive equality posed by excessive discretion. 
1 .  The Requirement of Precision 
The most obvious respect in which the Court has demonstrated 
its skepticism of official discretion is in continuing to strike down 
laws with vaguely defined standards that delegate to public officials 
virtually unbridled discretion to determine who may speak.178 The 
term "unbridled discretion" has become a watchword for what the 
First Amendment forbids, and is closely linked to the Court's general 
intolerance for vagueness where speech is criminalized or otherwise 
regulated.179 
For example, the Court in City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub­
lishing Co. 180 struck down an ordinance giving the mayor "unbridled 
discretion" to grant or deny applications for newsracks on city prop­
erty.181 In the course of its decision, the Court explained why precise 
standards are so vital, even where an abuse of authority cannot be 
shown: 
178. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 10, at 102 (discussing special skepticism of laws 
that "delegat(e) to executive agencies widely discretionary or imprecisely measured powers 
of censorship"). 
179. See TRIBE, supra note 74, § 12-2, at 794 ("Categorical rules thus tend to protect the 
system of free expression better because they are more likely to work in spite of the defects 
in the human machinery on which we must rely to preserve fundamental liberties."). 
180. 486 U.S. 750 (1988). 
181. City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 772. 
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Standards provide guideposts that check the licensor and allow courts 
quickly and easily to determine whether the licensor is discriminating 
against disfavored speech. Without these guideposts, post hoc rationali­
zations . . .  and the use of shifting or illegitimate criteria are far too easy, 
making it difficult for courts to determine in any particular case whether 
the licensor is permitting favorable, and suppressing unfavorable, expres­
sion.182 
The requirement of clear standards prescribed in advance prevents 
public officials from tilting the expressive playing field. Without such a 
requirement, it is all too easy for government to favor or disfavor 
speakers in ways that escape detection. But if there are statutes, ordi­
nances, or regulations limiting government discretion to regulate or 
prohibit speech, it is much more difficult for public officials to 
discriminate based on the messages expressed. As the Court expressly 
states, the danger of such discrimination is "at its zenith when 
the determination of who may speak and who may not is left to the 
unbridled discretion of a government official." 183 Without clearly de­
fined standards, it is simply too easy for the suppression of disfavored 
points of view to escape judicial detection. 
To be sure, cabining government officials' ability to discriminate is 
not the only reason for the rule against vagueness. The requirement of 
precision also provides notice to prospective speakers of what conduct 
is prohibited,184 and avoids the "chilling effect" upon constitutionally 
protected expression arising from unclear regulations.185 Guarding 
against discrimination is, however, one of the principal reasons why 
the Court has long insisted on precision when government regulates 
expression. 
City of Lakewood and other First Amendment Equal Protection 
cases requiring clear standards prescribed in advance can thus be 
understood as "soft purpose" cases - cases in which the Court has 
been willing to find a violation, even where direct evidence of 
intentional discrimination is lacking, due to the mere possibility that 
such discrimination might occur. The opinion in Forsyth County v. 
Nationalist Movement186 illustrates this point. In Forsyth County, the 
182. Id. at 758. 
183. Id. at 763. 
184. See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974) (holding unconstitutional a law 
forbidding "contemptuous[]" treatment of the flag because it "fails to draw reasonably clear 
lines between the kinds of nonceremonial treatment that are criminal and those that are 
not"); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 ,  614 (1971) (holding that a law making it a 
crime for people to annoy passers-by on sidewalk "is unconstitutionally vague because it 
subjects the exercise of the right of assembly to an unascertainable standard"). 
185. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (noting that freedom of 
speech is "delicate and vulnerable" and therefore that "threat of sanctions may deter their 
exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions"). 
186. 505 U.S. 123 (1992). 
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Court struck down a local ordinance that allowed government admin­
istrators to adjust the fee required for speech activities based upon the 
degree of hostility likely to be provoked. When the Nationalist 
Movement sought to demonstrate in opposition to a federal holiday 
commemorating Martin Luther King, Jr.'s birthday, the County sought 
to "adjust the amount paid in order to meet the expense incident to 
the administration of the Ordinance and to the maintenance of public 
order in the matter licensed."187 The Court held that the absence of 
specific standards for determining what fee to charge was enough to 
invalidate Forsyth County's scheme.188 
Nor is suspicion of "unbridled discretion" limited to permit 
requirements and other forms of prior restraint. For example, in City 
of Houston v. Hill,189 the Court struck down a Houston ordinance that 
made it unlawful to "oppose, molest, abuse or interrupt any policeman 
in the execution of his duty, or any person summoned to aid in making 
arrest."190 The Court concluded that this ordinance swept too broadly, 
and intruded upon the ability of citizens to challenge police actions 
verbally without arrest. As the Court explained, "we have repeatedly 
invalidated laws that provide the police with unfettered discretion to 
arrest individuals for words or conduct that annoy or offend them."191 
Although the ordinance was content and viewpoint neutral, 192 the 
Court held it facially invalid because it gave police officers too much 
leeway to target speakers of whom they disapproved.193 
· 
More recently, the Court's decision in Reno v. ACL U  struck down 
portions of the Communications Decency Act prohibiting the 
dissemination of "indecent" and "patently offensive" materials to 
those under 18 as insufficiently specific under the First Amendment.194 
The absence of precise definitions for either term left open an imper­
missibly large "risk of discriminatory enforcement" that required the 
187. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. at 127 (internal citation omitted). The record in­
cluded testimony regarding the various rates that the administrator had charged for various 
permitted activities in the past, ranging from $5 to $100. Id. at 132. 
188. Id. at 133. 
189. 482 U.S. 451 (1987). 
190. Hill, 482 U.S. at 455 (quoting HOUSTON, TEX., ORDINANCES § 34-ll(a) (1984) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)). 
191. Id. at 465. 
192. Id. at 459. 
193. Id. at 465 n.15 ("Houston's [ordinance] effectively grants police the discretion to 
make arrests selectively on the basis of the content of the speech."). There was general 
agreement on this point, even amongst the justices who considered the majority's opinion 
too sweeping in other respects. See id. at 480 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part, joined by O'Connor and Scalia, JJ.) (agreeing that the ordinance is unconstitutional 
because "it is clear that Houston has made no effort to curtail the wide discretion of police 
officers under the present ordinance"). 
194. 521 U.S. 844, 870-71 (1997). 
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statute's facial invalidation. 195 The Court recognized this risk and 
upheld the plaintiffs' vagueness challenge to the term "patently offen­
sive" notwithstanding the fact that this term is part of the three-prong 
test for assessing whether material is "obscene."196 
All of these cases rest on the Court's recognition that, absent re­
straints upon official discretion, government may discriminate against 
disfavored viewpoints in a manner likely to escape detection. Subject 
to narrow exceptions, 197 the Court has generally required government 
to walk a fine line when it regulates expression. 
2. Receptivity to Facial Challenges 
The requirement of precision is but one manifestation of the 
Court's more general suspicion of official and quasi-official discretion 
where expressive equality is at issue. Another feature of First 
Amendment doctrine closely linked to concerns regarding official 
discretion is the Court's receptivity to facial challenges. 
Outside the First Amendment context, the standard for facial 
challenges is extremely strict. For a successful facial challenge to be 
mounted outside the First Amendment context, "the challenger must 
195. Reno, 521 U.S. at 872. 
196. Id. at 872 (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)). 
197. One of the few Supreme Court decisions to uphold regulations of demonstrations is 
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989). Ward considered a regulation that re­
quired speakers in the Central Park bandshell to use amplification equipment and an experi­
enced sound technician provided by the City. Id. at 784. The Court rejected the argument 
that this arrangement gave government officials impermissibly broad discretion to regulate 
speech, stating that "perfect clarity and precise guidance have never been required even of 
regulations that restrict expressive activity." Id. at 794; see also Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 
703, 724, 732-33 (2000) (upholding a Colorado "bubble zone" law regulating speech in front 
of health-care facilities, despite imprecision as to the meaning of the activities regulated, 
namely "protest, education, or counseling"); id. at 739-40 (Souter, J., concurring) (acknowl­
edging that these terms "at first blush" seem to present a vagueness problem, but finding it 
"not fatal" because it "pretty clearly fails to limit very much at all"). 
The Court has also applied a more relaxed standard where the government funds artistic 
expression. For example, in National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998), 
the Court upheld a scheme vesting a federal agency with substantial discretion to award 
grants to artists and charging the agency with responsibility to ensure "artistic merit." Id. \It 
572-73. The Court actually rests its conclusion that the statute is viewpoint-neutral on the 
indeterminacy of terms like "decency" and "respect," stating that "one would be hard 
pressed to find two people in the United States" who would agree on their meaning. Id. at 
583. Finley thus permits the exercise of discretion in this area for a reason somewhat differ­
ent than Ward: not because the dangers of discrimination are minimal, but because of t4e 
impossibility of crafting standards to prohibit such discrimination without obliterating the 
discretion that public officials must have in order to carry out their duties. See also Arkansas 
Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 683 (1998) (allowing a public television 
station to exclude an independent candidate from political debate, where there was no evi­
dence that it did so based on opposition to his views). 
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establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act 
would be valid."198 
In free speech cases, by contrast, a facial challenge may be brought 
even where a law may validly be applied in some of its applications.199 
The question, as explained in City of Houston v. Hill, is whether the 
law in question reaches "a substantial amount of constitutionally pro­
tected conduct. "200 Thus, the Hill Court struck down a municipal ordi­
nance prohibiting interference with police officers, even though there 
were some forms of interference with the police that could justifiably 
be proscribed without infringing on speech, and even though there was 
no evidence that the content-neutral statute had been applied against 
disfavored viewpoints.201 The mere possibility that the law could be 
used to suppress speech critical of police officers was enough to strike 
it down on its face.202 
Within the general category of laws susceptible to facial challenges 
on First Amendment grounds, it is important to distinguish laws that 
are impermissibly vague (for failing to set sufficiently precise stan­
dards for regulating speech) from those that are impermissibly over­
broad (because they burden a substantial amount of protected 
speech).203 The dangers of discriminatory enforcement, as I have 
already explained, are obvious with respect to the vague laws which, 
by their very nature, give authorities room to discriminate against 
speakers whose message they disapprove of.204 Yet, dangers are also 
present with respect to overbroad laws - even ones that set reasona­
bly clear standards and are therefore not vague - because those laws 
may be selectively enforced in a manner that infringes upon speech.205 
As Professor Karst has observed, overbreadth doctrine often serves 
the First Amendment interest in equality, since an overbroad statute 
198. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). For a critique of the Salemo 
rule, see Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 
235, 239-42 (1994). 
199. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973). 
200. 482 U.S. 451, 458 (1987) (quoting Viii. of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, 
Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982)). 
201. Hill, 482 U.S. at 459. 
202. Id. at 459. 
203. See TRIBE, supra note 74, § 12-31, at 1033-35; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense 
of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 903-07 (1991) (hereinafter Fallon, Making Sense of 
Overbreadth ] .  
204. The prohibition against vague laws is not limited to those which infringe upon free 
speech, although this prohibition has been applied more robustly in speech cases. See Fallon, 
Making Sense of Overbreadth, supra note 203, at 904. 
205. See id. at 908 (observing that overbroad statutes may "provide a cover for content­
based hostility to constitutionally protected expressive activity"). 
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raises a more pronounced risk of selective enforcement.206 An exces­
. sively broad law may function as a sort of dragnet, sweeping in many 
from which authorities may target those harboring disfavored views. 
As with the requirement of precise standards, the Court's willing­
ness to entertain facial challenges under the First Amendment is not 
solely grounded in the need to cabin the possibilities of discrimination 
that can accompany official discretion. Among the other justifications 
for this rule are elimination of laws that would chill people from 
engaging in protected speech,207 and vindication of the litigants' rights 
"to be judged in accordance with a constitutionally valid rule of 
law."208 But limiting official opportunities to suppress disfavored 
speech is one of the important purposes served by allowing facial 
challenges under the First Amendment. 
3. Liberal Rules of Justiciability 
Related to, though analytically distinct from, the Court's willing­
ness to entertain facial First Amendment challenges is its relaxation of 
ordinary rules of justiciability.209 For purposes of assessing the rela­
tionship between procedural safeguards and official discretion, two 
aspects of First Amendment doctrine are noteworthy. 
First, in prior restraint cases, the Court has allowed litigants to 
challenge the constitutionality of laws infringing upon speech even 
when such litigants have not applied for the permit or license required 
under the challenged scheme. For example, in City of Lakewood, the 
206. Karst, Equality in the First Amendment, supra note 7, at 38. For example, in Village 
of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 622 (1980), the Court 
struck down an ordinance prohibiting solicitation by charitable organizations that used less 
than 75% of monies received for nonadministrative purposes. Also, in Secretary of State v. 
Joseph H. Munson Co. , 467 U.S. 947, 956 (1984), the Court struck down a statute that dif­
fered only in that it allowed an administrative waiver for "financial necessity." In both cases, 
the statutes at issue set reasonably clear standards, yet still raised the possibility of imposing 
a disproportionate burden on those with "unpopular" messages. See id. at 967 ("It is equally 
likely that the statute will restrict First Amendment activity that results in high costs but is 
itself a part of the charity's goal or that is simply attributable to the fact that the charity's 
cause proves to be unpopular."). 
207. See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757 (1988) 
("[T)he mere existence of the licensor's unfettered discretion . . .  intimidates parties into 
censoring their own speech, even if the discretion and power are never actually abused."); 
Thornhill. v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940) ("It is not merely the sporadic abuse of power 
by the censor but the pervasive threat inherent in its very existence that constitutes the dan­
ger to freedom of discussion."). 
208. Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. l,  3. 
209. To say that laws vesting public officials with broad authority to censor speech may 
be struck down on their face is one thing; to allow litigants whose speech is not itself pro­
tected to bring such a challenge is another. See Dorf, supra note 198, at 261 -62 (distinguish­
ing two views of overbreadth). But see TRIBE, supra note 74, § 12-27, at 1023 (noting that 
some have understood overbreadth as an exception to ordinary standing rules, but taking the 
position that it really reflects a right to be judged by a properly drawn rule). 
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Court allowed a newspaper publisher to challenge a municipal licens­
ing requirement without having applied for the license. The Court 
observed that "a licensing statute placing unbridled discretion in the 
hands of a government official or agency constitutes a prior restraint 
and may result in censorship," even without a showing that the power 
vested in the hands of public officials has actually been abused.210 The 
very absence of standards makes it difficult to distinguish between the 
legitimate exercise of the power to deny a permit and the exercise of 
that power to suppress a disfavored viewpoint.211 
The second rule confers more generous standing by allowing liti­
gants to challenge the constitutionality of a vague or overbroad law, 
"even though its application in the case under consideration may be 
constitutionally unobjectionable. "212 Indeed, litigants may bring facial 
challenges to such laws without showing that their conduct is itself 
protected by the . First Amendment.213 Under this rule, litigants need 
not show that others affected are incapable of bringing suit on their 
own.214 The Court has justified this "exception" to the general rule 
forbidding third-party standing by reasoning that the "very existence" 
of imprecise or overinclusive laws can inhibit the expression of others 
not before the Court.215 
4. Independent Factfinding 
A staple of First Amendment doctrine is an independent examina­
tion of the evidentiary record on appeal. The Court's willingness to 
discard ordinary rules against appellate factfinding in First Amend­
ment cases - and to second guess lower-level decisionmakers -
arises in part from concern that official discretion will be applied in a 
less-than-evenhanded fashion.216 
As New York Times Co. v. Sullivan exemplifies, the Court is not 
content simply to articulate principles in speech cases, but frequently 
insists upon making its own review of the evidence "to make certain 
that those principles have been constitutionally applied."217 The 
210. City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 757. 
211. Id. at 758. 
212. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 1 29 (1992); see also Sec'y of 
State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 956 (1984). 
213. Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 392-93 (1988). 
214. Joseph H. Munson Co. , 467 U.S. at 957-58. 
215. Id. But see Dorf, supra note 198, at 261 (noting that the special standing and over­
breadth rules developed in First Amendment cases have also been applied in cases impli­
cating other fundamental rights) . 
216. The line of cases involving demonstrations during the civil rights era, see discussion 
supra Section 11.A.3, exemplify the willingness to engage in such appellate factfinding. 
217. 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964). So, too, in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 466 U.S. 
485, 502 (1984), another defamation case involving the actual-malice standard, the Court 
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willingness to undertake a thoroughgoing reexamination of the record, 
rather than deferring to a lower court's findings, also extends to areas 
other than defamation. In determining whether expression falls within 
the generally proscribable category of obscenity under the standards 
set forth in Miller v. California,218 the Court has long insisted upon an 
"independent examination" of the evidentiary record to determine 
whether the material in question is patently offensive and appeals to 
prurient interests.219 Like the rules allowing for broader standing and 
facial challenges in First Amendment cases, this rule stems at least in 
part from a concern that official discretion will be abused to suppress 
speech conveying a disfavored message or idea. 
The flip-side of such heightened judicial inquiry into the underly­
ing facts, of course, is an unwillingness to defer to nonjudicial findings 
and conclusions. This is perhaps evident in the Freedman v. Maryland 
guidelines, which require prompt judicial review of certain "prior 
restraints" on speech, and place the burden on the government to 
obtain such review.220 It is equally evident in Sullivan and its progeny 
which, in recognition of the dangers to expressive equality posed by 
juror discretion, characterize issues as legal rather than factual so as to 
take matters out of the jury's hands and into the court's.221 Just as the 
Freedman guidelines stem from an unwillingness to defer to low-level 
bureaucrats, the rules crafted in the defamation cases evince an 
unwillingness to defer to juries. In both cases, the Court's refusal to 
defer arises from concern that expressive inequality is an inevitable 
by-product of the decisionmakers' discretion. 
C. Thomas v. Chicago Park District 
At first glance, the Supreme Court's recent unanimous opinion in 
Thomas v. Chicago Park District222 might seem like a repudiation of at 
held it "imperative that judges - and in some cases judges of this Court - make sure that it 
is correctly applied." See also Childress, supra note 152, at 1261 -67. 
218. 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
219. See, e.g. , City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458 n.6 (1987) ("[A Jn independent 
review of the record is appropriate where the activity in question is arguably protected by 
the Constitution."); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 160 (1974) (holding that appellate 
courts must conduct an independent review in order to protect against possible abuses by 
censoring authorities and juries). 
220. 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965). 
22 1 .  In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. , 418 U.S. 323, 349-50 (1974), for example, the Court 
held that the remedies for defamation should reach "no farther [sic] than is necessary," and 
therefore struck down state standards allowing publishers and broadcasters to be subjected 
to punitive damages. In so holding, the Court expressly relied on the dangers inherent in 
leaving juries with discretion to award punitive damages for defamation - specifically, that 
juries would be "free to use their discretion selectively to punish expressions of unpopular 
views" thereby leading to self-censorship by the press. Id. at 350. 
222. 534 U.S. 316 (2002). 
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least some of the features of First Amendment Equal Protection. In 
Thomas, the Supreme Court upheld a Chicago scheme regulating the 
usage of public parks, despite arguments from would-be speakers that 
the regulations accorded municipal officials unacceptably broad dis­
cretion. The Supreme Court held: (1) that public entities need not 
comply with the Freedman procedural guidelines when they engage in 
"content-neutral" speech regulation, even when that regulation takes 
the form of a prior restraint; and (2) that Chicago's ordinance pre­
scribing when a permit would issue was sufficiently specific to mini­
mize the risk of sub rosa viewpoint-based discrimination and to permit 
effective judicial review.223 
To understand the significance of Thomas, both in terms of what it 
does and what it does not do, it is helpful to contrast the Supreme 
Court's opinion in the case with the more sweeping opinion of the 
Seventh Circuit authored by Judge Posner.224 Had the Supreme Court 
adopted Judge Posner's analysis, it would have represented a sharp 
departure from settled rules designed to guard against discrimination 
with respect to political speech. As it stands, however, the Supreme 
Court's opinion represents a slight shift in the discretion/equality bal­
ance toward greater recognition of the need for some discretion to be 
vested in municipal decisionmakers regulating the use of public 
spaces. 
Both the Seventh Circuit and Supreme Court rejected a facial First 
Amendment challenge to Chicago's park-permit scheme brought by a 
group advocating the repeal of marijuana laws. The Seventh Circuit's 
opinion embraces a conception of the First Amendment that focuses 
on the quantity of speech permitted rather than on equality of oppor­
tunities for expression, at odds with the Supreme Court's longstanding 
skepticism of laws leaving officials with broad discretion to grant or 
deny permits to speak in public places. For example, while ostensibly 
recognizing the "danger in giving officials broad discretion over which 
political rallies shall be permitted to be conducted on public prop­
erty,"225 Judge Posner's opinion proceeds to minimize the dangers 
posed by such a scheme. For Judge Posner, the critical question was 
whether the regulations imposed by the city "reduce[] the amount of 
speech" in this public forum, suggestive of a "more speech is better" 
interpretation of the First Amendment.226 Yet his opinion gives short 
shrift to the critical question: whether the city's rules are sufficient to 
ensure equality of opportunities for expression and, more specifically, 
to guard against public officials' misusing their discretion to suppress 
223. Thomas, 534 U.S. at 323-24. 
224. Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 227 F.3d 921, 923-28 (7th Cir. 2000). 
225. Id. at 924. 
226. Id. (emphasis added). 
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disfavored messages or ideas. Under Judge Posner's standard, plain­
tiffs would be obliged to show that the regulations were actually 
applied to them in an unfair way because of hostility toward their 
message or ideas227 - a standard close to the intentional discrimina­
tion requirement typically applied to allegations of race discrimination 
under the Equal Protection Clause. 
Among the provisions challenged by plaintiffs was one giving 
Chicago officials discretion to reject a permit because of a "material" 
misrepresentation. While one might believe that the term "material" is 
sufficiently specific as to present a tolerably low risk of content- and 
viewpoint-based discrimination, Judge Posner's opinion goes further, 
asserting that "if this discretionary feature of the regulation were 
excised, the regulation would be more restrictive than it is. "228 Like­
wise, in rejecting the challenge to the discretionary "waiver" provision 
contained in the regulation, the circuit court stated that " [c]urtailing 
speech is an odd way of protecting speech. "229 What the court appears 
to mean by these statements is that a more precisely written regulation 
might bar more speech. The problem with this statement is that it 
disregards that ensuring equality, and in particular preventing against 
governmental discrimination based upon disapproval of the speaker's 
message, is at the heart of the traditional requirement of precision in 
rules that regulate speech. 
The Seventh Circuit's opinion in Thomas also represents a signifi­
cant departure from traditional First Amendment doctrine with 
respect to the facial-challenge rule. Judge Posner's opinion asserts that 
facial challenges to speech regulations, as distinct from as-applied 
challenges, invite "semantic nitpicking and judicial usurpation of the 
legislative drafting function in an effort to avert, without creating 
loopholes, dangers at best hypothetical and at worst chimerical. "230 Put 
another way, Judge Posner views the mere possibility that official 
discretion will be abused to be insufficient to justify facial invalidation, 
even where public demonstrations in parks - among the quintessen­
tial public fora - are at issue. 
Judge Posner was surely correct to recognize that some degree of 
regulation is necessary for anyone's speech rights effectively to be 
exercised - without some regulation, after all, competing groups 
would be hard pressed to determine who gets to use the stage at what 
times. Where the opinion departs from established precedent is the 
high threshold it imposes upon the would-be speaker to demonstrate 
227. Id. at 925 ("The opportunities for abuse are manifest but are minimized by the fact 
that if there is an abuse the victims can bring a judicial challenge to the permit regulation as 
applied to them."). 
228. Id. at 925. 
229. Id. 
230. Id. at 924. 
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that the government acted for improper reasons in refusing to grant a 
permit. Absent a showing that the government is "trying to restrict the 
expression of unpopular ideas,"231 Judge Posner's opinion suggests 
that courts should defer to the decisions of governmental decision­
makers charged with regulating the use of public spaces. This ignores 
the teaching of cases such as Shuttlesworth, Forsyth County, and City 
of Lakewood, which recognize that the very absence of sufficiently 
precise rules makes it practically impossible to assess whether 
discrimination against disfavored speakers is taking place. 
Although the Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit's 
conclusion that Chicago's permit scheme was facially constitutional, it 
did so on narrower grounds. The Court's opinion tinkers with First 
Amendment Equal Protection jurisprudence while leaving its basic 
structure intact. The Supreme Court agreed with the Seventh Circuit 
in recognizing the need for municipalities to exercise some control 
over limited public spaces such as parks through the enactment of 
a permit process.232 It also agreed with the Seventh Circuit on the 
inapplicability of the Freedman procedural requirements in the 
absence of some sort of content-based scheme.233 Where the Supreme 
Court departed from the Seventh Circuit was in its recognition of the 
dangers to expressive equality that exist even where the law in ques­
tion does not expressly draw a content-based distinction.234 
The Court emphasized that a permit may be denied only for one of 
the specified reasons set forth in the ordinance, finding these grounds 
to be "reasonably specific and objective. "235 While recognizing that the 
city's power to grant waivers might conceivably be abused to advan­
tage favored speakers, the Court held that the regulations were suffi­
ciently specific to prevent discrimination against unpopular ideas from 
occurring beneath the surface: 
The prophylaxis achieved by insisting upon a rigid, no-waiver application 
of the ordinance requirements would be far outweighed, we think, by the 
accompanying senseless prohibition of speech (and of other activity in 
the park) by organizations that fail to meet the technical requirements of 
the ordinance but for one reason or another pose no risk of the evils that 
those requirements are designed to avoid.236 
231. Id. at 928 
232. Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 322-23 (2002). 
233. Id. 
234. Citing Forsyth County, the Thomas Court stated the long-standing principle that 
"where the licensing official enjoys unduly broad discretion in determining whether to grant 
or deny a permit, there is a risk that he will favor or disfavor speech based on its content." 
Id. at 323. 
235. Id. at 324. 
236. Id. at 325. 
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Justice Scalia's majority opinion highlights this point by empha­
sizing that the alternative view - one that would permit no discretion 
to be exercised by officials charged with regulating speech - would 
have far-reaching consequences. It would, he notes, invalidate "every 
obscenity law, or every law placing limits upon political expendi­
tures,''237 since all of these laws vest some discretion in government 
officials to determine when to enforce them. Implicit in this opinion is 
a recognition that vesting some degree of discretion in public officials 
is inevitable - even where the regulation of speech is at issue. The 
opinion does not, however, abandon the insistence upon clear and 
definite standards that, as cases such as City of Lakewood emphasize, 
are essential to guard against the discriminatory use of this discretion. 
In the end, the principal significance of Thomas is its narrowing of 
the circumstances under which the procedural model championed by 
Professor Monaghan and embodied in Freedman will be applied.238 
Thomas does not overrule Freedman, but holds its guidelines inappli­
cable to content-neutral schemes of speech regulation. It shifts the 
balance slightly - but only slightly - toward greater recognition of 
the need for official discretion in regulating access to public places, 
given the minimal danger of expressive inequality that the Court 
perceived to exist. 
III. DISCRETION AND DISCRIMINATION: CONVENTIONAL EQUAL 
PROTECTION 
Part II traced the development of and described the doctrines 
designed to prevent official discretion from distorting the expressive 
playing field. This Part assesses the quite different standard that the 
Supreme Court has applied in considering the exercise of official 
discretion outside the realm of speech. In particular, it examines cases 
where governmental or quasi-governmental actors are claimed to have 
exercised their discretion to discriminate based on race. 
If the First Amendment cases described in Part II share a distrus� 
of official discretion, then the Equal Protection Clause cases discussed 
in this Part share a resignation that some degree of inequality must 
be tolerated in order to preserve needed discretion. In the area of 
public education, for example, the Court has exhibited a willingness to 
tolerate educational inequalities, absent clear evidence of intentional 
racial discrimination. In the administration of the death penalty, the 
Court has acknowledged that the discretion which permeates our 
criminal justice system may sometimes allow racial bias to enter the 
237. Id. 
238. See supra notes 133-134 and accompanying text. 
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decisionmaking process, and has frankly stated that such inequalities 
are inevitable. 
The general approach taken in constitutional race discrimination 
cases is that the imperative of preserving official discretion necessarily 
limits the ability of courts to ferret out discrimination. At least one of 
the reasons for this tolerance is suggested by Thomas v. City of 
Chicago and made explicit in McCleskey v. Kemp: namely, that it 
would prove too much or, more precisely, thrust upon the courts an 
impracticable burden. Government (let alone the courts) could hardly 
function if, in the name of promoting equality, the courts stripped de­
cisionmakers of discretion in any circumstance where discretion might 
possibly result in invidious discrimination. The benefit of this 
approach is that it allows for individualized justice, empowering jurors 
and other decisionmakers to consider intangible factors that call for 
lenity in particular cases. The cost is that, as McCleskey suggests, it 
necessarily requires that some inequalities remain beyond the reach of 
the courts. 
A. The Intent Standard Revisited 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that the Equal Protec­
tion Clause does not forbid practices having a disparate racial impact, 
but only those having a racially discriminatory intent or purpose.239 
This Article does not take issue with the now-settled proposition that 
the Equal Protection Clause's target is intentional discrimination.240 
The critical issue, for my purposes, is not whether this is correct as a 
theoretical matter, but how courts are supposed to implement this 
norm. More specifically, I seek to answer the question why the Court 
has not adopted mechanisms comparable to those adopted in the First 
Amendment Equal Protection cases to guard against intentional racial 
discrimination occurring behind a veil of discretion.241 
At first glance, the requirement of showing discriminatory intent 
might seem the most obvious distinction between the Supreme Court's 
equality doctrines in the areas of expression and race. After all, the 
239. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). This Article uses the terms 
"motive," "intent" and "purpose" synonymously. But see GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN 
M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 751-52 (13th ed. 1997) (raising the possibility that 
focus on discriminatory "motive" may differ from focus on discriminatory "purpose"). 
240. For critiques of the intentional discrimination standard, see generally Charles L. 
Lawrence III, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 
39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987), and Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 
STAN. L. REV. 1 105 (1989). 
241. Implicit in my approach is the idea that race and speech equality cases articulate a 
similar norm - namely, prohibiting intentional discrimination - but have adopted very dif­
ferent mechanisms to implement this norm. See Fallon, Implementing the Constitution, supra 
note 10, at 57, 60 (distinguishing the Supreme Court's role in articulating norms from its role 
in developing a means by which to enforce these norms). 
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Supreme Court has never expressly limited the First Amendment's 
mandate of equality to intentional discrimination against those with a 
disfavored message or viewpoint. Nevertheless, as set forth in Part II, 
the Supreme Court on numerous occasions has suggested that inten­
tional discrimination is at the root of its doctrines requiring particu­
larly searching review of schemes that vest government decisionmak­
ers with broad discretion to regulate speech. These rules are not only 
designed to detect intentional discrimination based on speakers' 
messages or ideas; they are also designed to prevent such discrimina­
tion from occurring in the first place. This is perhaps most explicit in 
City of Lakewood, where the Court explains its insistence upon clear 
guidelines as a prophylactic measure designed to prevent "discrimi­
nat[ion] against disfavored speech. "242 As the Court further explains, 
the absence of clear standards makes it all too easy for decisionmakers 
to explain their decisions on content- and viewpoint-neutral grounds, 
using "post hoc rationalizations" and "shifting or illegitimate criteria" 
to hide their discriminatory intent.243 . 
The question I seek to address is why the Court has not embraced 
comparable doctrines in Equal Protection Clause, cases to detect, 
deter, and remedy race discrimination. To be sure, the Court has 
clearly held that disproportionate impact may be a factor in deter­
mining whether discriminatory intent exists.244 But in cases stretching 
from Milliken v. Bradley245 through Washington v. Davis, and from 
McCleskey v. Kemp through United States v. Arm�trong,246 the Court 
has - in most though not all contexts - made it increasingly difficult 
to prove discriminatory intent. This high standard is, at least in part, 
rooted in the Courts' recognition that tolerating some racial inequali­
ties is simply the price to be paid for providing governmental and 
quasi-government actors with the discretion they need in order to 
function properly. 
Although Washington v. Davis and A rlington Heights are the deci­
sions most commonly cited as defining the requirement of discrimina­
tory intent, they are not the first to state it. Even before Brown,247 the 
Supreme Court's decision in Snowden v. Hughes declared that the 
"unequal application" of state laws is "not a denial of equal protection 
unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or 
purposeful discrimination. "248 Snowden discusses earlier �ases in which 
242. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 758 (1988). 
243. Id. 
244. Viii. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977). 
245. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
246. 517 U.S. 456 (1996). 
247. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
248. 321 U.S. 1 ,  8 (1944). 
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discrimination based on race was found to violate equal protection. 
For example, it characterizes Yick Wo v. Hopkins249 as a case in which 
"extrinsic evidence" revealed a discriminatory purpose. Snowden 
likewise characterizes jury selection cases as involving "extrinsic 
evidence of purposeful discriminatory administration of a statute fair 
on its face," while carefully qualifying those cases by stating that the 
mere showing that blacks were not included on a particular jury is 
insufficient to make out an equal protection violation.250 The Snowden 
Court's characterization thus expressly acknowledges that facially 
neutral laws may be susceptible to discriminatory enforcement, where 
public officials are given latitude with respect to their administration 
and enforcement. What is not clear is how courts are supposed 
to gauge whether that discretion is being misused, and what sort of 
"extrinsic" evidence suffices to demonstrate (or at least raise a prima 
facie case of) purposeful discrimination.251 
Justice Stevens raises this question in his Washington v. Davis 
concurrence. While agreeing with the Court's holding that the Equal 
Protection Clause bars only "purposeful discrimination," Justice 
Stevens trenchantly remarked that this holding raises the question 
how courts should go about assessing whether such a purpose exists.252 
In different contexts, Justice Stevens suggested, application of the 
discriminatory intent requirement will implicate different evidentiary 
issues, such as the extent of deference to be paid to the trial court's 
factfinding, the extent to which one characterizes the issue as factual 
or legal, and empirical evidence of disproportionate impact.253 Stating 
that the Equal Protection Clause's prohibition extends only to inten­
tional discrimination, then, raises as many questions as it answers. Left 
unresolved by Washington v. Davis and even by Arlington Heights, 
despite the latter's delineation of some factors that may bear upon the 
intent inquiry, is precisely how courts should determine whether 
discriminatory intent exists in different contexts. 
B.  The Intent Standard Applied 
Two areas are particularly useful in illustrating the general 
approach to discerning whether discriminatory intent exists when gov­
ernmental decisionmaking occurs behind a veil of discretion. The first 
is the Court's approach to the problem of assessing intentional 
249. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
250. Snowden, 321 U.S. at 9. 
251. Cf Ortiz, supra note 240, at 1 127 (describing numerous factors that the Court has 
taken into consideration in determining discriminatory intent in the educational context). 
252. 426 U.S. 229, 253-54 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
253. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 253-54 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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discrimination in the context of school segregation. The second is its 
approach to claims of racial discrimination in the implementation of 
the death penalty, where the discretion vested in prosecutors and 
jurors makes it difficult to discern whether improper motives are at 
work in any particular case. In both areas, the Court has shifted from a 
posture of skepticism toward official discretion, to one of greater trust. 
Implicit in this shift is a willingness to allow some intentional race 
discrimination to persist undetected as the inevitable by-product of the 
need to protect official discretion. 
1 .  Desegregation 
While the Court had stated the intent requirement even before 
Brown v. Board of Education,254 the early desegregation cases demon­
strated a willingness to find that equal protection had been denied 
even where clear evidence of deliberate racial discrimination was 
absent. Brown itself eschewed a reliance upon discriminatory intent, 
focusing instead on the effects of segregation - in particular, the 
"feeling of inferiority" that segregation tended to create in black 
schoolchildren.255 The Court's school segregation opinions over the 
next two decades adopted a similar approach both in determining 
whether equal protection was violated and in assessing the scope of 
permissible remedies.256 The focus upon eliminating segregation "root 
and branch" reflects the Court's early willingness to look beyond the 
noxious intent of individual evildoers, and instead commit the courts 
to remedying a system that, through the actions of numerous 
anonymous decisionmakers, denies equality of educational opportuni­
ties based on race.257 In so doing, the Court considerably narrowed the 
discretion of local school boards to make decisions on such matters as 
pupil reassignment, entrusting that authority instead to the federal 
courts. 
The Supreme Court has subsequently construed these cases as 
involving discriminatory intent, even though their holdings were not 
couched in those terms.258 The difficult question that remains is how 
254. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
255. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. 
256. See Mark D. Rosenbaum & Daniel P. Tokaji, Healing the Blind Goddess: Race and 
Criminal Justice, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1941, 1950-57 (2000) (book review). Illustrative of the 
more intense scrutiny devoted to public education is Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 
430, 435-37 (1968) (focusing on absence of racially identifiable schools as a measure of 
whether equal protection had been achieved). 
257. See Rosenbaum & Tokaji, supra note 256, at 1950-51 (citing Green, 391 U.S. at 438-
39). 
258. As Washington v. Davis, for example, states: "The school desegregation cases have 
also adhered to the basic equal protection principle that the invidious quality of a law 
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the courts should go about assessing whether such a discriminatory 
purpose exists. To borrow from City of Lakewood, the question is how 
courts can and should go about detecting racial discrimination 
shrouded behind "post hoc rationalizations," without unduly infring­
ing upon official discretion.259 
While immediate post-Brown desegregation cases loosely applied 
the requirement of discriminatory intent (in contrast to Snowden and 
later decisions such as Davis and Arlington Heights), the tension 
between the promotion of racial equality and the maintenance of offi­
cial discretion appeared even in those early cases.260 This difficulty is 
comparable to those which led the Supreme Court, in the context of 
speech regulations, to insist upon clear standards prescribed in 
advance, thus limiting official discretion and preventing speech regula­
tors from discriminating based on the messages or ideas expressed. 
Why, then, has the Court not imposed similar procedural require­
ments on such decisionmaking in its equal protection cases? One 
obvious answer is that decisions in this area do not lend themselves to 
the sort of precise standards that the Court has insisted upon in its 
First Amendment cases. Judgment calls regarding the allocation of 
scarce financial resources, for example, may necessitate giving 
government entities broad discretion to determine how to manage 
their schools. Ferreting out racial bias in all such decisions would 
arguably require a degree of judicial supervision that would deprive 
local school boards and city councils of the discretion they require to 
function and, quite possibly, overwhelm the federal courts. 
claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory 
purpose." 426 U.S. at 240. 
259. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 758 (1988). 
260. Two cases decided against the backdrop of court-ordered desegregation, both 
authored by Justice Black, illustrate the Court's difficulties in grappling .with this tension. In 
both Griffin v .  County School Board, 377 U.S.  218 (1964), and Palmer v .  Thompson, 403 
U.S. 217 (1971), the question before the Court was whether a government entity's decision 
to close public facilities in the wake of a desegregation order violated equal protection. Grif­
fin held unconstitutional a Virginia county's decision to shut down its public schools and 
shift resources to a fund formed to operate private schools for white children in that county. 
While recognizing that states enjoy "wide discretion" to determine whether their laws will 
operate statewide or only in certain counties, Justice Black's opinion for the Court saw 
through this attempt to evade court-ordered desegregation. Griffin, 377 U.S. at 231. In 
Palmer v. Thompson, the Jackson, Mississippi city council closed five public swimming pools 
in the wake of a desegregation order. 403 U.S. at 219. Although the circumstances bore a 
striking similarity to those in Griffin - in. particular, it seemed clear that the pools had been 
closed to prevent blacks and whites from swimming together - Justice Black distinguished 
Griffin, expressly grounding his opinion in Palmer in the difficulties inherent in discerning 
discriminatory intent, noting, "[I]t is extremely difficult for a court to ascertain the motiva­
tion, or collection of different motivations, that lie behind a legislative enactment." Palmer, 
403 U.S. at 224. For criticism of the motivation-blind approach taken by Justice Black in 
Palmer, see Paul Brest, The Supreme Court 1975 Term - Foreword: In Defense of the Anti­
discrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 26-27 (1976). 
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Such concerns with giving local entities adequate breathing space 
within which to operate come to the fore in Milliken v. Bradley,261 
which reversed a lower court order that required an interdistrict 
remedy for school segregation in Detroit. Chief Justice Burger's 
opinion in Milliken put a premium on protecting "local autonomy" 
over decisions of educational policy, asserting that " [n]o single 
tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local control 
over the operation of schools."262 By the time of Dayton Board of 
Education v. Brinkman,263 decided after Washington v. Davis and 
Arlington Heights, the Court had backed away from the searching 
scrutiny of local officials' education-related decisions that was evident 
in its earlier desegregation cases. The Court in Brinkman vacated the 
imposition of a systemwide remedy because of an inadequate showing 
of systemwide discriminatory intent.264 Like Justice Black's Griffin 
opinion, the Court acknowledged the perils of attempting to discern 
the motivations of multimember public bodies.265 But as in Milliken, 
the Court nevertheless held that deference to the autonomy of local 
officials requires that federal courts refrain from a systemwide remedy 
absent a clear showing. 
The latter desegregation cases strike the balance in favor of discre­
tion, holding that federal oversight of local school boards' decisions on 
educational policy is impermissible without clear evidence that a local 
school board has engaged in purposeful discrimination.266 Implicit in 
these decisions, most notably Milliken and Brinkman, is an inclination 
to respect the discretion of government officials, even if it means that 
illicit discrimination may remain undetected. The proper functioning 
of public schools, the Court seems to suggest, depends upon preserv­
ing such discretion. Also implicit in these decisions is a heightened 
sensitivity to the limitations of courts in discerning whether invidious 
discrimination is really at work with respect to any particular decision 
of a public entity. Undoubtedly, the Court's reluctance to intrude too 
deeply into local decisionmaking - and its concomitant willingness to 
tolerate such discrimination - is partly a reflection of the changing 
makeup of the Court during these years. Yet it might also be 
construed as reflecting an increasing awareness of the practical diffi­
culties involved in detecting illicit motivation, and a skepticism about 
261. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
262. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 741. 
263. 433 U.S. 406 (1977). 
264. Brinkman, 433 U.S. at 414. 
265. Id. ; see also Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 228 (1985) (recognizing the "diffi­
culties in determining the actual motivations of the various legislators that produced a given 
decision") . 
266. See Rosenbaum & Tokaji, supra note 256, al 1951-52. 
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the capacity of the courts adequately to remedy segregation even 
where it may be the product of intentional discrimination. The school 
desegregation cases thus evince a shift from skepticism to greater 
tolerance of official discretion, at least in the context of racial 
discrimination. 
2. The Death Penalty 
A similar shift is evident in the Court's consideration of claims of 
racial equality in the administration of the death penalty, and particu­
larly in the shift that took place between the decisions in Furman v. 
Georgia267 and McCleskey v. Kemp.268 While the Justices who formed 
the Furman majority expressed concern with the threat to equality 
posed by the discretion inherent in the imposition of the death 
penalty, McCleskey contains perhaps the most explicit declaration that 
some inequality in the imposition of criminal punishment is the inevi­
table price to be paid for giving the institutions of democratic self­
govemment the discretion they need to function.269 
In Furman, a fractured Court struck down the death penalty as 
administered in Georgia and Texas, and in other states by implica­
tion.270 Although the case was decided under the Eighth Amendment, 
the potential for racial discrimination arising from the discretionary 
system for implementing the death penalty is a common thread 
running through the opinions of the justices who formed the fractured 
majority.271 Justice Douglas's opinion, for example, stated that the 
"uncontrolled discretion of judges or juries" made it impossible to 
assess how great an impact racial bias had on the outcomes.272 His 
reasoning resembles the First Amendment Equal Protection line of 
267. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
268. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
269. The Court's attempts to grapple with the problematic relationship between discre­
tion and racial equality begins even before Furman. In McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 
(1971 ), the Court rejected a claim that the absence of standards to guide the jury's discretion 
violated the Constitution. "In light of history, experience, and the present limitations of hu­
man knowledge," the McGautha Court broadly stated, "we find it quite impossible to say 
that committing to the untrammeled discretion of the jury the power to pronounce life or 
death in capital cases is offensive to anything in the Constitution." Id. at 207. 
270. Steven F. Shatz & Nina Rivkind, The California Death Penalty Scheme: Requiem 
for Furman?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1283, 1285 (1997). 
271 .  The five justices who formed the majority joined only in a brief per curiam opinion, 
but otherwise wrote separately. Only Justices Brennan and Marshall would have invalidated 
the death penalty outright. The other three, Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White, reserved 
judgment on this question, concluding only that the manner in which it was applied was con­
stitutionally unacceptable. For a more detailed discussion of the justices' concerns regarding 
discretion and attendant inequality in the administration of the death penalty, evident in the 
five Furman concurrences, see Patterson, supra note 41, at 47-53. 
272. Furman, 408 U.S. at 253 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
2460 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 101 :2409 
reasoning - evident in such cases as Shuttlesworth, City of Lakewood, 
and Forsyth County - in which the Court has recognized that the lack 
of precise guidelines for regulating speech makes it practically impos­
sible for courts to determine whether improper motives (such as a 
desire to suppress particular viewpoints) are at work. While not going 
so far as to hold the death penalty unconstitutional per se, Justice 
Douglas thought the "discretionary statutes" before the Court uncon­
stitutional in their operation: "They are pregnant with discrimination 
and discrimination is an ingredient not compatible with the idea of 
equal protection of the laws . . . .  "273 
Post-Furman decisions struggled to resolve the tension between 
the constitutional mandate of racial equality and the discretion intrin­
sic in the states' systems for determining whether to impose the death 
penalty.274 The difficulty in reconciling these two values is evident in 
Gregg v. Georgia,275 in which seven members of the Court stated their 
view that the death penalty does not under all circumstances violate 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.276 The Gregg plurality 
nevertheless insisted that states must articulate guidelines for the ad­
ministration of the death penalty, stating that "where discretion is 
afforded a sentencing body . . . that discretion must be suitably 
directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and 
capricious action. "277 
The Gregg plurality opinion thus presents a noteworthy point of 
comparison with the standards set in First Amendment Equal Protec­
tion cases such as City of Lakewood. The public fora cases have long 
emphasized the need for public entities to specify clearly the reasons 
for which applications to speak may be granted or denied. The 
requirement of clear rules specified in advance - in both the prior 
273. Id. at 256-57. The other four· justices who formed the Furman majority likewise 
linked discretion and discrimination in the administration of the death penalty. See Patter­
son, supra note 41, at 53 (citing concurring opinions). Justice Marshall's opinion labeled the 
discretion authorized by the earlier decision in McGautha "an open invitation to discrimina­
tion," observing that blacks were sentenced to death at a much higher rate than whites. 
Furman, 408 U.S. at 364-65 (Marshall, J., concurring). In attempting to explain the apparent 
inconsistencies in the imposition of the death penalty, Justice Stewart's concurring opinion 
likewise observed: "[I]f any basis can be discerned for the selection of these few to be sen­
tenced to die, it is the constitutionally impermissible basis of race." Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., 
concurring). 
274. In the four years after Furman, at least thirty-five state legislatures enacted statutes 
allowing the death penalty in at least some murder cases. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 
179-80 & n.23 (1976) (citing statutes). 
275. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
276. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) ("We hold 
that the death penalty is not a form of punishment that may never be imposed . . . .  "); id. at 
207 (White, J., concurring, joined by Burger, C.J. and Rehnquist, J.); id. at 227 (Blackmun, 
J., concurring). 
277. Id. at 189 (plurality opinion). 
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restraint and death penalty contexts - is designed to prevent discre­
tion from resulting in discrimination, while at the same time making it 
easier for courts to meaningfully review cases in which authorities are 
alleged to have acted on constitutionally impermissible grounds. 
There is, however, an important respect in which the death penalty 
cases depart from the First Amendment Equal Protection model. In 
the speech cases, the Court has imposed upon regulating authorities 
the obligation to delineate what may trigger both the grant and denial 
of permission to speak. Two of Gregg's companion cases, however, 
expressly disallowed a comparable symmetry. Roberts v. Louisiana218 
and Woodson v. North Carolina219 both hold that some discretion must 
be left with the sentencing authority. While recognizing that Furman 
disapproved of "unbridled jury discretion" in the imposition of the 
death penalty, Woodson deems some such discretion necessary.280 
After Furman's emphasis on the dangers of racial inequality inher­
ent in a discretionary system for administering the death penalty, one 
might have thought that a system that clearly set forth the circum­
stances in which the death penalty is obligatory would comply with the 
Constitution. Such a system could be expected to reduce the dangers 
of racial inequality to which the various Furman opinions pointed. The 
opinions in Woodson and Roberts, however, emphasize the counter­
vailing value in allowing "consideration of the character and record of 
the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular 
offense."281 Allowing the jury to consider such factors, under this view, 
promotes more individualized justice, since mitigating circumstances 
that call for lenity may come into play. Such discretion is not only 
appropriate as a part of the implementation of the death penalty, the 
Court concluded, but constitutionally required. 
The post-Furman death penalty opinions thus illustrate the uneasy 
relationship between discretion and racial equality. On the one hand, 
in Woodson and Roberts, the Court emphasizes the importance of 
preserving discretion, so that mitigating circumstances can be taken 
into consideration in administering individualized justice. On the other 
hand, Gregg follows Furman in implicitly recognizing the dangers that 
may arise from such discretion - including the possibility that racial 
bias will creep into the process - while at the same time expressing 
278. 428 U.S. 325 (1976). 
279. 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
280. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 302. 
281. Id. at 304; see Roberts, 428 U.S. at 333 (finding the vice of a mandatory death­
sentence statute to be a "lack of focus on the circumstances of the particular offense and the 
character and propensities of the offender"). 
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confidence that guidelines crafted to cabin such discretion can control 
such improper factors.282 
The Court's attempt to balance the competing objectives of equal­
ity and discretion in the administration of the death penalty was short­
lived. In Lockett v. Ohio,283 the balance tilted decisively in the direc­
tion of affording discretion to sentencing authorities, even if it meant 
sacrificing regularity. Lockett rejected an Ohio law that limited the 
mitigating factors that a jury could consider in deciding whether to 
withhold the death penalty. While asserting the necessity of main­
taining a "proper balance between clear guidelines that assure relative 
equality of treatment and discretion to consider individual factors," 
the Lockett decision privileges the latter over the former.284 Lockett 
places greater value on the individualized justice that may result from 
discretion than on the need to ensure equality. , 
Lockett set the stage for McCleskey v. Kemp,285 a decision that 
brings together the heightened concern for discretion evident in the 
post-Furman Eighth Amendment cases and the high standards for 
proving discriminatory intent evident in equal protection cases such as 
Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights. In McCleskey, the Court 
was presented with the most thorough study ever developed of racial 
inequalities in the administration of the death penalty. The Baldus 
study, introduced by McCleskey's attorneys, provided strong evidence 
that (1) those murdering whites were far more likely to receive 
the death penalty than those murdering blacks, and that (2) black 
murderers were more likely to receive the death penalty than white 
murderers.286 
In McCleskey, the Court's prioritization of discretion over equality, 
implicit in Lockett, becomes even more prominent. Justice Powell's 
282. Patterson accurately sums up the uneasy balance embodied in the 1976 decisions as 
follows: " [T)he Court tried to strike a balance between discretion, which yields individual-· 
ized treatment, and standards that guide or channel discretion and prevent arbitrariness or 
discrimination." Patterson, supra note 41, at 65-66. 
283. 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
284. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 620. This caused some to read the Supreme Court's opinion as 
indicating that it was getting "out of the business of telling the states how to administer the 
death penalty." Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. Cr. REV. 305, 305 (1984); 
see Jeremy Rabkin, Justice and Judicial Hand-Wringing: The Death Penalty Since Gregg, 4 
CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 18 (1985). Although this proved to be an overstatement, Lockett indeed 
signaled that a higher premium would be placed on giving sentencing bodies some discretion 
in deciding whether to impose a death sentence, even if it meant that some inequalities 
would have to be tolerated. See Patterson, supra note 41, at 69 ("Lockett marks the turning 
point where the Court began to favor individualization over equality."). 
285. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
286. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286-87. Baldus and his colleagues found that those who 
murdered whites were 4.3 times as likely as those who murdered blacks to receive the death 
penalty, even after accounting for 230 nonracial variables. Id. at 287. The study found that 
black defendants were 1.1 times as likely to receive the death penalty as nonblack defen­
dants. Id. 
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opinion for the McCleskey majority emphasized that discretion is an 
integral component of the criminal justice system.287 Through a rigor­
ous application of the discriminatory intent requirement, the Court 
concluded that no violation of equal protection had been shown, 
either by the jury that determined McCleskey's sentence or by the 
state legislature that maintained the death penalty in the face of its 
alleged discriminatory effects.288 The Court decisively rejected 
McCleskey's argument that the racially disparate impact shown in the 
Baldus study demonstrated a "constitutionally significant risk of racial 
bias affecting the Georgia capital sentencing process."289 
The most illuminating portion of the McCleskey opinion is its 
remark that the defendant's claim "taken to its logical conclusion, 
throws into serious question the principles that underlie our entire 
criminal justice system."29° For if the Court were to accept 
McCleskey's proposition that racial bias infected the state's system for 
imposing the death penalty, it would cast doubt upon the constitution­
ality of the discretion vested in actors throughout every aspect of the 
criminal justice system, from cops on the beat to prosecutors to judges 
and juries.291 Justice Brennan's dissent summed up this concern as a 
fear of "too much justice."292 The Court's holding in McCleskey may 
be construed somewhat more charitably as an acknowledgment that 
racial inequalities are the price to be paid for the discretion the Court 
believed essential to the criminal justice system to function.293 
McCleskey marks the effective end of the Court's attempts to 
balance discretion and racial equality in the administration of capital 
punishment. It would, however, be inaccurate to regard the McCleskey 
majority as blind to the existence of racial disparities in the admini­
stration of the death penalty. The majority all but admits that some 
racial bias may creep into decisions about whether to impose the death 
287. Id. at 297. 
288. Id. at 292-99. 
289. Id. at 313. 
290. Id. at 314-15. 
291. See Rosenbaum & Tokaji, supra note 256, at 1955-57 (discussing the McCleskey 
majority's view that the eradication of the disparities documented in the Baldus study was 
beyond its legitimate reach). 
292. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
293. See Ortiz, supra note 240, at 1 145 ("Discretion in this context, far from being a rea­
son to distrust decisionmaking, is a reason to insulate it from attack."). An internal memo­
randum from Justice Scalia following oral argument in McCleskey even more clearly articu­
lates his recognition of and resignation to the fact that this discretion makes racial 
discrimination inevitable: "Since it is my view that the unconscious operation of irrational 
sympathies and antipathies, including racial, upon jury decisions and (hence) prosecutorial 
decisions is real, acknowledged in the decisions of this court, and ineradicable, I cannot hon­
estly say that all I need is more proof." EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE 
FIRST EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE EPIC STRUGGLE INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 211 
(1998). 
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penalty, but maintains that the elimination of all such bias is simply 
beyond the institutional capacities of courts.294 There are, moreover, 
some things that courts can do even after McCleskey to reduce the 
impact of such bias on the sentencing process. For example, as the 
Court held just a year before McCleskey, the discretion inherent in the 
death penalty cases requires that a criminal defendant be permitted to 
question prospective jurors in voir dire about possible racial bias in a 
case where race may be an issue.295 And as will be discussed at greater 
length below, the Court has imposed stringent limitations to prevent 
peremptory strikes from being exercised in a racially biased manner.296 
Yet the McCleskey majority appears to concede the point that, 
notwithstanding these protections, some racial bias will inevitably 
enter the process. McCleskey thus provides perhaps the most explicit 
acknowledgment that toleration of some racial discrimination is 
required in order to preserve discretion.297 
C. Explaining Conventional Equal Protection 
The areas analyzed above are just two of those in which the Court 
has adopted a more tolerant approach to official discretion, even 
where it may result in racial inequality. As Mark Rosenbaum and I 
have argued, this approach understands the role of the courts as 
limited to the detection of individual bad actors.298 The dominant 
paradigm therefore focuses on identifying "bad apples" rather than 
examining whether the tree is poisoned by more widespread discrimi­
nation within discretionary systems.299 One example is the problem of 
racial discrimination in police practices. In general, the Court has 
sought to preserve police discretion to determine whom to stop and 
arrest, notwithstanding the risk of racially discriminatory enforce­
ment.300 The difficulties of making a discrimination claim arise not 
294. McC/eskey, 481 U.S. at 313 n.37; see also Rosenbaum & Tokaji, supra note 256, at 
1956-57 (describing McC/eskey's core message that " [e]ven if systemic discrimination within 
our criminal justice processes exists, the Court must leave it untouched - as though the 
Constitution itself demanded that such discrimination remain invisible, or, at the very leas�, 
be defined as something other than discrimination"). 
295. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35 (1986). 
296. See infra Part IV.A. 
297. See Robert A. Burt, Disorder in the Court: The Death Penalty and the Constitution, 
85 MICH. L. REV. 1741 ,  1797-98 (1987) (suggesting that such a conclusion was necessary for 
the Court to uphold the death penalty). 
298. See Rosenbaum & Tokaji, supra note 256, at 1957. 
299. Id. at 1949. 
300. Recent examples of this tolerance include Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 
(1996) (holding that traffic stops are permissible when there is probable cause to believe a 
traffic-code violation has occurred), and Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) 
(holding that an arrest may occur for traffic violations). The dangers of racial discrimination 
furnish the backdrop for the Court's analysis of the Fourth Amendment issue before it. See 
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only from the exacting intent standard, but also because of the high 
bar that must be met to establish one's standing to seek equitable 
relief301 and the difficulties in obtaining evidence needed to show an 
equal protection violation.302 The result is that it is extremely difficult 
to obtain relief in those cases where discretion shrouds covert 
discrimination. 
What explains the very different balance struck between official 
discretion in the Conventional Equal Protection cases as compared to 
the First Amendment Equal Protection cases? Three possibilities 
warrant consideration. 
1. Trust 
One possibility is that the Court simply may not believe that offi­
cial decisionmakers today - be they local school officials, prosecutors, 
jurors, or police officers - are as likely to engage in intentional racial 
discrimination. The Court may feel more comfortable vesting discre­
tion in official decisionmakers in race cases (at least in these contexts) 
than in speech cases, because there is a lesser likelihood of that discre­
tion being exercised in a constitutionally impermissible manner. Put 
another way, the Court may simply be less distrustful of officials 
misusing their discretion to discriminate based upon race than on 
viewpoint, at least in the circumstances presented by these cases. 
2. Capacity 
The second possible explanation for the differences between First 
Amendment Equal Protection and Conventional Equal Protection is 
that, as a practical matter, it is less difficult to create mechanisms by 
which to curb discretion in the realm of speech. After all, it is fairly 
id. at 372 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("(A]s the recent debate over racial profiling demon­
strates all too clearly, a relatively minor traffic infraction may often serve as an excuse for 
stopping and harassing an individual."). Defenders of such tolerance might be expected to 
respond to such concerns by noting that intentional racial discrimination may still be chal­
lenged under the Equal Protection Clause. It is certainly true that those who believe that 
they are victims of racial discrimination may still assert equal protection claims. What this 
response does not, however, adequately grapple with is just how difficult it is as a practical 
matter to successfully make such a challenge. See also Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 
F.3d 612 (7th Cir. 2001) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to an alleged practice of 
stopping motorists based on race, on the ground that the plaintiffs' proof of discriminatory 
intent was inadequate). 
301. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (holding that an African­
American man seeking to challenge the LAPD's use of chokehold lacked standing because 
there was no immediate threat that this tactic would be used upon him again). 
302. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 469 (2003) (holding that to show dis­
criminatory effect, a defendant seeking discovery must adduce "some evidence that similarly 
situated defendants of other races could have been prosecuted, but were not"). For a discus­
sion of how Whren and Armstrong combine to make it more difficult to prove selective en­
forcement, see Hall, supra note 53. 
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easy for public entities to adopt specific rules for issuance of a permit 
to speak in a public park. It is much more difficult to prescribe precise 
and rigid standards to curb racial discrimination by juries administer­
ing the death penalty or police officers deciding whom to stop. Simi­
larly, the Court may feel that it is beyond the institutional capacity of 
courts to check possible racial discrimination arising from the exercise 
of official discretion.303 
3. Valuation 
A third explanation is that the Court may value discretion and 
inequality differently. It may believe that discretion is of greater im­
portance in the areas of public education, administration of criminal 
punishment, and law enforcement than in areas involving speech. 
Alternatively, it may believe that intentional expressive discrimination 
is a greater evil than intentional race discrimination (at least in the 
contexts described above). The valuation explanation suggests that it 
is more important to stop government from discriminating based on 
message or ideas - even if it requires curbing official discretion -
than to stop it from discriminating based on race. Put simply, the 
Court may value expressive equality more highly than racial equality, 
or place a lower value on discretion where speech is at issue than 
where group-based discrimination is alleged. 
* * * *  
Each of these three explanations undoubtedly has something to do 
with the enhanced skepticism that the Court has applied to discretion 
in the First Amendment as opposed to Conventional Equal Protection 
cases. To understand the relative importance of these factors, I 
now tum to lines of precedent that - though decided under the 
Equal Protection Clause - bear some similarities to the First 
Amendment Equal Protection cases. These cases show that the 
Court has been especially sensitive when considering threats to 
racial equality in the realm of political participation. They therefore 
suggest that a concern with political equality underlies the difference 
between First Amendment and Conventional Equal Protection. These 
Unconventional Equal Protection cases provide evidence that 
valuation - as in particular the high value attached to equality in the 
303. A related practical concern is the burden on courts charged with policing discre­
tion, especially in the criminal-justice system. Cf Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Seen 
in a Glass Darkly: The Future of the Federal Courts, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 1; William H. 
Rehnquist, The 1998 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 1999, 
at 1, 2 ("The number of cases brought to the federal courts is one of the most serious prob­
lems facing them today."). 
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realm of political participation - plays a substantial role in deter­
mining how much discretion official decisionmakers will be afforded. 
IV. DISCRETION AND PARTICIPATION: UNCONVENTIONAL EQUAL 
PROTECTION 
In assessing the differences between First Amendment Equal 
Protection's and Conventional Equal Protection's treatment of discre­
tion, it is helpful to examine three areas of equal protection inquiry 
that depart from the norm. These areas, which I collectively refer to as 
"Unconventional Equal Protection" involve: (1) racial discrimination 
in the selection of jurors, (2) restructuring of the political process to 
the disadvantage of minorities, and (3) the principle of one person, 
one vote. 
The overriding questions to be considered in examining these cases 
are why the Supreme Court has chosen to depart from its Conven­
tional Equal Protection rules, and whether that departure bears any 
relationship to the reasons underlying the First Amendment Equal 
Protection cases' skepticism of official discretion. My answer is that 
the approach that the Court has taken in each of these areas can be 
understood as motivated by concerns similar to those which underlie 
the First Amendment Equal Protection cases. For each of these areas 
involves government activities that bear critically upon political par­
ticipation. The more intense skepticism that the Court has applied to 
official discretion in each of these areas is grounded in the concern -
prominent in at least some of the First Amendment Equal Protection 
cases304 - that government discretion will be subtly exercised to deny 
equality in areas of democratic participation. 
A. Jury Exclusion 
The first area in which the Supreme Court has departed from its 
Conventional Equal Protection rules is in cases involving racial 
discrimination in the selection of jurors. There the Court has adopted 
a rule that allows a prima facie case to be made on something less than 
the ordinary showing.305 In striking down such discriminatory devices 
304. See, e.g. , supra notes 101-104, 135-177 and accompanying text. 
305. For more detailed discussions of the development of equal protection law in the 
area of juror selection, see Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin 
to Voting, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 203, 207-10 (1995); Swift, supra note 23, at 300-38; Michael 
A. Cressler, Note, Powers v. Ohio: The Death Knell for the Peremptory Challenge?, 28 
IDAHO L. REV. 349 (1991-92); Michael A. Desmond, Note, Limiting a Defendant's Peremp­
tory Challenges: Georgia v. McCollum and the Problematic Extension of Equal Protection, 42 
CATH. U. L. REV. 389, 400-06 (1993); Melissa C. Hinton, Note, Edmonson v. Leesville Con­
crete Co.: Has Batson Been Stretched Too Far?, 57 MO. L. REV. 569, 571-77 (1992); Bradley 
R. Kirk, Note, Milking the New Sacred Cow: The Supreme Court Limits the Peremptory 
Challenge on Racial Grounds in Powers v. Ohio and Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 19 
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as the "key man" system and, more recently, in proscribing discrimina­
tion in the exercise of peremptory challenges, the Court has exhibited 
a greater suspicion of discretion than is evident in other areas of equal 
protection law.306 
That the Equal Protection Clause prohibits racial discrimination in 
the selection of grand and petit juries has been settled since three 
cases decided in 1879: Strauder v. West Virginia,307 Virginia v. Rives,308 
and Ex Parte Virginia.309 These early cases, however, reveal the diffi­
culties in ferreting out intentional discrimination in the selection of 
juries - and the problems inherent in cabining the discretion of state 
officials when it comes to jury selection. Strauder involved an express 
prohibition against blacks serving on either grand or petit juries, a 
prohibition the Court held to violate the Equal Protection Clause.310 
Rives, however, held that cases may be removed to federal court only 
where state law expressly prohibited blacks from serving as jurors.3 1 1  
The third case, Ex Parte Virginia, affirmed the power of the federal 
courts to intervene even in the absence of an express racial classifica­
tion, where such intentional discrimination could be proven. The 
Court rejected a constitutional challenge to a federal prohibition 
against discrimination in the selection of jurors.312 While providing 
some federal check on the discriminatory misuse of state officials' 
discretion in the area of juror selection, Ex Parte Virginia leaves open 
the question of how to prove intentional discrimination. 
The first case to address this question was Neal v. Delaware,313 
decided the following year. Neal rejected the defendant's claim that 
the case should have been removed to federal court, where there was 
no express exclusion of blacks prescribed by state law.314 Neal reversed 
PEPP. L. REV. 691, 697-712 (1992); and Robert T. Prior, Comment, The Peremptory Chal­
lenge: A Lost Cause?, 44 MERCER L. REV. 579, 583-89 (1993). 
306. Amar, supra note 305, at 207 (describing these as first- and second-generation jury­
exclusion cases); Ortiz, supra note 240, at 1119-20 (describing the "venire selection and panel 
selection tests"). 
307. 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (striking down a law excluding blacks from juries and allowing 
the case to be removed to federal court). 
308. 100 U.S. 313 (1879) (limiting removal to cases where there was an express prohibi­
tion against blacks serving on juries). 
309. 100 U.S. 339 (1879) (holding that a federal criminal prohibition against discrimina­
tion in selection of juries was a valid exercise of authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
310. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 304, 308. 
311. Rives, 100 U.S. at 321-22. 
312. Ex Parle Virginia, 100 U.S. at 344. 
313. 103 U.S. 370 (1880). 
314. Neal, 103 U.S. at 393. In Neal, the Supreme Court applied a "conclusive" presump­
tion that the state's law complied with the Fourteenth Amendment's nondiscrimination 
requirement - and therefore an irrebuttable presumption against the propriety of removal 
June 2003] First Amendment Equal Protection 2469 
the conviction, however, on the ground that the defendant should 
have been permitted to make an evidentiary showing to support his 
claim that blacks had nevertheless been systematically excluded from 
jury pools. In particular, the defendant had introduced evidence 
showing that no blacks, from a population of over 20,000, had ever 
been summoned as jurors - a factual showing that, six years before 
Yick Wo, the Court held sufficient to make out a prima facie case.315 
Notwithstanding Neal, a series of tum-of-the-century cases denied 
relief to criminal defendants who alleged or showed a pattern of 
excluding African Americans from juries.316 But in Carter v. Texas,311 
the Court found an equal protection violation where the defendant 
alleged that jury commissioners had selected no black grand jurors for 
several years, even though blacks constituted one-fourth of registered 
voters.318 Carter distinguished prior cases on the ground that the 
defendant in the case before it had never been given the opportunity 
to introduce evidence in support of his discrimination claim, even 
though he stood ready to call witnesses.319 The Court's opinion sug­
gests that statistically significant variations from the population at 
large, occurring within a system that provides an opportunity for offi­
cials to discriminate, creates a presumption that equal protection has 
- where state courts had struck down a state-law requirement of exclusion and the legisla­
ture had not attempted to reenact it. Id. at 389-90. Given the absence of an express prohibi­
tion requiring exclusion, a' defendant would be required to prove discrimination in the state 
court's actions. The Court applied and extended this presumption in Bush v. Kentucky, 107 
U.S. 110 (1883), to a state whose legislature had twice reenacted laws requiring exclusion 
even after a state-court holding that such discrimination violated the Fourteenth Amend­
ment as interpreted in Strauder. This presumption did not, however, apply to an indictment 
handed down by grand jurors selected before the state court struck down the exclusionary 
law. Bush, 107 U.S. at 122; see Swift, supra note 23, at 302-03 (describing the presumption 
applied in Rives, Neal, and Bush). 
315. Neal, 103 U.S. at 397. 
316. These included cases in which defendants provided affidavits asserting that no 
blacks had been selected as grand or petit jurors in their counties. Tarrance v. Florida 188 
U.S. 519, 520-21 (1903) (applying Smith to reject a defendant's motion to quash venire and 
panels of grand and petit jurors, based on an affidavit alleging that for many years none of 
some 1400 African American men in the county had been selected); Brownfield v. South 
Carolina, 189 U.S. 426, 427 (1903) (rejecting a challenge based on allegations that the grand 
jury was composed solely of whites in a county in which blacks constituted four-fifths of reg­
istered voters); Smith v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 592, 600-01 (1896) (concluding that competent 
evidence of race-based exclusion was lacking where the defendant had submitted affidavit 
asserting that none of the some 1300 black registered voters in the county had been selected 
as grand jurors). 
317. 177 U.S. 442 (1900). 
318. Carter, 177 U.S. at 448. 
319. Id. at 447-49. 
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been denied.320 Put simply, disparity plus discretion would equal (a 
prima facie case of) discrimination.321 
Although the practice of excluding blacks from juries continued 
unchallenged for decades,322 the Court reinvigorated the Carter 
formula starting in the mid-1930s. In Norris v. Alabama,323 the Court 
struck down the state's key man system. State law gave jury commis­
sioners discretion to select men "generally reputed to be honest and 
intelligent" as jurors, and no black had been called for grand or petit 
jury service in decades.324 The Court held this sufficient to make out a 
prima facie case325 and rejected the suggestion that it should simply 
defer to the state court's finding that there was insufficient evidence of 
purposeful discrimination.326 After a careful weighing of the evidence 
adduced below, it concluded that no reasonable explanation but inten­
tional discrimination against blacks could be provided for the statisti­
cal disparity demonstrated.327 
Norris marks an important turn in the development of equal 
protection doctrine in the area of jury selection, not only because of its 
application of the "discretion plus disparity equals discrimination" 
formula, but also because of its willingness carefully to scrutinize the 
state's explanations for the disparities shown. Over the next several 
decades, the Court would apply this analytic framework to strike down 
the juror-selection practices of numerous states.328 
320. See Swift, supra note 23, at 308 (stating that Carter establishes the elements of a 
prima facie case of race discrimination in jury selection). 
321. See Ortiz, supra note 240, at 1 127 ("(T]he jury cases require a showing of disparate 
impact plus a showing that the jury selection procedure was susceptible to abuse . . . .  ") . 
322. See Swift, supra note 23, at 308 ("[T]otal exclusion of African-Americans from jury 
eligibility appears to have continued for over a generation in some states without further 
challenge."). 
323. 294 U.S. 587 (1935). 
324. Norris, 294 U.S. at 590-91 .  The evidence showed that 666 of 8801 male residents of 
the county over twenty-one were black. Id. at 590. 
325. Id. at 591 . 
326. Id. at 590 ("(W]henever a conclusion of law of a state court as to a federal right and 
findings of fact are so intermingled that the latter control the former, it is incumbent upon us 
to analyze the facts in order that the appropriate enforcement of the federal right may be 
assured."). 
327. Id. at 592-98. 
328. See, e.g. , Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 550-51 (1967) (finding a prima facie case 
of intentional discrimination based on the statistical disparity in jury composition under a 
system in which jury lists were composed from tax digests separating white and black vot­
ers); Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404, 407-08 (1967) (same); Jones v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 24, 24-
25 (1967) (same); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 561-62 (1953) (finding a prima facie case 
based on the statistical disparity in jury composition under a system in which names of black 
and white potential jurors were printed on differently colored tickets); Patton v. Mississippi, 
332 U.S. 463, 466-69 (1947) (holding that the absence of blacks on grand and petit juries for 
thirty years, under a system that gave commissioners discretion to decide who was qualified 
to serve, proved purposeful discrimination); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 402-06 (1942) 
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The jury exclusion cases thus apply a less deferential standard than 
is characteristic of Conventional Equal Protection analysis. Even after 
Washington v. Davis329 and Arlington Heights clarified that (in the 
absence of an express racial classification) discriminatory intent must 
be shown to establish an equal protection violation, the Court has 
adhered to the "discretion plus disparity equals discrimination" 
formula in its jury selection cases. In Castaneda v. Partida, the Court 
relied on the statistically significant underrepresentation of Mexican 
Americans on grand juries, along with evidence of "a selection proce­
dure that is susceptible of abuse or is not racially neutral," to hold that 
a denial of equal protection had been established.330 While expressly 
recognizing that the holdings of Washington v. Davis and Arlington 
Heights required something more than disparate impact, the subjec­
tivity of Texas's system combined with the evidence of disparate 
impact was held sufficient to make out a prima facie case, if only in 
this area.331 The Court proceeded to undertake a thorough examina-
(holding that the absence of blacks on a grand jury list, where there were qualified blacks 
but jury commissioners had discretion to choose acquaintances that they believed qualified, 
made a prima facie case); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940) (finding an equal protection 
violation based on statistical evidence showing underrepresentation of blacks on county 
grand juries, plus a discretionary system whereby commissioners limited selection to their 
personal acquaintances); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 359-62 (1939) (holding that the 
absence of blacks from venire, in a system that gave commissioners power to exclude based 
on character and community standing, made a prima facie case of discrimination); Hale v. 
Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613, 614-15 (1938) (holding that a fifty-year exclusion of blacks from 
grand-jury service, coupled with evidence that only white persons' names had been put on 
the jury wheel, made a case of discrimination). 
Especially illuminating is the opinion in Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 348 (1970), 
which challenged the manner in which grand juries were selected in many Georgia counties. 
Under Georgia law, state superior court judges selected six-person jury commissions in each 
county, which in turn selected grand juries, which in turn selected five-person boards of edu­
cation. Id. The Turner plaintiffs argued both that this system was facially unconstitutional 
and that it was applied in a discriminatory manner. Despite the broad discretion vested in 
both state judges and grand juries, the Supreme Court rejected the facial challenge. Id. at 
353-55. It accepted, however, plaintiffs' argument that discretion, in conjunction with evi­
dence of a substantial statistical disparity within a county, made a prima facie case of jury 
discrimination. Id. at 360; see also Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 630-31 (1972) 
(holding that a significant statistical racial disparity in selection of grand jurors under a sys­
tem providing for a racial designation on questionnaires presented a prima facie case of ra­
cial discrimination). 
329. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976), implicitly acknowledged that the 
jury selection cases allowed a less stringent disparate-impact test for assessing whether inten­
tional discrimination has occurred, explaining this difference as follows: 
It is . . .  not infrequently true that the discriminatory impact - in the jury cases for example, 
the total or seriously disproportionate exclusion of Negroes from jury venires - may for all 
practical purposes demonstrate unconstitutionality because in various circumstances the dis­
crimination is very difficult to explain on nonracial grounds. 
Id. Left incompletely explained is what "circumstances" lead the Court to believe that dis­
criminatory intent may be inferred from disparate impact in the jury selection context, but 
not others. 
330. 430 U.S. 482, 494, 497 (1977). 
331. Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 493, 495-97. 
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tion of the evidence on which the state relied to prove nondiscrimina­
tion, and despite the district court's finding to the contrary, concluded 
that the state had failed to meet its burden.332 
More recently, the Court has grappled with the tension between 
racial equality and discretion in the exercise of peremptory challenges 
by prosecutors, criminal defendants, and civil litigants. The issue first 
arose in Swain v. Alabama,333 in which the prosecutor used his 
peremptory strikes to eliminate all of the six blacks on the venire. The 
Court declined to undertake an inquiry into whether the prosecutor 
intentionally excluded all blacks (or any other group) because of their 
race, but created a "presumption" that peremptories were exercised 
for race-neutral reasons - a presumption that, under Swain, was all 
but irrebuttable.334 For although the defendant alleged that blacks had 
not served on any county jury for years, the Court held such evidence 
insufficient to rebut the presumption because it could not be shown 
that the absence of blacks was (except in the immediate instance) the 
result of prosecutorial action alone.335 As a practical matter, this made 
it impossible to prove intentional discrimination in the exercise of 
peremptory challenges.336 
In sharp contrast to the cases involving grand and petit jury 
venires, Swain represented a strong inclination to preserve prosecu­
tors' discretion with respect to peremptories, even in the face of 
compelling evidence of intentional race discrimination. Over twenty 
years later in Batson v. Kentucky,337 the Court decisively reversed 
course, overruling Swain by holding that an inference of discrimina­
tion could be drawn in similar circumstances. 
Batson attempted to adapt the "disparity plus discretion equals 
discrimination" formula into a workable framework for reviewing 
claims of discrimination in the exercise of peremptories, one that 
would preserve discretion while ferreting out intentional discrimina­
tion, and that has since been expanded beyond prosecutors to criminal 
defendants338 and civil litigants,339 and beyond race discrimination to 
332. Id. at 498-500. The district court found that there was a prima facie case of dis­
crimination, but that it had been rebutted by evidence showing that Mexican Americans 
constituted a "governing majority" in the county. Id. at 491. 
333. 380 U.S. 202, 210 (1965). 
334. Swain, 380 U.S. at 222. 
335. Id. at 224-25. 
336. Justices Goldberg and Douglas dissented in Swain, believing the evidence of pur� 
poseful discrimination overwhelmingly clear from both the prosecutors' actions and the fact 
that no blacks had ever served as jurors in the county. Id. at 237. 
337. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
338. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992). 
339. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991). 
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sex discrimination.340 Recognizing that Swain had imposed a "crippling 
burden of proof" on defendants seeking to prove discrimination,341 
Batson articulated a new test, under which a prima facie case could be 
made by showing membership in a cognizable racial group whose 
members were eliminated by the prosecutor's exercise of perempto­
ries. 342 More nebulously, the defendant must also show that "relevant 
circumstances raise an inference" of intentional discrimination.343 
Batson thus leaves to trial judges the problem of deciding what should 
cause an inference of purposeful discrimination to be drawn.344 
While the Batson Court blithely asserted that it was not "per­
suaded by the State's suggestion that our holding will create serious 
administrative difficulties,''345 eliminating discrimination in the use of 
peremptory challenges has proven to be practically difficult - and 
threatens to overburden the capacity of courts now required to make 
case-by-case determinations whether discrimination exists.346 Three 
issues that have arisen since Batson are of particular interest in deci­
phering the effort to balance the discretion inherent in the exercise of 
peremptory challenges against the imperative of racial equality. 
The first pertains to the circumstances in which an inference of 
discrimination can be drawn from disparate impact. In contrast to 
allegations of systemic discrimination in jury composition, the exercise 
of peremptory challenges in a particular case turns on a very small 
sample. Is a prima facie case of disproportionate impact made out, for 
example, when a prosecutor or criminal defendant strikes two of three 
African American jurors, and only one of ten white jurors? Some 
courts have allowed such scant evidence of disparate impact to make 
340. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994). 
341. Batson, 476 U.S. at 92. 
342. Id. at 96. This requirement was later modified in Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 
(1991), which held that criminal defendants may object to the use of peremptories to strike 
prospective jurors of other racial or ethnic groups. 
343. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. 
344. In his Batson concurrence, Justice Marshall expressed the view that the Court's 
opinion did not go far enough to root out intentional race discrimination in the exercise of 
peremptory challenges, and that the only effective way would be to ban them entirely. Id. at 
107 (Marshall, J., concurring). Some commentators have expressed agreement with Justice 
Marshall's position. Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Per­
emptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 157 (1989); 
Brent J. Gurney, Note, The Case for Abolishing Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Trials, 
21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 227 (1986); Clara L. Meek, Note, The Use of Peremptory Chal­
lenges to Exclude Blacks from Petit Juries in Civil Actions: The Case for Striking Peremptory 
Strikes, 4 REV. LITIG. 175 (1984). 
345. Batson, 476 U.S. at 99. 
346. See Alschuler, supra note 344, at 199. 
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out a claim, and to shift the burden to the party exercising the peremp­
tory.347 
The second issue is what kind of showing is required to rebut the 
prima facie case. In this area, the Supreme Court has issued two deci­
sions of significance since Batson, both of which tilt the balance 
toward greater discretion for parties exercising peremptories. In 
Hernandez v. New York,348 a prosecutor defended his decision to strike 
Latino jurors not because of their race but because of their ability to 
speak Spanish, which might make them reluctant to accept the official 
translation of the court's interpreter. The plurality held this explana­
tion race-neutral. In Purkett v. Elem,349 the Court accepted as race­
neutral the prosecution's explanation for striking two black males, that 
he did not "like the way they looked" because of their goatees. The 
Court rejected the defendant's argument that the justification given 
must "make[] sense" in order to be accepted.350 These decisions tilt the 
balance toward discretion at the expense of equality, allowing litigants 
to make up ostensibly race-neutral, yet pretextual justifications that 
courts are bound to accept.351 On the other hand, some lower courts 
have rejected superficially race-neutral explanations that appear to be 
functioning as surrogates for race.352 
The third issue pertains to the standing of those who may seek 
relief for alleged discrimination in the exercise of peremptory 
challenges - a question that necessarily implicates the broader ques­
tion of whose equality rights Batson and its progeny protect. This issue 
was resolved by cases that rejected a defendant's Sixth Amendment 
claim based on the exclusion of jurors of a different race,353 but 
allowed an equal protection claim to be brought based on such exclu-
347. Some of the lower courts have answered this question in the affirmative. See, e.g. , 
United States v. Lorenzo, 995 F.2d 1448, 1 453-54 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a prima facie 
case was made where three of nine Hawaiian jurors were struck); United States v. Alvarado, 
923 F.2d 253, 255 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that a prima facie case was made where a prosecu­
tor struck four of seven minorities on the venire ). 
348. 500 U.S. 352 (1991 ). 
349. 514 U.S. 765, 766 (1995). 
350. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768-69. 
351. See Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say Nol: A Proposal to Eliminate Racially Discrimi­
natory Uses of Peremptory Challenges, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1099 (1994); Swift, supra note 
23, at 329-30 (suggesting that Hernandez and Purkett "could effectively undo Batson by 
permitting attorneys to stockpile rote justifications known to be acceptable as race neutral to 
particular judges"). 
352. See, e.g. , United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820, 821 (9th Cir. 1992) (rejecting a 
prosecutor's explanation that jurors were struck because of residency in low-income, black 
neighborhood and therefore likely to believe that police "pick on black people"); People v. 
Turner, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138 (Ct. App. 2001) (rejecting an explanation that black jurors 
were struck not because of race but because they were from Inglewood, in which blacks 
comprise 49.9% of voting-age population). 
353. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990). 
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sion.354 Citing the opportunity that jury service provides for citizens to 
"participate in the democratic process,"355 the Court upheld a defen­
dant's standing to challenge the exclusion of those of a different 
race.306 Over the vigorous dissent of Justice Scalia, the majority pro­
ceeded to hold that litigants have third-party standing to challenge the 
exclusion of different-race jurors. Although Justice Scalia focuses on 
the injury-in-fact prong of the test for third-party standing, what is 
most remarkable about the Court's opinion is its finding the requisite 
"close relation" between the litigant and juror to lie in their "common 
interest" in eliminating discrimination.357 If this were enough to satisfy 
the third-party standing requirement, then a litigant in almost any case 
could meet this prong, simply by claiming a desire to remedy to consti­
tutional wrong suffered by the person whose right was allegedly vio­
lated. 358 
Whether or not the juror-selection cases have achieved a salubri­
ous balance between the values of discretion and equality, there can 
be no question that they have created an analytic framework that sig­
nificantly departs from Conventional Equal Protection. Without 
renouncing the requirement of discriminatory intent, the Court has 
allowed intent to be presumed where a disparate impact is produced 
by a discretionary system. It has adopted an analysis that requires 
careful scrutiny of the evidence, even at the risk of second guessing the 
judgments of prosecutors and even trial courts. While affirming that 
jurors' equality interests underlie the insistence on eradicating inten­
tional race discrimination from the process of selecting juries, the 
Court has been generous in according third-party standing to ensure 
that such discrimination is addressed. It thus shares at least some of 
the characteristics of First Amendment Equal Protection. 
B. Political Restructuring 
As explained in Part III, the Supreme Court has generally been 
reluctant to find an equal protection violation in the absence of a 
facial classification or a showing of intentional discrimination. There 
is, however, a series of cases that does not seem to fit into either of 
these categories. In Hunter v. Erickson,359 Washington v. Seattle School 
354. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991). 
355. Id. at 407. 
356. Id. at 408. The Court relied in part on Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972), a decision 
that, without a majority opinion, allowed a white defendant to challenge the exclusion of 
African Americans from juries. 
357. Powers, 499 U.S. at 413. 
358. See Kirk, supra note 305, at 709. 
359. 393 U.S. 385 (1969). 
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District No. 1 ,360 and Romer v. Evans,361 which I collectively refer to as 
the "political restructuring" cases,362 the Court struck down laws 
deemed to impose unequal burdens on the ability of certain groups to 
participate in the political process.363 
These cases are difficult to explain in light of traditional equal pro­
tection jurisprudence since they do not involve laws that expressly 
target a particular racial group, nor do they involve the typical show­
ing of intentional discrimination.364 It is therefore easy to view these 
cases as constitutional oddballs, difficult or impossible to explain in 
light of accepted equal protection principles.365 Viewing these cases 
alongside the juror selection cases, however, reveals their shared con­
cern with the danger of prejudice subtly denying equal participation. 
More to the point, they share a concern that - absent a more strin­
gent test for determining whether equal protection has been denied -
intentional discrimination on the part of the polity may escape detec­
tion. 
Of these three cases, Hunter is perhaps most easily understood in 
light of traditional equal protection doctrine. Hunter struck down an 
Akron charter amendment which prohibited implementation of any 
ordinance prohibiting housing discrimination absent approval of a 
majority of the city's voters.366 Enacted by the Akron electorate, the 
charter amendment not only effected a repeal of existing fair housing 
ordinances, but also required approval of voters before any future 
ordinance could be implemented.367 The Court struck down Akron's 
charter amendment. 
360. 458 U.S. 457 (1982). 
361. 517 u .s. 620 (1996). 
362. See also Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (striking down an amendment to 
the California Constitution prohibiting state or local entities from enacting laws limiting dis­
crimination by private landlords). 
363. Mark Rosenbaum and I have elsewhere explored the principle of equal access to 
the political process that, we claim, lies at the heart of these cases. Daniel P. Tokaji & Mark 
D. Rosenbaum, Promoting Equality by Protecting Local Power: A Neo-Federalist Challenge 
to State Af irmative Action Bans, 10 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 129, 136 (1999) ("It might be 
tempting to view Hunter and Seattle School District as anomalies . . .  in light of the Supreme 
Court's general insistence that only facially or intentionally discriminatory laws violate the 
Equal Protection Clause."). 
364. Amar & Caminker, supra note 20, at 1024-29. 
365. See, e.g., id. at 1022-29 (contrasting ordinary equal protection analysis with the doc­
trine applied in Hunter and Seattle School District); David J. Barron, The Promise of 
Cooley's Cities: Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 560-61 (1999) 
(characterizing Seattle School District and Romer as "jurisprudential enigmas"); Tokaji & 
Rosenbaum, supra note 363, at 136 ("It might be tempting to view Hunter and Seattle School 
District as anomalies . . .  in light of the Supreme Court's general insistence that only facially 
or intentionally discriminatory laws violate the Equal Protection Clause."). 
366. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 386 ( 1969). 
367. Id. at 389-90. 
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While intentional discrimination on the part of the electorate 
might well have been inferred from the circumstances, the Court did 
not expressly make a finding of discriminatory intent on the part of 
Akron's voters.368 Instead, the Court reasoned that the charter 
amendment required racial minorities to run a special legislative 
gauntlet that no other groups were required to run.369 In particular, it 
drew "a distinction between those groups who sought the law's protec­
tion against racial, religious, or ancestral discriminations in the sale 
and rental of real estate and those who sought to regulate real prop­
erty transactions in the pursuit of other ends."370 Although the charter 
amendment on its face treated all racial and religious groups the same 
- e.g., it did not distinguish blacks from whites, or Christians from 
Jews - the Court recognized that minorities would bear the brunt of 
this law's impact.371 After the charter amendment, only racial and 
religious minorities would have to obtain the approval of the Akron 
electorate to enact favorable legislation. By precluding them from 
approaching the city council on the same terms as others, the charter 
amendment "place[ d] special burdens on racial minorities within the 
governmental process," something that the Court viewed as "no more 
permissible than denying them the vote, on an equal basis with 
others."372 The Court therefore treated Akron's law as a race-based 
distinction, subject to strict scrutiny.373 
Hunter may plausibly be understood as only a slight departure 
from traditional equal protection doctrine, since the Akron charter 
amendment was apparently driven by a desire to insulate private racial 
discrimination from government interference. It is therefore easy to 
understand it as involving intentional discrimination, difficult to miss 
yet hard to prove under the equal protection test subsequently articu­
lated in Washington v. Davis. 
Somewhat more difficult to understand in these terms is Washing­
ton v. Seattle School District No. 1 ,374 a case decided after Washington 
v. Davis. In Seattle School District, the Court broadened the rule of 
Hunter to strike down a statewide initiative that had the practical 
effect of barring school boards from adopting race-conscious desegre­
gation programs.375 Like the Hunter charter amendment, the Washing­
ton initiative "subtly distort[ ed] governmental processes in such a way 
368. Amar & Caminker, supra note 20, at 1024. 
369. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 390. 
370. Id. 
371. Id. at 391. 
372. Id. 
373. Id. at 392-93. 
374. 458 U.S. 457 (1982). 
375. Seattle Sch. Dist. , 458 U.S. at 463. 
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as to place special burdens on the ability of minority groups to achieve 
beneficial legislation."376 In particular, after enactment of the Wash­
ington initiative, only proponents of race-conscious desegregation 
were precluded from going to their local school boards to seek favor­
able legislation. Because racial minorities were deemed to be the ones 
benefiting most from race-conscious busing, the Court held that the 
law placed special burdens on minorities' access to the political 
process, in violation of the Hunter principle.377 As in Hunter, it did not 
require evidence of intentional racial discrimination on the part of the 
electorate in making its decision.378 
The Court's opinion does nevertheless suggest a concern that hard­
to-prove racial discrimination may partly explain the result. Near the 
outset of the opinion, for example, the Court notes the district court's 
frank conclusion that it was practically impossible to ascertain the 
extent to which "racial bias" was a factor in the Washington elector­
ate's enactment of the antibusing initiative.379 Probing the intent of all 
the voters who supported the initiative is beyond the capacity of any 
court. Later in the opinion, the Court expressly agrees that "purpose­
ful discrimination is 'the condition that offends the Constitution. '  "380 
In attempting to reconcile its conclusion with Washington v. Davis's 
requirement of intentional discrimination, the Seattle School District 
Court explains: "We have not insisted on a particularized inquiry into 
motivation in all equal protection cases."381 Without abandoning the 
requirement of intentional discrimination, the Court held that laws 
that restructure the political process to the disadvantage of minorities 
would be deemed "inherently suspect."382 
The Court does not deny that a concern with intentional discrimi­
nation underlies its holding. What it does deny is that a "particularized 
inquiry" into discriminatory intent is always required.383 In Seattle 
School District, the Court was willing to infer discriminatory intent 
376. Id. at 467. 
377. Id. at 483-84. 
378. Id. at 484-85; see also Amar & Caminker, supra note 20, at 1034-35. 
379. Seattle Sch. Dist. , 458 U.S. at 465. 
380. Id. at 484 (quoting Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979)). 
381. Id. at 485 (emphasis added). 
382. Id. 
383. The Court's recent opinion in City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Community Hope 
Foundation, 538 U.S. 188 (2003), lends further support to my interpretation of Hunter and 
Seattle School District as "soft purpose" cases. See supra note 20. The Cuyahoga Court de­
scribes Hunter as among the cases "in which we have subjected enacted, discretionary meas­
ures to equal protection scrutiny and treated decisionmakers' statements as evidence of such 
intent." Id. at 1393. Later in the opinion, Cuyahoga cites Seattle School District for the 
proposition that "statements made by decisionmakers or referendum sponsors during delib­
eration over a referendum may constitute relevant evidence of discriminatory intent in a 
challenge to an ultimately enacted initiative." Id. at 1395. 
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from the fact that the Washington electorate chose to impose special 
burdens on minorities' ability to enact beneficial legislation. But the 
Court does not adequately explain why it should apply a different, less 
searching test for assessing discriminatory intent in this context than in 
others. 
This question is magnified when Seattle School District is examined 
in conjunction with Crawford v. Board of Education,384 decided the 
same day. In Crawford, the Court upheld an initiative that, at first 
glance, might seem indistinguishable from the one struck down in 
Seattle School District. At issue in Crawford was a California constitu­
tional amendment, which prohibited California courts from requiring 
racial busing in circumstances where it was not required by the United 
States Constitution.385 Both the Seattle School District and Crawford 
initiatives, then, made it more difficult for racial minorities to secure 
race-conscious busing programs. The critical difference, in the major­
ity's view, was that the Crawford initiative in no way limited access to 
the political process. Instead, it represented a "mere repeal" of a 
constitutional provision that had been interpreted to extend protec­
tions over and above those provided by the Fourteenth Amendment: 
" [H]aving gone beyond the requirements of the Federal Constitution, 
the State was free to return in part to the standard prevailing generally 
throughout the United States."386 Because the California initiative did 
not restrict access to the political process, but only limited the reme­
dies available for de facto discrimination under state law, the Court 
applied its conventional test for assessing whether the law was 
"enacted with a discriminatory purpose."387 In contrast to Seattle 
School District, where the "practical effect" of the initiative on minori­
ties was deemed sufficient to show a prima facie equal protection 
violation, the Crawford Court insisted on a clear showing of discrimi­
natory purpose.388 
Read together, what is clear from Crawford and Seattle School 
District is that the critical question was whether the initiative limited 
access to a political, as opposed to a judicial forum. After enactment of 
the Crawford initiative, minorities in California were as free as they 
had been before to approach their local school boards, seeking racial 
busing programs to reduce de facto school segregation. After enact­
ment of the Seattle School District initiative, by contrast, minorities in 
384. 458 U.S. 527 (1982). 
385. Crawford, 458 U.S. at 532. 
386. Id. at 542. 
387. Id. at 543-45. 
388. Id. at 545 ("Even if we could assume that Proposition I had a disproportionate ad­
verse effect on racial minorities, we see no reason to challenge the Court of Appeal's conclu­
sion that the voters of the State were not motivated by a discriminatory purpose."). 
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Washington were no longer free to approach their local school boards, 
seeking desegregative busing for the same purpose. 
What is less clear - and inadequately explained by the opinions in 
either case - is why a different standard should apply when a state­
wide initiative limits access to a political forum, rather than a judicial 
forum. Seattle School District's suggestion that it is not abandoning the 
requirement of discriminatory intent, but merely applying a more 
searching test for intent in this context only magnifies the confusion. 
Was there any greater reason to believe that the Washington antibus­
ing initiative sprang from discriminatory intent than the California 
antibusing initiative? Would it be any easier to develop evidence of 
intentional discrimination in one case than the other? In short, what 
calls for explanation is why courts should apply a different equal 
protection test when a law regulates access to political as opposed to 
judicial relief. 
The most recent political-restructuring case, Romer v. Evans, relies 
on a logic similar to Hunter and Seattle School District, though it too 
fails to explain why access to the political process warrants special 
treatment. Romer struck down an amendment to the Colorado Consti­
tution that prohibited local antidiscrimination protections for gays and 
lesbians.389 While not expressly relying on Hunter or Seattle School 
District, and while addressing discrimination based on sexual orienta­
tion and not race, the Romer Court applied a nearly identical principle 
of equal political access to strike down the Colorado initiative: "Cen­
tral both to the idea of the rule of law and to our own Constitution's 
guarantee of equal protection is the principle that government and 
each of its parts remain open on impartial terms to all who seek its 
assistance."390 The Colorado initiative violated this prohibition, the 
Court concluded, by making it more difficult for gays and lesbians to 
enact protective legislation. To be sure, the Romer Court avoids 
express reliance on either Hunter or Seattle School District. More 
clearly than either of these cases, the Romer Court grounds its holding 
on discriminatory purpose, stating that "laws of the kind now before 
us raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born 
of animosity toward the class of persons affected."391 But as in Seattle 
School District, the Court provides little explanation for why a 
presumption of discriminatory purpose should be drawn in this 
context but not others. 
The questions raised by the political-restructuring cases thus 
parallel those raised by the jury-selection cases. In both areas, the 
389. 517  U.S. 620, 624 (1996). 
390. Romer, 517 U.S. at 633. 
391. Id. at 634. For a discussion of the antigay animus behind Amendment Two, see 
ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN LAW 
21-24 (2002). 
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Court has applied an unconventional rule of equal protection, which 
presumes a violation even without the direct evidence of intentional 
discrimination ordinarily required. While not abandoning the general 
rule that intentional discrimination must be shown, the Court applies a 
more sensitive test for assessing whether such intent exists. But at least 
on the surface, there appears to be an important difference: while the 
special rule applied in jury-selection cases arises from suspicion that 
official discretion may lead to covert intentional discrimination, the 
special rule applied in the political-restructuring cases may actually 
promote discretion.392 In Seattle School District, for example, the Court 
refers approvingly to the power of local school districts to determine 
how best to meet students' needs, noting that such matters as student 
assignment had been "firmly committed to the local [school] board's 
discretion."393 The problem with the Seattle School District initiative, 
then, was that it removed that discretion from local school boards. 
A closer examination of the political-restructuring cases, however, 
shows that the problem with which they are concerned is not so much 
whether discretion exists, but where it is vested. In Hunter, Seattle 
School District, and Romer, discretion to adopt protective legislation 
was removed from the entities perceived to be more accessible to the 
burdened group, and placed at a more remote level of government. In 
Hunter, for example, the discretion to adopt fair housing laws was 
removed from the city council and vested in the electorate. In Seattle 
School District, the discretion to adopt desegregative busing was 
removed from local school boards and vested in the state legislature or 
statewide electorate.394 Similarly, in Romer, the discretion to adopt 
antidiscrimination laws protecting gays and lesbians was removed 
from the local to the state level of government. Thus, while protecting 
discretion in one sense, these cases limit discretion in another. In 
particular, they limit the discretion of the electorate to create special 
rules of access to the political process that burden identifiable groups. 
It is precisely this intrusion into the ability of the electorate to 
structure its government that the dissenting justices, in Seattle School 
District and in Romer, found so objectionable. Justice Powell's 
dissenting opinion in Seattle School District voices objection to the 
majority's "unprecedented intrusion into the structure of a state 
government."395 Justice Powell proceeds to explain that the matter of 
how best to order the institutions of state and local government is for 
392. David Barron makes this point, in emphasizing that Seattle School District and 
Romer are driven by a concern with "preserving local discretion" to adopt appropriate 
remedies for discrimination or segregation. Barron, supra note 365, at 579. 
393. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 479-80 (1982). 
394. Id. at 474 ("Those favoring the elimination of de facto school segregation now must 
seek relief from the state legislature, or the statewide electorate."). 
395. Id. at 489 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
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the people, and not the federal judiciary, to decide - each state's elec­
torate should have the freedom to "structure the decisionmaking 
authority of its government" as it deems appropriate.396 Justice Scalia's 
blistering dissent in Romer echoes these concerns, decrying the 
Court's intrusion into the State of Colorado's prerogative to deter­
mine how its government should be structured. In Justice Scalia's 
view, the Colorado initiative represented a legitimate effort by the 
electorate to "counter both the geographic concentration and the 
disproportionate political power of homosexuals."397 Justice Scalia's 
view would thus leave to the discretion of the "majority of citizens" 
the decision whether a ban on gay-protective local laws are appropri­
ate. 
The dispute between the majority and the dissenters, in other 
words, is not over whether discretion exists, but over where that 
discretion should lie: in local elected officials or in the electorate. In 
Hunter, Seattle School District, and Romer, the Court limits the discre­
tion of the electorate to determine the structure of its government, 
vesting that discretion in local entities perceived to be more respon­
sive to minorities. The political-restructuring cases, of course, impli­
cate a very different sort of discretion from that at issue in the 
jury-selection cases. While the jury-exclusion cases involve questions 
of whether a single individual's decisions (i.e., those of a prosecutor or 
defense attorney) are motivated by discriminatory intent, the 
political-restructuring cases implicate the discretion of a larger group 
(i.e. , the electorate).  But in both cases, the concern underlying the 
Court's especially searching inquiry is to guard against discrimination, 
where access to the democratic process is at stake. 
The political restructuring cases thus share the First Amendment 
Equal Protection cases' concern with promoting a fair political 
discourse, one that minimizes the possibility that discrimination 
against disfavored groups will go undetected. And because they impli­
cate participation in the political process, the Courts in Hunter, Seattle 
School District, and Romer found it necessary to strike down the laws 
denying equal access on their face. While none of the opinions explain 
the reasons for facial invalidation of the laws at issue, it is not difficult 
to perceive why: as in the First Amendment context, the mere 
existence of these laws is sufficient to chill - and indeed, entirely 
freeze out - the disadvantaged groups from fully participating in the 
political process. The only remedy that would suffice, accordingly, is 
facial invalidation. 
The relationship to First Amendment Equal Protection also 
explains why the Seattle School District Court (again without explana-
396. Id. at 493. 
397. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 647 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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tion) allowed a party whose standing was in question to proceed as 
plaintiff. The injury in Seattle School District was a denial of political 
participation, yet the challenge to Washington's initiative was brought 
not by a member of the group whose right to equal participation was 
denied (for example, one seeking to advance desegregative busing at 
the local level), but rather by the Seattle School District - the entity 
that had enacted one of the programs banned by the initiative. 
Without explaining its reasons, the Seattle School District Court grants 
third-party standing to the district to assert the rights of others not 
before it but whose rights to political participation would otherwise be 
denied. The high value attached to equality of political participation 
thus explains the Court's decision to constitutionalize limits on official 
discretion, in a way that departs from Conventional Equal Protection 
analysis. 
C. One Person, One Vote 
The third area in which the Court has departed from Conventional 
Equal Protection in order to guard against the distorting impact of 
excessive discretion is the "one person, one vote" line of cases. At first 
glance, grouping this line of cases with the juror-selection and 
political-restructuring cases might seem odd. For unlike the special 
rules developed in those cases, the one person, one vote rule was not 
designed - at least not expressly - to deal with race discrimination. 
A closer examination of the one person, one vote cases, however, 
reveals that the decisions are motivated by similar concerns, which 
bear a close resemblance to those underlying First Amendment Equal 
Protection jurisprudence. In particular, they arise from a concern that 
without clear rules by which to cabin official discretion over the elec­
toral process, discrimination against politically disfavored groups 
might otherwise escape detection. 
The one person, one vote cases arise against a backdrop of prac­
tices designed to diminish the voting strength of African Americans. 
After initially refusing to involve itself in the elimination of practices 
designed to prevent African Americans from voting,398 the Supreme 
Court struck down devices such as the grandfather clause,399 the all­
white primary,400 gerrymandered districts,401 the interpretation test,402 
and the poll tax.403 Though none rest on the First Amendment, the 
398. See, e.g. , Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903) (affirming the denial of equitable re-
lief to black citizens disallowed from registering to vote). 
399. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915). 
400. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927). 
401. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
402. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 150 (1965). 
403. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
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decisions striking such practices - like the rule requiring clear rules in 
the regulation as speech - serve as a prophylactic against decision­
makers acting based on venal motives. Louisiana v. United States, for 
example, concluded that the state's test requiring interpretation of the 
Constitution was susceptible to discriminatory application, because 
the test vested government officials with "a virtually uncontrolled 
discretion as to who should vote and who should not. "404 So too, in 
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, the Court struck down 
Virginia's poll tax, noting the dangers of discriminatory application 
against African Americans but finding that it was unnecessary to 
determine whether the poll tax served this purpose in order to hold it 
unconstitutional.405 
The one person, one vote rule was not expressly justified by a 
desire to stop racial discrimination, but nevertheless shares with these 
cases an emphasis on the need to control the distorting effects of offi­
cial discretion upon the electoral process.406 In Baker v. Carr,407 the 
Court reversed its previous holding that legislative reapportionment 
presented a nonjusticiable "political question" due to the impossibility 
of formulating judicially manageable standards.408 One year later, in 
Gray v. Sanders, the Court held unconstitutional a "county unit" 
system for counting votes, under which votes in rural counties were 
weighted more heavily than those cast in urban counties.409 And a year 
after that, in Reynolds v. Sims, the Court required that state legislative 
seats "must be apportioned on a population basis."410 The rule was 
404. Louisiana, 380 U.S. at 150; see also SAMUEL ISAACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF 
DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 95-102 (1988) (describing 
the demise of discretionary techniques used to suppress black vote). 
405. Harper, 383 U.S. at 666 n.3. As Rich Hasen explains, the Court in Harper originally 
planned to issue a summary affirmance of the lower court opinion that had upheld the poll 
tax. RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING EQUALITY 
FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 36-37 (2003). The Court changed course, however, 
after Justice Goldberg circulated a proposed dissent to the per curiam affirmance. Id. at 37. 
The proposed dissent more expressly addressed the discriminatory purpose of the poll tax, 
noting that "the principal aim of this limitation was the disenfranchisement of the Negroes." 
Id. at 179. 
406. See Andrew S. Marovitz, Note, Casting a Meaningful Ballot: Applying One-Person, 
One-Vote to Judicial Elections Involving Racial Discrimination, 98 YALE L.J. 1193, 1201 
(1989) (describing the roots of the one person, one vote rule in cases involving race discrimi­
nation within the electoral process). 
407. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
408. Colesgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (holding that courts should avoid 
entering the "political thicket" of malapportionment). 
409. 372 U.S. 368, 379-80 (1963). 
410. 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964). Earlier that year, the Court had decided Wesberry v. 
Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), striking down unevenly apportioned congressional districts under 
Article I, § 2. 
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subsequently extended to require roughly equal districts in local as 
well as state elections.411 
Like the First Amendment rule of precision, the one person, one 
vote rule may be understood as a device to prevent the playing field 
from being tilted for or . against particular groups, including those 
defined by political party or race. The great virtue of the one person, 
one vote rule is its simplicity. As Spencer Overton puts it: "The one­
person, one-vote rule promotes uniformity, consistency, fairness, and 
neutrality in decisions about apportionment by limiting judicial discre­
tion to one simple question: Do all districts have the same number of 
residents?"412 The rule thus provides a relatively clear and easily 
administrable standard.413 
There are, however, both theoretical and practical difficulties with 
the standard. Voting rights scholars have criticized, for example, the 
"incompletely theorized" character of the one person, one vote rule.414 
While the opinions advert to general conceptions of political equality 
to support this rule,415 they are less than specific about both the 
"parameters of this claimed right"416 and the objective(s) it is supposed 
to serve.417 On the practical side, the one person, one vote rule 
(perhaps because of . its weak theoretical moorings) provides little 
411 .  Bd. of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 
474 (1968). 
412. Overton, supra note 32, at 79. 
413. As Professor Ely put it: " [A]dministrability is its long suit, and the more trouble­
some question is what else it has to recommend it." JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISTRUST 121 (1980). 
414. Heather K. Gerken, The Costs and Causes of Minimalism in Voting Cases: Baker v. 
Carr and its Progeny, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1411, 1419 (2002); see also Barbara Y. Phillips, Recon­
sidering Reynolds v. Sims: The Relevance of Its Basic Standard of Equality to Other Vote 
Dilution Claims, 38 How. L.J. 561 (1995) (criticizing the "simplistic and deceptive slogan, 
one person, one vote," and stating that subsequent difficulties in determining vote-dilution 
standard arise from "confusion created by the Court's initial failure to exercise theoretical 
and jurisprudential fortitude"). 
415. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 567 ("To the extent that a citizen's right to vote is debased, 
he is that much less a citizen."); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) ("The conception 
of political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Ad­
dress, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing 
- one person, one vote."). 
416. Samuel Isaacaroff, Political Judgments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 637, 649 (2001); see also 
TRIBE, supra note 74, § 13-3, at 1065 ("The Reynolds opinion did little to illuminate the spe­
cific scope and content of the one person, one vote rule."). 
417. Professor Gerken notes several possible theories, including (1) preventing an en­
trenched group from preventing others from sharing power, (2) guarding against racial and 
other group-based forms of animus, (3) making sure that all voters are effectively repre­
sented, and (4) preventing "expressive harm" to those treated less favorably. Gerken, supra 
note 414, at 1421-27; see also Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bi­
zarre Districts, " and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. 
Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 506-12 (1993) (assessing the notion that expressive harm is a 
cognizable constitutional injury). 
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defense against more sophisticated apportionments designed to di­
minish the power of out-of-power parties, nonincumbents, and racial 
minorities.418 
The practical and theoretical insufficiencies of the one person, one 
vote rule thus led the Court to back away from cases asserting not only 
a right to quantitative equality (i.e., population equality) but also a 
right to qualitative equality (i.e., equal voting strength).419 Specifically, 
in Mobile v. Bolden,420 the Court insisted upon the conventional 
showing of discriminatory purpose in a claim challenging a scheme 
alleged to diminish minority voting strength.421 The problem with 
application of Conventional Equal Protection standards is that 
requiring voting districts of equal size may not get at all the cases in 
which lines have been drawn with the intent to diminish the voting 
strength of a particular racial group. 
Notwithstanding the theoretical and practical limitations of the . 
one person, one vote doctrine, there can be no question that it 
represents a departure from Conventional Equal Protection. Like the 
jury-selection cases, the one person, one vote cases seek to reduce 
opportunities for discrimination by placing limits on discretion. Like 
the political-restructuring cases, the one person, one vote cases seek to 
advance some conception of political equality.422 And like the First 
Amendment Equal Protection cases, the one person, one vote cases 
aim to eliminate inequality through objective bright-line rules. 
The Unconventional Equal Protection decisions share a willing­
ness to find an equal protection violation on something less than the 
ordinary showing of discriminatory intent, adopting a rule that is 
designed at least in part to prevent illicit motives from seeping into a 
discretionary decisionmaking process - and to avoid the inherent dif­
ficulties that courts would otherwise face in determining whether 
418. See Overton, supra note 32, at 81 ("Under the one-person, one-vote rule, shrewd 
and calculating legislators have the ability to game the system by drawing districts of equal 
population that minimize the political strength of rival political groups . . . .  "). 
419. See Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness 
in Racial Vote Dilwion Claims, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 176 (1989) (distinguishing 
qualitative and quantitative vote-dilution claims). 
420. 446 U.S. 55 (1980). 
421 . After Mobile v. Bolden, Congress amended § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1973, to clarify that discriminatory intent is not required. See Heather Gerken, Under­
standing the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1663, 1674 (2001) (citing S. Rep. 
No. 97-417, at 2, 16-34 (1982)). 
422. Indeed, Hunter v. Erickson (and therefore, by implication, Seattle School District 
and Romer) expressly rely on the one person, one vote rule in formulating the rule prohib­
iting laws that restructure the political process to disadvantage the interests of a racial mi­
nority. 393 U.S. 385, 392-93 (1969) ("[T]he State may no more disadvantage any particular 
group by making it more difficult to enact legislation in its behalf than it may dilute any per­
son's vote or give any group a smaller representation than another of comparable size.") 
(citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)). 
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intentional discrimination has entered into the decisionmaking 
process.423 Yet they also share a failure, in the end, to explain their 
reasons for this departure from Conventional Equal Protection. 
D. Bush v. Gore 
The one person, one vote cases form the ostensible basis for what 
is arguably the most unconventional of Unconventional Equal Protec­
tion cases, and certainly the one that has generated the most public 
and scholarly criticism.424 This decision is also the equal protection 
case whose reasoning most closely resembles that applied in the First 
Amendment Equal Protection cases.425 
At least four aspects of the Court's decision in Bush v. Gore are 
remarkable, both for their departure from Conventional Equal Protec­
tion analysis and their similarity to First Amendment Equal Protec­
tion: (1) the holding that the absence of specific standards for 
recounting violated equal protection, (2) the assumption that candi­
dates Bush and Cheney had standing to assert the equal protection 
rights of voters,426 (3) the remedy ordered, which suggests treatment of 
the equal protection argument as a facial challenge rather than an as 
applied challenge, and ( 4) the willingness to second-guess both public 
officials charged with counting votes and the Florida Supreme Court. 
Although it is risky to read any great shifts in legal doctrine into 
Bush v. Gore, given the circumstances under which it was written427 
and the Court's explicit attempt to cabin its ruling,428 its action on each 
423. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 560-61 (stating the "fundamental principle . . .  of equal 
representation for equal numbers of people, without regard to race, sex, economic status, or 
place or residence within a State"). 
424. See, e.g. , VINCENT BUGLIOSI, THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICA: How THE SUPREME 
COURT UNDERMINED THE CONSTITUTION AND CHOSE OUR PRESIDENT (2001) (charac­
terizing Bush v. Gore as criminal); Laurence H. Tribe, eroG v. husB and Its Disguises: Free­
ing Bush v. Gore from Its Hall of Mirrors, 115 HARV. L. REV. 170 (2001) (characterizing the 
Court's analysis as a shell game); Bruce Ackerman, Anatomy of a Constitutional Coup, 
LONDON REV. BOOKS, Feb. 8, 2001, at 3 (characterizing the Court's action as a "constitu­
tional coup"). 
425. See Daniel P. Tokaji, Political Equality After Bush v. Gore: A First Amendment 
Approach to Voting Rights, in FINAL ARBITER: THE CONSEQUENCES OF BUSH V. GORE FOR 
LAW AND POLITICS (forthcoming 2004) (discussing Bush v. Gore's relationship to First 
Amendment doctrine). 
426. Erwin Chemerinsky, Bush v. Gore Was Not Justiciable, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1093, 1094 (2001) (arguing that Bush lacked standing and that the Court improperly treated 
his equal protection argument as a facial rather than as an as-applied challenge). 
427. JEFFREY TOOBIN, Too CLOSE TO CALL 264-65 (2001) (reporting that the writing 
of what would become the majority opinion took place in the morning of December 12, 
2000, the day it was issued). 
428. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) ("Our consideration is limited to the present 
circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally presents 
many complexities."). For an explication of reasons for doubting that Bush v. Gore will have 
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of these points suggests a connection to First Amendment Equal Pro­
tection that is worthy of exploration. In silently borrowing from these 
cases, the Court exhibits a suspicion of discretion - not only of public 
officials but also of state judges including those at the appellate level 
- characteristic of First Amendment Equal Protection.429 The real 
progenitors of Bush v. Gore, then, are not the one person, one vote 
cases like Reynolds v. Sims that the majority cites, but First Amend­
ment Equal Protection cases such as Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham that 
it does not mention. 
1. The Equal Protection Holding 
The Court concluded that the absence of sufficiently precise rules 
for determining which undervotes should be counted violated equal 
protection. The principle upon which the Court purports to rely is: 
"Having once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the State may 
not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person's 
vote over that of another. "430 The recount procedure in Florida 
violated this principle, the Court explained, because of the "absence of 
specific standards to ensure its equal application. "431 
The Florida Supreme Court had of course articulated the standard 
according to which ballots should be evaluated: the intent of the voter. 
This standard, however, was deemed insufficient to rein in the discre­
tion of the canvassing boards responsible for conducting the recounts; 
instead what was required were "specific rules designed to ensure 
uniform treatment."432 In other words, what was wanting was a defini­
tion of which ballot markings should count as votes (e.g., "hanging 
chads" count as votes if and only if at least two corners are detached) 
that would eliminate subjective judgments. Because of the absence of 
such a clear rule, the Court notes, vote-counters in different counties 
(and sometimes even within a county) were applying different rules 
for determining which votes would count.433 
As authority for its equal protection holding, the majority cites 
four cases: Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,434 which struck down 
significant precedential value, see Richard L. Hasen, Bush v. Gore and the Future of Equal 
Protection Law in Elections, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 377, 386-92 (2001). 
429. See David A. Strauss, Bush v. Gore: What Were They Thinking?, 68 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 737, 750 (2001) (arguing that the decision may be understood to rest on principle that 
"at least where the right to vote is concerned, the states may not use discretionary standards 
if it is practicable to formulate rules that will limit discretion"). 
430. Bush, 531 U.S. at 104-05. 
431. Id. at 106. 
432. Id. 
433. Id. 
434. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
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the poll tax, and three of the early one person, one vote cases - Gray 
v. Sanders, Reynolds v. Sims, and Moore v. Ogilvie435• These cases 
cannot by themselves justify the decision the Court reaches. As an 
initial matter, each of the four cases upon which the majority relies 
rested upon a disparate impact upon an identifiable class of voters.436 
In Harper, for example, voters of limited means were the ones 
dis-advantaged by the poll tax requirement.437 And in Reynolds, 
Moore, and Gray, voters in larger urban counties were treated less 
favorably than voters in smaller urban counties.438 Thus, while the 
Bush v. Gore majority cites a concern that the absence of any stan­
dards will result in "arbitrary" treatment, the cases upon which it 
relies have to do with disfavored treatment of an identifiable group of 
voters. In particular, they focus on the differential treatment afforded 
to voters of a particular class, definable by lack of wealth (in Harper) 
and place of residence (in the one person, one vote cases).439 
In fairness to the majority, there is a sense in which the problem 
that it characterized as "arbitrary and disparate treatment" resembles 
the one person, one vote cases. As the Court notes, different counties 
were applying different standards for determining which votes should 
be counted,440 leading to a risk that the voting strength of certain 
counties was diminished in comparison to others. Yet the comparison 
to these cases remains strained, since none of them held that the 
absence of sufficiently clear and specific standards - without any 
evidence 'of a disparate impact upon a particular group of voters -
violated equal protection. Rather, in each of those cases, the evidence 
before the Court demonstrated that voters in certain counties were 
quantifiably denied equal voting strength. In Gray, for example, the 
435. 394 U.S. 814 (1969). 
436. See Frank I .  Michelman, Suspicion, or the New Prince, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 679, 684 
(2001) (noting the absence of an ex ante race, party, residence, or wealth based classification 
in Florida's recount scheme); Tribe, supra note 424, at 225 (noting that the cases cited by the 
majority each involved schemes that "had the purpose and effect of granting greater voting 
power to a particular class"). 
437. Harper, 383 U.S. at 666. 
438. Moore, 394 U.S. at 819; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 545-51 (1964); Gray v. 
Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379 (1963). 
439. There is at least one case in which the Supreme Court has allowed an equal protec­
tion case to proceed, notwithstanding the absence of any claim that the plaintiff was treated 
unfavorably as the result of her membership in a definable class. In Village of Willowbrook 
v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000), the Court reversed the dismissal of an equal protection claim 
alleging "irrational and wholly arbitrary" denial of an easement, even though the plaintiff 
"did not allege membership in a class or group." Id. at 564. With little explanation, the Court 
allowed her to state a claim based on her allegation that she had been treated less favorably 
than others similarly situated without any rational basis. Id. But in Willowbrook, unlike Bush 
v. Gore, an identified plaintiff alleged that she was subjected to intentional differential 
treatment. Id. 
440. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 107 (stating that "each of the counties used varying 
standards to determine what was a legal vote"). 
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county-unit system gave each resident of the least populous Georgia 
county influence equal to that of 99 residents of Fulton County.441 
None of the one person, one vote cases invalidated an electoral 
scheme based solely upon the absence of "clear and specific 
standards. "442 
The one person, one vote cases therefore are not sufficient to 
justify the conclusion that the Court reached. The more apt compari­
son would have been to speech cases like Shuttlesworth, City of 
Lakewood, and Forsyth County, in which the Court held that insuffi­
ciently precise standards for determining who may speak violate the 
First Amendment.443 City of Lakewood, for example, rests its require­
ment of precise standards on the recognition that it is otherwise too 
easy for decisionmakers to disfavor certain speakers and get away with 
it, by relying on "post hoc" explanations for its decisions.444 In a similar 
vein, Forsyth County condemned the "overly broad licensing discre­
tion" arising from the absence of sufficiently clear and specific 
standards.445 In both cases, the real concern is that loose standards 
provide too much opportunity for decisionmakers to exercise the 
discretion in a less than evenhanded fashion - a concern present in 
Bush v. Gore with respect to the Florida Supreme Court. 
Unfortunately, Bush v. Gore does not even mention the First 
Amendment Equal Protection cases upon which it implicitly relies. Of 
course, if the Court had cited cases like Shuttlesworth, Forsyth County, 
and City of Lakewood, it would have been required to explain its 
reasons for importing speech doctrine into an equal protection case, in 
light of its prior refusal to treat voting as an activity protected by the 
First Amendment.446 Accordingly, if the Court's implicit reliance on 
First Amendment doctrine is to be justified, some additional explana­
tion of the link between voting and speech is required. 
441. Gray, 372 U.S. at 371. The only evidence the Bush v. Gore Court cites that would 
appear analogous is that Broward County "uncovered almost three times as many new 
votes" as Palm Beach County, "a result markedly disproportionate to the difference in 
population between the counties." 531 U.S. at 107. The majority's opinion, however, did not 
simply deal with the discrepancy between these two counties, but instead with the perceived 
statewide problem arising from the lack of adequate vote-counting rules. 
442. Cass Sunstein, Order Without Law, 68 U. CHI. L. REY. 757, 764 (2001). 
443. See ABNER GREENE, UNDERSTANDING THE 2000 ELECTION: A GUIDE TO THE 
LEGAL BATTLES THAT DECIDED THE PRESIDENCY 132-33 (2001) (suggesting that Bush v. 
Gore's holding may best be understood in light of First Amendment cases). 
444. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 758 (1 988) 
445. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 123 (1992). 
446. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (rejecting the argument that a chal­
lenge to write-in voting stated a First Amendment claim); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elec­
tions, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966) (striking down a poll tax while avoiding the question whether 
the First Amendment protects the right to vote). 
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The second aspect of Bush v. Gore that warrants scrutiny is its 
unexplained assumption that candidates Bush and Cheney had stand­
ing to assert the equal protection violations suffered by the voters 
harmed. According to the Court, the injury caused by the absence of a 
clear vote-counting rule was "the equal dignity owed to each voter."447 
But if it was the rights of the voters that were being violated, what 
conferred standing upon the candidates? 
As Professor Chemerinsky has explained, the general rule is that 
"plaintiffs only have standing to raise their own claims and cannot 
present the injuries suffered by third parties not before the Court."448 
While there are exceptions to this general rule - where, for example, 
there are obstacles to third parties coming forward to assert their 
rights or where there is a special relationship between the plaintiff and 
the third party - it is not self-evident that those conditions existed in 
Bush v. Gore.449 The standing of candidates Bush and Cheney is 
especially dubious given that they could not show that the absence of 
specific standards actually injured them or subjected them to any 
greater harm than their opponents.450 
Here again, the Court's assumption of standing would make sense 
- if this were a First Amendment case. For in those cases, the Court 
has allowed litigants to challenge the constitutionality of schemes, the 
implementation of which threatens to deny expressive equality, 
without showing that they were treated less favorably than other 
speakers. Those whose rights are not violated may challenge laws that 
"delegate[] overly broad discretion to the decisionmaker," and there­
fore impinge upon the protected speech of others not before the 
court.451 Moreover, First Amendment plaintiffs are not required to 
show that the rightholders cannot press their claims on their own,452 
nor to demonstrate a close relationship to the third-party rightholders. 
447. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 104 . 
. 
448. Chemerinsky, supra note 426, at 1099. 
449. Id. at 1 101. But see Tribe, supra note 424, at 229-30 & n.232 (arguing that Bush met 
the requirements for third-party standing). 
450. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Newest Equal Protection: Regressive Doctrine on a 
Changeable Court, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 77, 85 (Cass R. 
Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001) (arguing that Bush lacked third-party standing 
unless his "supporters [were] disproportionately likely not to have their votes counted under 
the prescribed process"); Michael W. McConnell, Two-and-a-Half Cheers for Bush v Gore, 
68 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 676 (2001) (observing that if recount had proceeded, Bush might 
have won "by a wider margin"). 
451. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 129 (1992); Freedman v. 
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 56 (1965). 
452. Sec'y of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 957 (1984). 
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One might object to the importation of standing rules derived from 
prior restraint cases, on the ground that these cases rest on the "chill­
ing effect" upon others not before the Court.453 But while the "chilling 
effect" metaphor may not easily translate from the speech to the 
voting context, a similar problem exists: without a broad standing rule, 
the rights of others - either to have their voices heard or to have their 
votes counted - will be denied. 
3. The Remedy 
The most problematic aspect of Bush v. Gore is the remedy 
ordered - namely, issuance of a stay order that immediately stopped 
the manual recounts and, three days later, an opinion that prevented 
them from restarting.454 If the equal protection problem was the lack 
of a sufficiently definite standard for counting votes, then why not 
remand for the Florida Supreme Court to articulate such a standard? 
Justice Souter's dissent makes this point.455 The majority's explanation 
was that the recounts had to be completed by December 12, the day 
the Court issued its opinion.456 Commentators have almost uniformly 
found that reason unconvincing since it was a matter of state law 
whether Florida wished to avail itself of the "safe harbor" provision 
requiring the choice of electors by that date.457 
While the critics are correct that this aspect of Bush v. Gore is 
difficult to justify, there is a better explanation that might be offered 
for the decision to stop the Florida recounting process. In declaring 
the recount process invalid altogether and ordering that it be put to a 
halt, the Court acted as though it were considering a facial challenge 
to the Florida manual-recount scheme.458 Such a challenge may 
453. Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 129. 
454. For a critical analysis of the prophylactic remedy issued in Bush v. Gore, see Tracy 
A. Thomas, Understanding Prophylactic Remedies Through the Looking Glass of Bush v. 
Gore, 1 1  WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 343, 387 (2002) (describing the remedial aspect of Bush 
v. Gore as "unnecessary and inappropriately tailored under the Court's guiding standards for 
issuing such extraordinary relief.") Even some of those who defend other aspects of Bush v. 
Gore have criticized the remedy ordered. See, e.g. , McConnell, supra note 450, at 675 (giving 
the decision only two and one-half cheers because of its decision to halt recounts altogether 
instead of remanding); see also Sunstein, supra note 442, at 767-68 (concluding that the rem­
edy ordered is the part of the opinion "most difficult to defend on conventional legal 
grounds"). 
455. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 132-33 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
456. Id. at 1 10. 
457. Id. ; see also McConnell, supra note 450, at 675; Sunstein, supra note 442, at 767-68. 
458. See Chemerinsky, supra note 426, at 1094 (criticizing the Court for "decid[ing] the 
case before the Florida law was applied," when Bush had raised only an as applied rather 
than a facial challenge to that law); Brief of Respondent Albert Gore, Jr., at 43-44, Bush v. 
Gore 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00-949) (stating that "the contention that the 'intent of the 
voter' standard violates equal protection . . .  is nothing more than an argument that the con-
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ordinarily be entertained only where there is "no set of circumstances" 
under which the law could validly be applied.459 But even Salerno, 
which sets forth a stringent test for when a facial challenge may be 
maintained, acknowledges that a different rule for facial challenges 
applies in the First Amendment context. 
If we see First Amendment Equal Protection cases as the progeni­
tors of Bush v. Gore, we can make some sense even of the remedy that 
the Court ordered. As I have already explained, Shuttlesworth struck 
down on its face an ordinance conferring broad discretion on munici­
pal decisionmakers to deny permission to demonstrate based on an 
amorphous health and welfare standard.460 While the Court's invalida­
tion of this portion of the ordinance simply followed precedent that 
had long been settled, what was remarkable about Shuttlesworth is 
that it reached this conclusion even after the Alabama Supreme Court 
had provided a narrowing construction aimed at curin� the constitu­
tional defect. What Shuttlesworth and its progeny thus require are not 
just narrow and definite standards, but clear standards prescribed in 
advance. 461 Allowing a state · court to save the statute (and therefore 
Shuttlesworth's conviction) through a post hoc narrowing construction 
would defeat that purpose. For through such construction, the state 
court would accomplish what prior First Amendment cases forbade 
municipal officials from doing: tilting the expressive playing field 
against disfavored speakers through uneven application of vague stan­
dards. 
Shuttlesworth thus reflects distrust of municipal and judicial deci­
sionmakers. More specifically, the decision suggests a concern that 
without clear standards set forth by law in advance, state courts 
(including the state's highest court) might exercise their discretion to 
discriminate against disfavored speakers. This was not, of course, an 
implausible fear regarding the Alabama courts of the 1960s. Nor is it 
implausible to suppose that, at least in the eyes of the Supreme Court, 
there were reasons to distrust the Florida Supreme Court in 2000. The 
Court's refusal to remand for the state court to articulate a clear 
vote-counting rule may therefore be understood as reflecting its skep­
ticism of that court's capacity to do so in an evenhanded manner. In 
the event of a remand, the Court might have feared, the state court 
could have chosen a standard for counting votes that would benefit its 
test and recount procedures of Florida's election code . . .  are on their face unconstitu­
tional"). 
459. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1989). But see Dorf, supra note 198, at 
236 (arguing that Salerno's statement of the facial-challenge rule is not consistent with what 
the Court has actually done). 
460. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 149 (1969). 
461. But see TRIBE, supra note 74, § 12-32, at 1036-37 (noting an increased willingness of 
Court to allow saving constructions of facially invalid laws). 
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favored candidate. Hence the requirement of clear standards pre­
scribed in advance amounted to a facial invalidation of a state law that 
failed to provide such standards.462 
4. Lack of Deference 
The final aspect of Bush v. Gore that bears consideration is the 
Court's willingness to second-guess the decisions of both administra­
tive factfinders and the court below. This is evident in the Court's 
explicit distrust of the county canvassing boards conducting the 
recounts, and in its implicit but palpable distrust of the Florida 
Supreme Court.463 The Court's mode of analysis reflects the "inde­
pendent examination" of the facts reminiscent of First Amendment 
jurisprudence. 
The Court digs deep into the record to note various defects in the 
manner in which votes were being counted, exposing what it undoubt­
edly perceived to be the dark underbelly of the vote-counting process. 
It implicitly rejects, moreover, Justice Stevens's suggestion that the 
Court should assume that the "single impartial magistrate" overseeing 
the recount process would have provided sufficient safeguards against 
unequal treatment of similarly marked ballots.464 As Justice Stevens 
put it, the majority's conclusion can only rest upon "an unstated lack 
of confidence in the impartiality and capacity of the state judges who 
would make the critical decisions if the vote count were to proceed."465 
Finally, as already noted, the Court reversed and called the election 
instead of remanding, thereby refusing to leave to the Florida 
Supreme Court the decision whether Florida law required the vote 
counting to be completed by the "safe harbor" deadline. It is no 
stretch to believe that the Bush v. Gore Court's distrust of the deter-
462. I do not here deal with what some might believe the most serious conceptual prob­
lem with the remedy ordered: the fact that it systematically disadvantaged those who cast 
their votes in counties using the most unreliable systems (the "hanging chad" punch cards) 
relative to those using more reliable systems. Thus, on this argument, even flawed manual 
recounts result in lesser inequality than no recounts at all. This argument was suggested in 
two footnotes within Gore's brief. Brief of Respondent Albert Gore, Jr., at 43 n.24, Bush v. 
Gore 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00-949) ("The manual recounts can ameliorate some of the 
disparity created by the use of different marking and counting equipment."); id. at 50 n.28 
("Counting none of the votes would be vote dilution with a vengeance."). If  this argument is 
correct, however, it suggests not that the Court's remedy went too far, but that it did not go 
far enough. Rather than simply declaring only the recount scheme constitutionally invalid, 
this argument suggests, it should have declared the entire election violative of equal protec­
tion. Cf Thomas, supra note 454, at 387-88 (arguing that the prophylactic remedy imposed in 
Bush v. Gore exacerbated harm to voters, by "den[ying] the fundamental right to vote of 
Florida voters who cast a legal vote not counted by the tabulation systems"). 
463. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 108-09 (2000). 
464. Id. at 126 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
465. Id. at 128. 
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minations made by vote-counting officials and the state courts led it to 
choose this remedy. 
* * * * 
The aspects of Bush v. Gore discusssed above track the four key 
features of First Amendment Equal Protection: (1) the requirement of 
precision, (2) liberal rules of justiciability, (3) receptivity to facial 
challenges, and (4) independent examination of the evidence.466 Of 
course, an account of Bush v. Gore that rests upon its connection to 
First Amendment Equal Protection is at odds with the Supreme 
Court's own explanation for its decision. The Court nowhere expressly 
references the First Amendment cases from which it silently borrows. 
Nor does this account justify the Court's smuggling First Amendment 
doctrines into a voting case, a step - or perhaps more accurately a 
leap - that the Court has heretofore refused to take.467 If Bush v. 
Gore or any of the other Unconventional Equal Protection cases are 
to be understood in light of First Amendment doctrines, we must con­
sider why such a leap might be appropriate. 
V. A MORE PERFECT UNION: EQUAL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
The failure to acknowledge the relationship between the First 
Amendment and voting is not limited to Bush v. Gore but is charac­
teristic of voting cases decided under the Equal Protection Clause. It 
can be traced directly to a case decided almost thirty-five years earlier, 
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, one of the four equal protection 
cases upon which Bush v. Gore relies. Justice Douglas's opinion in 
Harper raised, but explicitly failed to settle, the relationship between 
the First Amendment and the right to vote: 
It is argued that the right to vote in state elections is implicit, particularly 
by reason of the First Amendment and that it may not constitutionally be 
conditioned upon payment of a tax or fee. We do not stop to canvass the 
relation between voting and political expression. For it is enough to say 
that once the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be 
drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.468 
466. See supra Part 11.B. 
467. See supra note 446 and accompanying text. 
468. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966) (citation omitted). For 
arguments that the First Amendment should be considered a source of the right to vote, see 
Justice Brennan's opinion in Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 756 (1974), and Karst, Equality 
in the First Amendment, supra note 7, at 53-59. 
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Harper's avoidance of this question has hindered the recognition of 
the links between the First Amendment and the principle of equal par­
ticipation. Had the Court addressed the question, it might have 
avoided the confusion evident in such cases over the proper relation­
ship between First Amendment equality and equality in other areas of 
political participation ever since.469 
Taken together, Thomas v. Chicago Park District and Bush v. Gore 
suggest a reconciliation of the divergent approaches to the problem of 
discretion and inequality. Although decided under the First Amend­
ment, Thomas gestures toward Conventional Equal Protection analy­
sis, in relaxing the general requirement of precision and in suggesting 
that same deference should be accorded to official decisionmakers. 
Bush v. Gore, on the other hand, moves equal protection doctrine in 
the area of voting closer to that which has traditionally been applied in 
the First Amendment context. This is evident not only in its quasi­
First Amendment holding that the absence of sufficiently specific rules 
for vote counting creates a constitutional problem, but also in its care­
ful scrutiny of the actions of state officials and judges, its assumption 
that Bush and Cheney had standing, and its willingness to entertain 
what amounted to facial challenge of Florida's scheme. Put differently, 
Thomas moves in the direction of greater toleration for discretion 
characteristic of Conventional Equal Protection (thereby risking 
expressive inequality), while Bush v. Gore moves in the direction of 
lesser toleration for discretion characteristic of First Amendment 
Equal Protection (to further equality in the electoral process). 
It remains to be seen whether these cases are simply blips on the 
radar, or harbingers of a more lasting change. While it is not my objec­
tive here to soothsay, it is worth asking whether there is any justifica­
tion for this convergence. This Part argues that there is, and suggests 
the directions in which the law of expressive and electoral equality 
might productively move from its recognition. In particular, such 
recognition might move us toward a clearer understanding of the 
special dangers to equality that may arise from official discretion to . 
grant or withhold access to channels of political participation. It would 
thereby promote a more perfect union of the discordant doctrines of 
discretion that predominate under the First Amendment and the · 
Equal Protection Clause. More importantly, it would further the con­
stitutional vision of a more perfect union by enhancing the opportu­
nity of all citizens to participate in the conversations of democracy. 
469. Professor Hasen notes that, at the time of Harper, the Court viewed the First 
Amendment right of political association as "somewhat interchangeable" with the Four­
teenth Amendment right to equal participation. HASEN, supra note 405, at 209 n.55. It was 
Chief Justice Warren's suggestion that the Harper opinion rely on equal protection rather 
than the First Amendment. Id. 
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At this point, it is helpful to recall the three factors identified at the 
conclusion of Part III to explain why the Court takes a harder look at 
discretion in some contexts than in others: (1) trust, (2) capacity, and 
(3) valuation. It is apparent that, to some extent, each of these factors 
plays a role in the approach taken to the relationship between equality 
and discretion in different circumstances. For example, in the civil 
rights era speech cases, such as Shuttlesworth, distrust of official deci­
sionmakers appears most prominent. On the other hand, in Conven­
tional Equal Protection cases, such as McCleskey, the Court seems 
more concerned with the institutional capacity of the judiciary to 
police discrimination that tends to accompany official discretion. It is 
not so much that the Court trusted jurors to act free from racial bias, 
as that it believed the courts are unable to stop such bias without 
stripping decisionmakers of necessary discretion. 
There can be no denying that each of the explanatory factors I 
have identified plays some role in the doctrines developed. While it is 
difficult to gauge the impact of each of them - and while I certainly 
do not mean to underestimate the importance of the "trust" and 
"capacity" factors - the heightened value accorded to equality in the 
realm of political participation is vital to explaining the differences I 
have identified. This is the common thread running through the First 
Amendment and Unconventional Equal Protection cases. 
The First Amendment Equal Protection cases from Thornhill to 
Shuttlesworth to Forsyth County share a preoccupation with govern­
ment selectively regulating access to channels of communication -
especially where core political speech is concerned - behind a veil of 
discretion. So too, the atypical equal protection rules applied in the 
jury-exclusion, political-restructuring, and one person, one vote cases 
stem, at least in part, from cognizance of the special dangers that exist 
where official or quasi-official misuse of discretion threatens to deny 
citizens an equal voice in democratic processes. In various contexts, 
these cases implement requirements of precision and relax ordinary 
rules regarding justiciability, facial challenges, and appellate factfind­
ing. Adoption of these doctrines serve the overriding objective of 
promoting equality in the realm of political participation, and 
preventing official misuse of discretion from denying such equality. 
These concerns seem to take on special significance where racial bias 
threatens to distort the process of democratic decisionmaking, a 
recognition implicit in First Amendment cases like Shuttlesworth as 
well as Unconventional Equal Protection cases like Washington v. 
Seattle School District and Reynolds v. Sims. 
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Whatever one thinks of Bush v. Gore, its line of reasoning taps into 
an important insight: that the concerns arising from discretionary 
access to the political process are similar to those which arise from 
discretionary systems of regulating expression. There is a stronger and 
a weaker version of this claim. The stronger version asserts that the 
First Amendment itself extends to voting and other forms of political 
participation that have traditionally been examined under the lens of 
equal protection.470 The weaker version asserts that such forms of 
political participation are important for reasons similar to those 
warranting heightened protection for speech equality - even though 
they are not protected by the First Amendment. The weaker version 
would justify the importation of First Amendment modes pf analysis 
into Equal Protection Clause cases on the ground that the interests at 
stake in these cases, if not themselves First Amendment interests, are 
worthy of special protection from official discretion for similar 
reasons. Put another way, this view asserts that there is a common 
constitutional value underlying rights of speech and rights of political 
participation. 
It is the weaker version of this claim that I seek to press here -
namely, the incorporation of a First Amendment Equal Protection 
approach to inequalities in the realm of political participation is justi­
fied because the interests at stake are valuable for similar reasons. 
Acceptance of the First Amendment Equal Protection approach to 
political equality does not require belief that the vote itself falls within 
the scope of the First Amendment. This approach does, however, 
depend on acceptance of the proposition that rights of equal political 
participation bear a sufficient similarity to rights of equal expression 
such that the two should be examined under comparatively protective 
doctrines. 
To see the relationship between speech interests and other 
interests of political participation, it is helpful to revisit the areas that 
depart from the Conventional Equal Protection model. The special 
attention paid to discretion in the jury-exclusion, political­
restructuring, and one person, one vote cases arises at least in part 
from their shared concern with equality of political participation. This 
is self-evidently true of the political-restructuring cases and the one 
person, one vote cases. Each of these decisions are expressly 
concerned with leveling the political playing field. In Hunter, Seattle 
470. Such an argument might draw support from Akhil Amar's contention that the very 
meaning of the First Amendment changed through its incorporation by way of the Four­
teenth Amendment. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amend­
ment, 101 YALE L.J. 1 193, 1277 (1992). But see Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (re­
jecting a First Amendment challenge to a state prohibition on write-in voting). For an 
argument that the First Amendment should be construed to extend to voting rights, see 
Michele Logan, Note, The Right to Write-In: Voting Rights and the First Amendment, 44 
HASTINGS L.J. 727 (1993). 
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School District, and Romer this means removing barriers to a numeri­
cal minority's access to local government. The right to seek "beneficial 
legislation" from one's government on equal terms with all other citi­
zens, if not itself protected by the First Amendment, bears a conspicu­
ous resemblance to interests protected by the speech and petition 
clauses. In both cases, there is an interest in being able to approach 
one's government on equal terms as all other citizens. The political­
participation cases protect against exclusion from the political conver­
sation because of one's race (or, in the case of Romer, sexual orienta­
tion) by adopting a more sensitive test for assessing whether a 
discriminatory purpose exists. 
So too, the one person, one vote cases hinge upon a conception of 
equal political participation, albeit one that may be incompletely 
developed. In particular, the one person, one vote cases do not explain 
what sort of inequality they are guarding against (for example, 
schemes that skew the process to the advantage of a political party, a 
racial group, or incumbents). What is clear from the one person, one 
vote cases, however, is that they are rooted in a conception of the 
"equal dignity owed to each voter." In Bush v. Gore, for example, the 
Court notes that the states might chose to take away from their citi­
zens the right to cast votes for the President entirely. What the state 
may not do is to selectively disenfranchise its citizens. The greater 
power to deny political participation entirely does not include the 
lesser power to do so on an unequal basis. 
The role that juries play as instruments of democratic self­
government can likewise help explain the connection between the 
jury-selection cases, the political-restructuring cases, and the one 
person, one vote cases. The jury, from the Founding on, has served not 
only as a factfinder but also as a fundamental component of the 
American democracy.471 Alexis de Tocqueville famously remarked 
that "the jury is above all a political institution," taking the position 
that "it is essential that the jury lists should expand or shrink with the 
lists of voters."472 The post-Batson jury-selection cases likewise rely on 
the central place of the jury as a forum for democratic participation, a 
role distinct from its function as a mechanism by which to educate the 
471. Amar, supra note 305, at 218-21 ("[T]he jury was an essential democratic institution 
because it was a means by which citizens could engage in self-government."). 
472. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 250-51 (J.P. Mayer & Max 
Lerner eds., George Lawrence trans., Harper & Row 1966) (1848). Another European expa­
triate, German philosopher Frances Lieber, made a similar point about the American jury 
system: "Self-government, to be of a penetrative character . . .  consists in the presenting 
grand jury, in the petty jury, in the fact that much which is called on the European continent 
the administrative branch is left to the people." FRANCIS LIEBER, ON CIVIL LIBERTY AND 
SELF-GOVERNMENT 321 (Theodore D. Woolsey ed., 3d ed., rev., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippin­
cott & Co. 1891). 
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citizenry.473 For example, in extending third-party standing to criminal 
defendants challenging peremptory strikes of other-race jurors, 
Powers v. Ohio expressly stated: "The opportunity for ordinary citi­
zens to participate in the administration of justice has long been rec­
ognized as one of the principal justifications for retaining the jury sys­
tem. "474 Jury service, Powers proceeds to explain, "preserves the 
democratic element of the law."475 It is democracy in action. For this 
reason, mechanisms that deny equal participation on juries warrant 
especially rigorous review. 
Understanding the jury box as a forum for political participation 
on par with the ballot box not only helps explain the special scrutiny 
accorded to race-based peremptories in cases such as Batson; it also 
helps explain the apparently divergent approaches to juror decision­
making evident in Conventional Equal Protection cases like 
McCleskey and First Amendment Equal Protection cases like 
Herndon and New York Times v. Sullivan. In particular, McCleskey 
suggests an unwillingness to limit the discretion of juries, since doing 
so would effectively restrict their ability to participate in this forum for 
democratic conversation. While the Court properly views juror deci­
sionmaking (at least sometimes) as the exercise of rights of political 
participation, it is willing to take power away from these institutions of 
democracy in cases where the political expression of unpopular 
minorities is placed at risk. This risk may be viewed as less acute in 
death penalty cases, because the jury is not regulating access to 
channels of political participation in these cases. Because the death 
penalty cases present no danger of distorting public discourse to the 
disadvantage of a locally unpopular minority, the Court may be 
unwilling to override jury decisionmaking in this area. 
The Court's decision this past term in Ring v. Arizona,476 requiring 
the jury to find the preconditions for imposition of a death sentence, 
supports this interpretation of McCleskey. Ring suggests that respect 
for the critical role that the jury plays in democratic self-government 
at least partly underlies the Court's unwillingness to override the 
jury's decisionmaking authority - absent a countervailing infringe­
ment on rights of political participation, as was present in cases such as 
Herndon and New York Times v. Sullivan.477 
473. See Amar, supra note 305, at 221 (noting de Tocqueville's distinction between "ac­
tual self-government through juries" and "development of self-governance skills from jury 
service"). 
474. 499 U.S. 400, 406 (1991 ). 
475. Powers, 499 U.S. at 407. 
476. 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
477. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). One might still believe that McCleskey underestimates the 
dangers or undervalues the harms resulting from discriminatory implementation from the 
death penalty. Indeed, Mark Rosenbaum and I have taken such a position. See Rosenbaum 
& Tokaji, supra note 256, at 1965 (arguing for an approach that would take into considera-
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To be sure, the special importance of equality in the realm of po­
litical participation is not the only factor supporting the special doc­
trines created to curb the distorting effects of discretion in the First 
Amendment and Unconventional Equal Protection cases. Concerns 
with the capacity of courts to create an administrable remedy and 
distrust of decisionmakers in particular contexts also play a role in 
shaping the legal doctrine. For example, the refusal of the McCleskey 
Court to interfere with juror decisionmaking - tainted as it may be 
with racial bias - arises in part from the difficulty of coming up with a 
suitable remedy, short of holding the death penalty unconstitutional in 
its entirety. And if the death penalty were entirely invalidated, the 
Court feared a slippery slope with · respect to . less severe forms of 
criminal punishment.478 So too, the reluctance of the courts to enter 
the fray with respect to claims of racial discrimination by police 
departments might arise from remedial concerns. 
It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court has not demonstrated the 
same reluctance to interfere where claims of race discrimination in the 
composition of juries are at issue. For example, despite the public 
attention devoted to issues of racial profiling in the enforcement of 
traffic laws, courts have so far been unwilling to adopt rules like that 
adopted in the jury-exclusion cases - i.e., the existence of discretion 
plus a statistical disparity equals a prima facie case of discrimination.479 
Even if the value attached to political participation is not the only 
reason for the heightened sensitivity accorded official discretion in 
First Amendment and Unconventional Equal Protection cases, it is an 
important part of the explanation. 
2. The Priority of Participation 
Still wanting, however, is a theoretical explanation for prioritiz­
ation of equality in the realm of political participation. Why should 
equality in the realm of political participation be given greater protec­
tion from discretionary decisionmaking than equality in other areas?480 
Asserting that there is an expressive element .to rights of political 
participation only partly explains these differences. 
tion the "interplay between McCleskey's Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment 
claims"). My argument here is not that McC/eskey was correctly decided, but only that its 
holding can be reconciled with cases like Herndon and New York Times if we understand the 
Court to be especially concerned with racial bias creeping into jury decisionmaking when 
political expression is at issue. 
478. See id. at 1956-57. 
479. Id. at 1969-70. 
480. For an argument that the right to political participation is among the core values of 
equal citizenship, see Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term - Foreword: Equal 
Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8-9, 26-29 (1977). 
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In seeking such an explanation, it is instructive to revisit the com­
peting theories of First Amendment equality discussed in Part I, one 
atomistic (focusing on the individual speaker's interest in autonomy) 
and the other systemic (focusing on a balanced public discourse that 
allows a diversity of groups to have their views aired). It has not up 
until now been necessary to adjudicate these views, at least for my 
purposes, because they share a concern with preventing the govern­
ment from singling out particular speakers for disfavored treatment 
because of their messages or ideas. But having now reviewed the doc­
trines developed to resolve the tension between equality and discre­
tion in various contexts, we may assess what theoretical justification 
might exist for these differences. In particular, we may consider 
whether either of these theories provides a satisfactory account of the 
different rules applied in the First Amendment Equal Protection, 
Conventional Equal Protection, and Unconventional Equal Protection 
cases. That is not to suggest that all of these cases have been correctly 
decided. It is certainly possible that some of these cases were incor­
rectly decided, and even that some of the doctrines that have devel­
oped are wrongheaded. But departures from our settled precedent 
should lead us at least to question the explanatory power of the pre­
dominant First Amendment theories.481 
Such an examination reveals that neither the atomistic nor the 
systemic views of expressive equality provides a wholly satisfactory 
account of the different equal protection standards. An atomistic view 
of the First Amendment, predicated upon individual autonomy, has no 
convincing explanation for why rights of political participation should 
receive special protection, in comparison with other interests. It 
cannot, for example, explain why a prospective Latino juror has a 
more important interest in being free from racial discrimination on the 
part of a prosecutor, than does a Latino driver on Interstate 5 stopped 
by the California Highway Patrol for going five miles over the speed 
limit. It is not apparent that one's interest in individual autonomy is 
any less implicated by the former than the latter example. The 
contrary would instead appear to be the case. Nor is it immediately 
evident how a theory predicated on individual autonomy would 
explain the greater scrutiny accorded to victims of quantitative mal­
apportionment, as opposed to those sentenced to death as a result of 
racial bias within the capital sentencing system. 
481. Cf RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 61, at 42 (suggesting that theories 
of justice should be measured by how well they account for our "considered judgments" 
reached after due consideration). My suggestion draws upon Rawls, in suggesting that con­
stitutional theories should be evaluated, at least in part, by how well they account for con­
sidered judgments reflected in settled case authority. As in Professor Rawls's work, this is 
not to suggest that such judgments are beyond revision. Id. But comparing our considered 
judgments to what various theories of free speech would appear to demand at least provides , 
a starting point by which to evaluate the adequacy of those theories. 
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The special doctrines created to monitor inequalities in the politi­
cal process also defy explanation under an atomistic theory premised 
on individual autonomy. This theory can perhaps explain a case like 
Harper, striking down the poll tax, on the ground that our right to be 
treated as equal citizens - and to exercise the most basic of roles as a 
citizen by casting a vote - should not be denied on account of limited 
means. But it is difficult to explain the rule developed in the one 
person, one vote cases on the ground that it is necessary to respect 
each individual's right to be treated as an "equal sovereign citizen."482 
The harm to individual autonomy arising from such deviations from 
the one person, one vote seems quite attenuated.483 It is, for example, 
difficult to see how an individual voter's right to vote is denied by be­
ing placed in a voting district that is slightly larger than a neighboring 
district, to the extent that we view each voter atomistically. For each 
voter is still able to cast a vote for his or her preferred candidate, and 
thereby to realize his or her interest in self-representation. The real 
harm can only be judged by virtue of the impact of malapportionment 
upon the groups negatively affected by such malapportionment - for 
example, African Americans as a group, to the extent they are more 
likely to reside in larger voting districts, and therefore have their 
collective political power diminished.484 
Indeed, the atomistic theory even has difficulty explaining some of 
the differences within First Amendment doctrine. Take, for example, 
the case of National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,485 which upheld 
a highly discretionary system of distributing public funds for artistic 
expression. The vague standard for allocation of federal funds in 
Finley, based on "artistic merit," allows and indeed requires public 
officials to evaluate the content of speech in determining how public 
monies are spent. Suppose, however, that a state legislature were to 
develop a scheme of publicly financing political-advocacy organiza­
tions that left a state commission discretion to award funds based upon 
"political merit."  Such a scheme could not withstand constitutional 
scrutiny, allocating as it does vast discretion to public officials that 
very easily could be used to advance favored viewpoints and put dis­
favored viewpoints at a relative disadvantage. The atomistic view 
cannot, however, explain why political expression should be privileged 
over artistic expression. 
482. Fried, supra note 82, at 233. 
483. But see Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitu­
tional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1072 (1980) (explaining the one person, one vote rule as 
"an expression of the equal respect in which we as a society aspire to hold each individual"). 
484. See Gerken, supra note 421, at 1682-84 (defining the right to an undiluted vote as 
an aggregate right, in part because it can only be understood by reference to an individual's 
relation to the group). 
485. 524 U.S. 569 (1998). 
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At first glance, the systemic theory of the First Amendment based 
upon creation of a robust public discourse seems to do better. The 
First Amendment Equal Protection cases - especially those arising 
out of the civil rights era and those arising from dissident political 
speech - likewise appear to rest on some conception of a fair political 
discourse. The objective, after all, in these cases was to prevent 
unfriendly bureaucrats, juries, and judges from tilting the expressive 
playing field to the disadvantage of an insurgent political force. 
The systemic theory also provides some explanation for the differ­
ences between First Amendment Equal Protection and Conventional 
Equal Protection, since the idea of a democracy that allows all seg­
ments of society to be heard - regardless of wealth, race, or political 
influence - underlies this theory.486 A malapportioned state legisla­
ture, which leaves each voter in one county with ninety-nine times the 
voting strength of each voter in another county, would seem to violate 
this principle. So too, the systemic view would appear to do a better 
job at first glance of explaining the political-restructuring cases. In 
particular, these cases can be understood under this theory as dealing 
with the concern that hidden racial bias may distort the public debate, 
leaving the voices of certain disfavored segments of society unheard. 
It also does a good job of explaining the first generation of jury exclu­
sion cases, which focused upon one segment of society - African 
Americans - being denied the opportunity to have their voices heard 
in one important facet of the democratic process. The greater skepti­
cism with which courts view the exercise of official discretion when it 
impinges on expressive equality is of less importance when that discre­
tion, although perhaps arising from racial bias, does not "skew" the 
democratic process. 
A closer examination of the systemic view, however, reveals some 
serious problems. For one thing, a theory that focuses on systematic 
distortions of the public debate cannot explain the distinction between 
Seattle School District and Crawford very well. Recall that the distinc­
tion between the initiatives in the two cases was that one regulated 
access to the political process and the other access to a judicial rem­
edy. It is not immediately apparent why one distorts public debate any 
more than the other - the only difference is the forum within which 
that debate takes place. But if the only goal is a fair public discourse, it 
is not immediately apparent why distortions of that discourse should 
be treated with less deference when they take place in a political 
rather than a judicial forum. 
This theory also cannot explain a case like Bush v. Gore, since 
there was little evidence described in the Court's opinion that 
486. Owen Fiss, for example, predicates his theory on the idea that the speech of some 
should not be permitted to "drown[) out the voices of others or systematically distort[] the 
public agenda." Fiss, Why the State?, supra note 98, at 786. 
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Florida's recounting procedure allowed the playing field to be tilted 
for or against anyone. It was not, for example, clear that urban 
dwellers were disadvantaged by the vote-counting procedures rather 
than rural dwellers, that Republicans were disadvantaged relative to 
Democrats, or that whites were disadvantaged relative to blacks. At 
best, the Court may have suspected that one group of citizens (those 
supporting Bush) might be placed at a relative disadvantage by 
Florida's manual-recount procedure. In all the other cases, there was 
proof that a class of voters was being disadvantaged. Finally, the 
systemic theory does a poor job of explaining the special scrutiny that 
the Court has accorded the exercise of peremptory challenges. For if 
both sides of a case have the opportunity to strike prospective jurors 
they disfavor - whether upon grounds of race, gender, age, or view­
point - there would seem to be very little risk that the jury's dialogue 
would be "distorted." 
What the systemic theory misses is the importance of equal partici­
pation in both the First Amendment Equal Protection and Unconven­
tional Equal Protection cases. For theorists in the Meiklejohn tradi­
tion, " [w]hat is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that 
everything worth saying shall be said. "487 But the focus on equal par­
ticipation in the Unconventional Equal Protection cases belies the 
suggestion that the breadth of speech product available to listeners is 
all that matters - it also matters that each citizen have the opportu­
nity to speak and to have her voice heard. Put another way, it is 
important for all citizens to have an equal opportunity to partake in 
the conversations of democracy. 
This is closely related to a more fundamental objection that liberal 
scholars have raised to theories which rest upon some conception of a 
fair political process or rich public discourse. Any such theory must 
somehow explain what a just process would look like. As Professor 
Tribe puts it: "Deciding what kind of participation the Constitution 
demands requires analysis . . .  of the character and importance of the 
interest at stake."488 While proponents of democracy-based theories of 
the First Amendment refer to the ideal of a "rich public debate,"489 
determining what a fair public debate looks like requires some norma­
tive theory of rights - a vision of how the political system ought to 
487. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 87, at 26; see also Barron, supra 
note 88, at 1653 (quoting Meiklejohn with approval). But see Karst, Equality in the First 
Amendment, supra note 7, at 39-41 (arguing that even if one accepts Meiklejohn's proposi­
tion, there is still a need to define public fora broadly "in order to ensure that all will be 
heard"). 
488. Tribe, supra note 483, at 1069; see also TRIBE, supra note 74, § 12-1, at 787 (noting 
that a conception of free speech that rests upon political participation must ultimately ex­
plain why these things are to be valued). 
489. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, supra note 88, at 1410. 
2506 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 101:2409 
function.490 To speak of "distortions of public debate,"491 as scholars 
who advocate a systemic conception of speech are wont to do, is there­
fore a bit of a cheat. Different observers are likely to have radically 
different views as to what a fair political process would look like, and 
therefore about what it means for the political process to be distorted 
or skewed, either in the area of expression or with respect to other 
areas of political participation. Relying on some vision of a fair politi­
cal process therefore cannot allow us to escape normative judgments 
about how we value various political and civil rights, and which should 
be given priority in particular circumstances.492 
The debate between the majority and the dissent in Romer brings 
this problem dramatically to light. Both sides try to explain their views 
in terms of some vision of a fair political process, yet arrive at diamet­
rically opposed conclusions. The majority envisions a fair political 
process as one that is free from animus against a particular group of 
citizens, including antigay animus. In particular, a fair political process 
rests on two principles: (1) "that government and each of its parts 
remain open on impartial terms to all who seek its assistance," and (2) 
that the electorate may not close off such access based upon "animos­
ity toward a class of persons. "493 
Justice Scalia's dissent sees the process problem quite differently. 
For him, the problem that the Colorado electorate was trying to 
address was that of a geographically concentrated and powerful cadre 
of citizens "capturing" a local government, thereby undermining the 
clearly expressed will of a majority of state voters. He characterizes 
the initiative as a "modest attempt by seemingly tolerant Coloradans 
to preserve sexual mores against the efforts of a politically powerful 
minority to revise those mores through use of the laws."494 For Justice 
Scalia, the fact that the initiative may have been borne of hostility or 
animus towards gays was irrelevant.495 In short, his dissent envisions a 
fair (or at least a constitutional) political process as one in which a 
majority of the state's electorate rules, even if it acts based upon 
animus toward a particular group. 
The point here is not to debate whether the majority or dissent has 
the better argument. It is instead to emphasize that both of their 
490. See Overton, supra note 32, at 83 (noting that "one's assumptions about how de­
mocracy works or should work" may explain the choice between rules and standards with 
respect to the democratic process). 
491 . Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, supra note 88, at 1413. 
492. See Tribe, supra note 483, at 1069. Of course, Professor Ely's elaboration of a proc­
ess-based theory of constitutional rights may be seen as an attempt to explain how such 
normative judgments should be made. See generally ELY, supra note 413. 
493. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633-34 (1996). 
494. Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
495. Id. at 644. 
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arguments depend upon a vision of how politics should function. The 
systemic theory of speech thus cannot get around the sticky problem 
of defining what sort of democratic participation the Constitution 
requires. No theory of political participation, whether grounded in the 
First Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause, can escape these 
sorts of judgments. 
While neither the atomistic nor the systemic theory provides a 
completely satisfactory account of the ideal of equal participation evi­
dent in the First Amendment Equal Protection and Unconventional 
Equal Protection cases, parts of both theories are essential to this 
ideal. The systemic view of the First Amendment properly recognizes 
that there is something special about political discourse that demands 
especially searching review of schemes that vest discretion to regulate 
in this area. The atomistic view captures the idea that it is not suffi­
cient simply to have a range of ideas available to those interested in 
hearing them, but that it is also important to provide an opportunity 
for equal participation in the processes of democracy. 
The approach I suggest is thus not exclusively atomistic or sys­
temic, but instead carries elements of both. Professor Fallon's explana­
tion for the special overbreadth rules applicable under the First 
Amendment nicely captures this duality: "The First Amendment, 
more even than any other constitutional provisions conferring funda­
mental rights, contributes vitally to the preservation of an open, 
democratic political regime, at the same time as it secures rights of 
high importance to particular individuals."496 But First Amendment 
cases, as I have attempted to show, are not the only ones specially 
concerned with the twin goals of promoting an open democracy and 
protecting the individual's right to be treated as an equal sovereign 
citizen. That ideal is also implicit in the Unconventional Equal Protec­
tion cases looking with special skepticism upon discretion that impli­
cates equal political participation, whether that discretion is wielded 
by police officers, bureaucrats, juries, judges, or the electorate. It is 
therefore worth exploring whether there are other areas of political 
participation that might benefit from closer examination, under the 
light cast by First Amendment Equal Protection cases. 
B. New Directions 
In Snowden v. Hughes, the Court stated that "the necessity of a 
showing of purposeful discrimination is no less in a case involving 
political rights than in any other."497 As my discussion of the Uncon­
ventional Equal Protection cases shows, the Court has not consistently 
496. Fallon, Making Sense of Overbreadth, supra note 203, at 884 n.192. 
497. 321 U.S. 1 ,  11 (1944) 
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adhered to this rule. The truth is that the Court has embraced a differ­
ent analysis for assessing purposeful discrimination in considering 
schemes that threaten equal political participation, just as it has 
adopted a different analysis in considering schemes that mask pur­
poseful discrimination in the First Amendment context. Yet it has 
never expressly acknowledged the link between the line of reasoning 
applied in equal protection cases implicating access to the political 
process and in expressive equality cases decided under the First 
Amendment. 
In each of these areas, the Court has adopted a version of what 
might be termed "front end" strict scrutiny. Traditional strict scrutiny 
only kicks in on the "back end," requiring the government to show 
narrow tailoring to a compelling interest only after a prima facie case 
has been shown (e.g., after intentional race discrimination or content­
based classification has been shown). But if the plaintiff cannot show a 
facial classification or prove discriminatory purpose, then the govern­
ment is never required to meet this burden. 
The Unconventional Equal Protection cases on the other hand, 
apply a more searching test on the front end in determining whether a 
prima facie case is made. The jury-selection cases allow such a case to 
be made where a discretionary system has a disparate impact on a par­
ticular group. The political restructuring cases allow such a case to be 
made where the "practical effect" of a law enacted by the electorate is 
to make it more difficult for a particular minority group to secure 
beneficial legislation. The one person, one vote cases impose a 
presumption of unconstitutionality where there are significant dispari­
ties in the size of a voting district, without even a showing of disparate 
impact upon any particular racial group. They also evince a more 
relaxed approach to justiciability and facial challenges, as well as a 
willingness to examine more thoroughly the evidentiary record on 
appeal. Each of these doctrines indicates a searching form of up-front 
scrutiny arising from the special concern with potential inequalities 
that may affect political participation. This is comparable to what the 
Court has long done in First Amendment Equal Protection cases, 
striking down discretionary schemes on their face without requiring 
proof of actual content or viewpoint discrimination. The principal 
difference is that in the First Amendment Equal Protection cases, the 
presumption is irrebuttable. For instance, as in Forsyth County or 
Shuttlesworth, the government cannot win by showing that - despite 
the existence of a discretionary scheme that left its officials room 
within which to discriminate - it did not really discriminate. The Bush 
v. Gore Court, interestingly, appears to have applied a similar irrebut­
table presumption. 
One might object to importation of First Amendment Equal 
Protection doctrines into other areas implicating rights of political 
participation, on the ground that such rights, though they may bear a 
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resemblance to expression, are not really speech rights. Professor 
Tribe, for example, argues that voting "is not so much a matter of 
engaging in positive acts of speech . . .  but of participating in a collec­
tive political enterprise."498 To the extent that this observation suggests 
that the act of casting a vote is not exclusively an act of expressing 
one's views, he is surely correct. If voting is a sort of speech act, it is 
not only one that has a special sort of consequence but also one that 
has a special social meaning: it is the quintessential act of political par­
ticipation. This, however, does not differentiate it from other sorts of 
speech acts for which the Court has adopted special protections 
through the First Amendment Equal Protection cases. For many of 
those cases, including Shuttlesworth, New York Times, and even 
Forsyth County, also implicated participation in a "collective political 
enterprise." Moreover, the fact that voting also implicates the value of 
political participation - perhaps even more directly than in First 
Amendment cases - cannot justify less searching review of discre­
tionary election systems that threaten to deny equal protection. If any­
thing, it suggests that judicial review of systems denying equality with 
respect to the voting process should be subject to more searching 
review. 
The heightened value attaching to political participation, to be 
sure, is not the only factor motivating the heightened attention to offi­
cial discretion in the First Amendment and Unconventional Equal 
Protection cases. Also of importance are the value that attaches to dis­
cretion in a particular context, the capacity of courts effectively to 
administer a legal rule that will rein in the harmful effects of discretion 
without destroying it, and the degree to which circumstances suggest 
that race or viewpoint based discrimination is likely under the circum­
stances presented. 
The threat to equality of political participation is therefore not the 
only consideration motivating a shift away from Conventional Equal 
Protection. But it is, and should be, an important determinant in the 
development of doctrines designed to restrain official discretion where 
it bears upon the functioning of the political process. The problem of 
equality and discretion, then, is not one that is susceptible to an easy 
formulaic answer. Where it is necessary to balance equality and discre­
tion as the Court has done in many contexts, my approach would 
require a thumb be placed on equality's side of the scale where rights 
of political participation are at stake - especially where race dis­
crimination may be at work. Such an approach should cause us to 
think about some familiar problems in a different way. 
I close with three areas of political equality that might appear 
differently if viewed through the lens of First Amendment Equal 
498. Tribe, supra note 424, at 243. 
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Protection. The suggestions below are necessarily tentative. My objec­
tive here is not to present a full-blown argument that particular 
practices would be deemed unconstitutional, but rather to suggest how 
borrowing from the First Amendment Equal Protection cases' 
approach to official discretion might affect the constitutional analysis 
of such problems. Such an analysis is particularly salient, given that 
suspected but hard-to-prove racial discrimination lies in the back­
ground of each of these equal protection problems. In other words, the 
examples below present cases in which racial discrimination and view­
point discrimination may at least partly overlap, making the sort of 
analysis applied in the First Amendment Equal Protection cases espe­
cially appropriate. 
1. Election Reform 
Disparities in the electoral process might seem the most obvious 
candidate for examining inequalities of political participation under 
the lens of First Amendment Equal Protection. Among the most 
pressing set of democracy-related questions is how the line of equal 
protection precedent culminating in Bush v. Gore will affect currently 
pending efforts at election reform. As explained below, the most 
important implications of First Amendment Equal Protection may lie 
not in the area of voting technology, which has heretofore attracted 
the most attention, but rather to other areas in which discretion may 
threaten equality of political participation. 
In the wake of the November 2000 elections, several lawsuits were 
filed throughout the country challenging disparities in the systems 
used to cast and count votes.499 In the months that followed, a raft of 
reports analyzed various problems plaguing our voting systems and 
potential solutions.500 While these studies have not reached uniform 
499. In the months following the November 2000 election, attorneys in Florida, Georgia, 
Illinois, and California brought lawsuits challenging their states' continuing reliance on 
punch-card voting systems. Common Cause v. Jones, No. 01-3470 (C.D. Cal. filed Apr. 17, 
2001); Black v. McGuffage, No. 01-C-208 (N.D. ll1. filed Jan. 11, 2001); NAACP v. Harris, 
No. 01-CIV-120 (S.D. Fla. filed Jan. 10, 2001); Andrews v. Cox, No. 01-CV-0318 (N.D. Ga. 
filed Jan. 5, 2001). For selected pleadings and orders from these and other voting cases filed 
in the wake of the November 2000 elections, see Election 2000, at http://election2000.stan­
ford.edu/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2003). 
500. See, e.g., CALTECH-MIT VOTING TECH. PROJECT, VOTING - WHAT IS, WHAT 
COULD BE (2001) (hereinafter CALTECH-MIT] ; CONSTITUTION PROJECT, BUILDING 
CONSENSUS ON ELECTION REFORM (2001) [hereinafter CONSTITUTION PROJECT]; 
DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS SPECIAL COMM. ON ELECTION REFORM, REVITALIZING OUR 
NATION'S ELECTION SYSTEM (2001) [hereinafter DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS]; NAT'L TASK 
FORCE ON ELECTION REFORM, ELECTION CTR., ELECTION 2000: REVIEW AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE NATION'S ELECTIONS ADMINISTRATORS (2001) [hereinafter 
NAT'L TASK FORCE]; SURVEY RESEARCH CTR. & INST. OF GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, 
UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY, COUNTING ALL THE VOTES: THE PERFORMANCE OF VOTING 
TECHNOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES (2001) (hereinafter SURVEY RESEARCH CTR.]; TASK 
FORCE ON THE FED. ELECTION SYSTEM, NAT'L COMM'N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, TO 
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conclusions, almost all suggest problems that go well beyond the 
mechanical devices used for voting, resulting in inequalities in whose 
votes actually gets counted.501 
What these studies reveal is wide variations among counties in 
various aspects of the voting process, including machinery used to cast 
votes, registration systems, polling-place operations, provisional vot­
ing, and the use of sample ballots. The amount of discretion that states 
delegate to local election officials in the conduct of elections varies 
dramatically from state to state: 
State election codes and regulations may be very specific or very general. 
Moreover some states have mandated statewide election administration 
guidelines and procedures that foster uniformity in the way local jurisdic­
tions conduct elections. Other states have guidelines that generally per­
mit local election jurisdictions considerable autonomy and discretion in 
the way that they run elections.502 
A "decentralized" approach to the conduct of elections predominates 
in most states, devolving responsibility for the conduct of elections to 
more than 10,000 counties, cities, and other local governmental enti­
ties. 503 
Problems with the methods by which votes are cast have attracted 
the most attention and, it appears, have been the subject of the most 
litigation thus far.504 Studies of voting systems conducted in the wake 
of the November 2000 election have found significant disparities in the 
uncounted vote rate - that is, the combined "overvote" and "under­
vote" - arising from the use of different types of voting machines. 
According to a comprehensive study of data from the 2000 elections 
conducted by Professor Henry Brady and his colleagues at the Univer­
sity of California, Berkeley, Survey Research Center, punch-card sys­
tems result in significantly more uncounted votes than direct record 
electronic systems, lever machines, optical-scan systems, or paper 
ASSURE PRIDE AND CONFIDENCE IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS (2001) [hereinafter NAT'L 
COMM'N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM]; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ELECTIONS: 
PERSPECTIVES ON ACTIVITIES AND CHALLENGES ACROSS THE NATION (2001) [hereinafter 
GAO PERSPECTIVES]. 
501. See, e.g., CALTECH-MIT, supra note 500, at 21 (finding significant disparities in re­
sidual vote rate among voting systems); SURVEY RESEARCH CTR., supra note 500, at 2 
(finding that punch card systems have significantly higher residual vote rates than other sys­
tems); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ELECTIONS: STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF 
FACTORS THAT AFFECTED UNCOUNTED VOTES IN THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION ( 
2001) [hereinafter GAO STATISTICAL ANALYSIS] (finding that uncounted votes varied in 
part based on type of equipment used). 
502. GAO PERSPECTIVES, supra note 500, at 7. 
503. CALTECH-MIT, supra note 500, at 13 ("Almost all states have given the authority 
for administering elections to local governments."); GAO PERSPECTIVES, supra note 500, at 
30 n.7. 
504. See cases cited supra note 499; Hasen, supra note 428, at 398-402 (describing the 
benefits and costs of requiring equality in the mechanics of elections). 
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ballots.sos In some but not all states, people of color are particularly 
hard hit by the technology gap.s06 
These statistical disparities have resulted in litigation challenging 
states' continuing use of systems with differing uncounted-vote rates. 
The structure of the argument bears at least a superficial similarity to 
that embraced by the Court in Bush v. Gore. In Bush v. Gore, the 
problem complained of was the state's failure to set adequate stan­
dards for manual recounts, resulting in significant disparities among 
counties. In the punch-card litigation, the problem complained of is 
the states' failure to set adequate standards for voting systems, result­
ing in significant disparities among counties.so7 
Such a challenge is one that might conceivably have been raised 
even before Bush v. Gore, based on the one person, one vote line of 
cases. Indeed, in one sense, it presents a much easier case for applica­
tion of settled equal protection principles than Bush v. Gore. For there 
was relatively little statistical evidence of intercounty disparities within 
Florida arising from the manual recount procedures used. By contrast, 
there is already a significant and growing body of evidence proving 
that disparities arise from the different systems used to cast votes.sos 
This makes the voting-machine cases much more similar to traditional 
quantitative vote-dilution cases, in which it is possible to present 
empirical proof that the relative voting strength of different counties 
has been strengthened or diminished by the challenged practice.so9 
The voting-machine litigation thus presents a relatively clear case 
of inequalities in the opportunities for political participation arising 
505. SURVEY RESEARCH Cm., supra note 500, at 4, 29; see also GAO STATISTICAL 
ANALYSIS, supra note 501, at 9 (finding that counties using punch card had a higher percent­
ages of uncounted votes than those using electronic, paper, or optical scan systems). 
506. See Stephen Knack & Martha Kropf, Who Uses Inferior Voting Technology?, at 
http://unofficial.umkc.edu/kropfm/inferior.pdf (Jan. 2001 ); see also Michael Tomz & Robert 
P. Van Houweling, How Does Voting Equipment Affect the Racial Gap in Voided Ballots?, 
at 18, at http://www.stanford.edu/-tomz/pubs/gap.pdf (June 12, 2002) (finding black-white 
disparity in voided ballots to be substantially lower on modern direct-record electronic sys­
tems than on punch cards and optical-scan systems). 
507. See Common Cause v. Jones, 213 F.Supp.2d 1106, 1 107 (C.D. Cal. 2001). 
508. See, e.g., SURVEY RESEARCH CTR., supra note 500; Tomz & Van Houweling, supra 
note 506. 
509. On the other hand, there may be stronger justifications for using different voting 
systems than for using different recounting standards within a state. In particular, the in­
creased costs of converting to more reliable systems, states have argued, distinguish the two 
scenarios. See Hasen, supra note 428, at 399 (stating that "the costs associated with upgrad­
ing voting equipment . . .  will be considerable"). I do not here dwell on whether this argu­
ment might justify using voting systems of varying degrees of reliability within a state. How­
ever, to the extent that the one person, one vote cases are deemed applicable to voting 
system disparities, those cases require application of strict scrutiny to intercounty inequali­
ties. Id. at 389 ("It is hornbook law that laws infringing on fundamental rights, including 
voting, must be judged under the standard of strict scrutiny . . . .  ") Under this level of scru­
tiny, the costs of remedying the claimed inequalities are not generally an adequate justifica­
tion for allowing those inequalities to persist. Id. at 395. 
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from the discretion vested in local officials - in this case, the discre­
tion to choose what type of voting machinery to use. 
While the use of different kinds of voting machines may be the 
most visible electoral equality issue to emerge in the wake of the 
November 2000 elections, it is probably not the most significant, either 
in terms of its impact on the number of votes counted or its impact on 
equal protection doctrine. It is only one of the several areas in which 
the discretion delegated to local officials in the conduct of elections 
may result in inequalities among voters. One study, for example, esti­
mates that approximately 4 to 6 million votes were lost in the Novem­
ber 2000 elections. Of those, approximately 1.5 to 2 million votes were 
lost due to voting equipment or confusing ballots, while an estimated 
1.5 to 3 million were lost due to voter-registration problems and up to 
1 million were lost due to problems in polling-place operations.510 
While these calculations are admittedly rough, they do suggest other 
areas in which the states have delegated discretion to local officials 
that may have a substantial impact upon electoral equality. 
An approach to these problems that draws upon First Amendment 
Equal Protection doctrine would look with particular skepticism on 
decentralized election systems conferring significant discretion upon 
county officials - even where it is difficult to isolate any particular 
factor and empirically prove that any particular group has been dis­
advantaged as a result of that factor. Take, for example, the problems 
that several studies have found to exist in voter-registration systems. 
Most of the studies conducted after the November 2000 elections sug­
gest that this is among the most serious existing problems with our 
voting system.51 1  Only thirteen of the states have a statewide voter­
registration system, resulting in wide variations across jurisdictions 
(and even within jurisdictions) in how voter registration is handled.512 
For example, voter-registration forms missing certain information 
(e.g., the last four digits of one's social security number) may be 
treated differently from county to county, or even within one 
county.513 Aggravating the problems arising from the lack of statewide 
registration systems are the inconsistent practices by which voters' 
names are "purged" from the voting rolls.514 Quantifying the number 
of votes lost as a result of the defects in registration systems - let 
alone determining whether particular groups are disproportionately 
510. CALTECH-MIT, supra note 500, at 9. 
511 .  See, e.g. , CALTECH-MIT, supra note 500, at 9, 26-31; DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS, supra 
note 500, at 37-43; GAO PERSPECTIVES, supra note 500, at 51-98; NAT'L COMM'N ON FED. 
ELECTION REFORM, supra note 500, at 26-33. 
512. GAO PERSPECTIVES, supra note 500, at 72, 95. 
513. Id. at 72. 
514. CALTECH-MIT, supra note 500, at 29. 
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harmed - is extremely difficult.sis Nevertheless, in at least one case, 
voters have claimed that Florida officials disproportionately purged 
African American voters from the rolls.s16 
Some of the post-2000 election studies recommend that all states 
implement statewide voter-registration systems, as a means to pro­
mote uniform treatment of voters across jurisdictions.517 Such a system, 
if not a panacea, might reduce the degree of discretion exercised by 
local officials in determining how registrations should be handled and 
who should be purged. The question is whether one might challenge 
interjurisdictional disparities in voter registration within a state, with­
out evidence of either discriminatory intent or disparate impact as to 
any particular racial or ethnic group. Under traditional equal protec­
tion analysis, and even under the one person, one vote doctrine, such a 
challenge would seem unlikely. Conventional Equal Protection analy­
sis would require a showing of discriminatory intent, while the one 
person, one vote cases would at the very least require some statistical 
proof of quantitative vote dilution. 
On the other hand, the analysis applied in Bush v. Gore - and 
borrowed from the First Amendment Equal Protection cases - might 
allow such disparate practices to be held unconstitutional even without 
proof of discriminatory intent or disparate impact. For in these cases, 
the delegation of broad discretion to government officials, even with­
out proof that a particular group has been disadvantaged, has sufficed 
to make out a violation. It is thus in areas like voter registration, 
rather than voting machinery, where Bush v. Gore's incorporation of 
First Amendment Equal Protection analysis may ultimately prove 
most significant. Borrowing from the jury-selection cases, one might 
require at least some empirical evidence of disparate impact or treat­
ment, in addition to the presence of discretion, to make out a prima 
fade case of discrimination. Courts might adopt a similar approach to 
analysis of other problems that the election-reform reports have iden­
tified, including intrastate disparities in provisional voting,518 distribu­
tion of sample ballots in advance of the election,519 and poll-worker 
515. Id. at 8-9 (making a rough estimate of number of votes lost due to registration mix­
ups). 
516. NAACP v. Harris, No. Ol-CIV-120 (S.D. Fla. filed Jan. 10, 2001). 
517. See, e.g., DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS, supra note 500, at 40; NAT'L COMM'N ON FED. 
ELECTION REFORM, supra note 500, at 29. 
518. See NAT'L COMM'N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, supra note 500, at 36 (recom­
mending that every state adopt a provisional voting system); NAT'L TASK FORCE, supra note 
500, at 44 (noting that more than half the states do not have a system for provisional voting). 
519. CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 500, at 1-2 (advocating distribution of sample 
ballots to all voters); DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS, supra note 500, at 50-51 (noting variations in 
state practices for distributing voting guides, including sample ballots); GAO PERSPECTIVES, 
supra note 500, at 176 (noting variations in distribution of sample ballots among jurisdic­
tions); Peter Brien, Voter Pamphlets: The Next Best Step In Election Reform, 28 J. LEGIS. 87 
(2002). 
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recruitment, training, and pay.520 Each of these practices may have a 
disparate impact upon particular groups, albeit one that is very diffi­
cult to prove. 
I do not mean to underestimate the difficulties of developing judi­
cially manageable standards to disparities in any of these areas. What I 
am suggesting is that courts should look more closely than they previ­
ously have at decentralized electoral systems that confer broad discre­
tion upon local officials, where the nature of that discretion makes it 
difficult to determine whether particular groups are disadvantaged. 
The problem here is comparable to that identified by the City of 
Lakewood Court: the absence of precise, uniform standards 
prescribed in advance makes it very easy for officials to discriminate 
behind a veil of discretion.521 "Without these guideposts, post hoc 
rationalizations by the [official] and the use of shifting or illegitimate 
criteria are far too easy, making it difficult for courts to determine in 
any particular case whether the [official] is permitting favorable, and 
suppressing unfavorable, expression."522 The kernel of equal protec­
tion wisdom buried in Bush v. Gore is that this danger should be taken 
just as seriously in the voting process as it is in the speech context. 
2. Incumbent Gerrymandering 
The voting process is not the only area that might stand to benefit 
were it to borrow from the First Amendment Equal Protection cases. 
Another area that may warrant more searching up-front analysis is the 
redrawing of district boundaries to prevent serious challenges to 
incumbents from being mounted. Here too, First Amendment cases 
could inform the analysis of a problem that, to this point, has not been 
understood to present serious equal protection concerns. 
A notorious recent example of this practice of incumbent protec­
tion is the redrawing of California's congressional legislative districts 
in the wake of the 2000 census. District lines were redrawn in a trans­
parent effort to create "safe seats" for virtually all state and federal 
legislators - a package to which, unsurprisingly, state legislators of 
both parties almost unanimously agreed. As a result of the post-2000 
California congressional redistricting, the number of competitive seats 
decreased from 14 of 52 in 1990, to only 1 of 53.523 Some commentators 
520. DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS, supra note 500, at 94-99 (noting variations in how jurisdic­
tions handle poll-worker issues, and problems that result from inadequacies); GAO 
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 500, at 158 (identifying training and recruitment of poll workers 
as a "major problem"). 
521. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g. Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988). 
522 Id. at 758. 
523. Where the Lines Fall, CAL. J., Jan. 2002, at 36, 36-37. 
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have understandably labeled the 2000 California redistricting an 
"incumbent protection plan. "524 
Under traditional equal protection analysis, this sort of redistrict­
ing presents no constitutional problem, but is left to the discretion of 
those who draw district lines, whether or not they stand to benefit. 
Although the Court once stated that districting plans adopted "to 
minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political ele­
ments of the population"525 violate equal protection, it has not held to 
this formulation. In Gaffney v. Cummings, for example, the Court held 
that districting plans may be drawn to "achieve a rough approximation 
of the statewide political strengths of the Democratic and Republican 
parties," rejecting the contention that such a "political gerrymander" 
violates equal protection.526 In the Court's view, consideration of the 
partisan political consequences of drawing districts were "unavoid­
able."527 Since then, the Court has held that it is permissible for district 
lines to be drawn for political reasons, so long as they are not drawn 
for "predominantly racial" reasons.528 Thus, drawing districts in order 
to create a "safe Republican" or "safe Democratic" district is permis­
sible, so long as race is not the " 'predominant factor' motivating the 
legislature's redistricting decision."529 
The current standard thus does not allow any inquiry into whether 
Democrats and Republicans have colluded to protect incumbents, as 
occurred in the most recent round of California redistricting. All the 
Equal Protection Clause has been held to forbid is the use of race as a 
"predominant factor." Civil rights plaintiffs challenging the constitu­
tionality of such plans must therefore show intentional race discrimi­
nation, an argument that the Mexican-American Legal Defense Fund 
("MALDEF") unsuccessfully attempted to make with respect to the 
California plan.530 Such arguments provide the only realistic vehicle for 
challenging a redistricting plan on constitutional grounds. 
Even if one agrees with the race-discrimination arguments pressed 
by MALDEF in that case, those arguments only capture a sliver of the 
problem with California's redistricting plan. While racial gerryman­
dering may or may not have been one aspect of the line-drawing 
process, it is only part of the larger picture - namely, the self-dealing 
524. Lisa Plendl, Are Voters Dissed by Redistricting?, CAL. J., Jan. 2002, at 12. 
525. Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965). 
526. 412 U.S. 735, 752 (1973). 
527. Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 753. 
528. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 249 (2001). 
529. Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 547 (1999). 
530. See Cano v. Davis, 21 l F. Supp. 2d 1208 (C.D. Cal. 2002), affd, 537 U.S. 1 100 
(2003) .  MALDEF also argued that the redistricting had a disparate impact upon Latinos in 
violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, an argument that the district court also rejected. 
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by legislators of both parties designed to prevent challengers from 
being elected. To the extent one embraces any sort of process-based 
theory of constitutional rights, such self-dealing is especially perni­
cious. It is one of the prime areas in which the political branches 
cannot be expected to police themselves. The risk of self-dealing thus 
presents a strong argument for entering the "political thicket."531 And 
if racial gerrymandering also plays a role in the drawing of district 
lines, as was arguably the case in California, it only strengthens the 
argument for judicial intervention. 
Notwithstanding the appearance of unfairness arising from incum­
bent gerrymandering, one might still question the propriety of judicial 
intervention on both theoretical and practical grounds. On a theoreti­
cal level, it is not entirely clear whose rights are violated by an incum­
bency-protective redistricting. Those of the voters? Those of would-be 
challengers? More to the point, it is not immediately apparent what 
the equality right being violated might be. For surely there can be no 
constitutional right to live in a competitive district. And if there is 
some constitutional right, it is unclear who would have standing to 
raise it. On a practical level, a fundamental problem is the inherent 
difficulty in developing judicially manageable standards by which to 
measure incumbent gerrymandering. It may be readily apparent that 
California's district lines were drawn with the protection of incum­
bents in mind� But going down this road might present a difficult 
problem of line drawing, especially given the inherent difficulties of 
probing legislative intent. For example, how much of a shift in the 
number of safe seats should be required to make out a prima facie 
case of incumbent gerrymandering? And is all incumbent gerryman­
dering to be forbidden? Or only in cases where protection of incum­
bents is the predominant consideration of the line-drawing body? 
Here again, borrowing from First Amendment Equal Protection 
cases may provide some guidance. Particularly illuminating is Service 
Employees International Union v. Fair Political Practices Commis­
sion,532 · in which the Ninth Circuit considered a First Amendment 
challenge to Proposition 73, a California campaign finance reform 
measure enacted through the initiative process. The basis for the 
constitutional challenge was that the measure put challengers at a 
competitive disadvantage relative to incumbents by limiting the 
amount that contributors may give during each fiscal year, as opposed 
to each election cycle.533 Plaintiffs argued that this scheme violated the 
531. For arguments that courts should intervene with respect to incumbent gerryman­
dering, see Sally Dworak-Fisher, Note, Drawing the Line on Incumbency Protection, 2 MICH. 
J .  RACE & L. 131 (1996); Kristen L. Silverberg, Note, The Illegitimacy of the Incumbent Ger­
rymander, 74 TEXAS L. REV. 913 (1996). 
532. 955 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1992). 
533. SEIU, 955 F.2d. at 1314-15. 
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First Amendment and produced evidence that incumbents had a much 
easier time raising money in off years.534 The restrictions were, how­
ever, "viewpoint and content neutral," and did not facially advantage 
either incumbents or challengers.535 Moreover, as the dissent pointed 
out (and the majority did not dispute), there was no evidence of pur­
poseful discrimination against challengers as a class.536 The Ninth 
Circuit nevertheless struck down Proposition 73, concluding that the 
"discriminatory impact" on challengers was sufficient to violate the 
First Amendment.537 
The SEIU court's mode of First Amendment analysis has much to 
recommend it with respect not only to campaign finance schemes, but 
also to redistricting schemes like California's. As is typical of First 
Amendment analysis, the SEIU court looked beyond facial neutrality 
and evidence of intentional discrimination, implicitly recognizing the 
difficulty of coming up with direct evidence of such intent. The 
dangers of tilting the political balance in favor of incumbents, the 
court's opinion suggests, justifies a more searching brand of equal 
protection analysis. 
Could such an analysis be applied to a redistricting scheme that 
tilts the competitive balance sharply in favor of incumbents, like the 
post-2000 California congressional redistricting? The sharp decrease in 
the number of competitive districts, from 14 to just 1, would seem to 
constitute compelling evidence that the scheme was indeed drawn sys­
tematically to favor the interests of incumbents. One could certainly 
imagine a legal test (not unlike that constructed in the post-Batson 
peremptory-strike cases) in which such evidence were held sufficient 
to make out a prima facie case of discrimination in favor of 
incumbents. Moreover, if there is any area in which the discretion of 
incumbent legislators to act impartially might legitimately be ques­
tioned, it is in the drawing of district lines. Accordingly, to the extent 
one believes that a strong case for judicial intervention exists where 
the political branches cannot be trusted,538 a redistricting plan that sys­
tematically advantages incumbents is a prime candidate for searching 
front-end review. Indeed, the arguments for judicial intervention for 
incumbent gerrymandering are even stronger than in SEIU, given that 
Proposition 73 was enacted by the voters whereas California's most 
recent redistricting plan is a product of sitting legislators, thus exacer­
bating the risk of self-dealing by entrenched interests. 
534. Id. at 1315. 
535. Id. at 1318, 1320. 
536. Id. at 1324 (Wiggins, J., dissenting). 
537. Id. at 1320. 
538. See ELY, supra note 413, at 106 ("Courts must police inhibitions on expression and 
other political activity because we cannot trust elected officials to do so: ins have a way of 
wanting to make sure the outs stay out."). 
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The First Amendment prism through which the SEIV court viewed 
Proposition 73 also provides some guidance with respect to the ques­
tion of whose rights are violated by a redistricting scheme skewed to 
the advantage of incumbents, as well as the concomitant question of 
who might have standing to raise such a challenge. Although none of 
those who sued to enjoin Proposition 73 were prospective political 
challengers, the court held that groups which alleged an interest in 
contributing to challengers had standing to sue, viewing the making of 
such contributions as an act of political association. Thus, the SEIV 
court viewed both challengers and their supporters to have a cogniza­
ble interest in challenging a campaign finance scheme tilted to the 
advantage of incumbents. Extending this analysis to the area of redis­
tricting, either those voters who would seek to support a challenger or 
prospective challenger should also have standing to challenge a redis­
tricting scheme tilted to the disadvantage of all challengers. As in the 
campaign finance context, it ought not be necessary for any particular 
voter or challenger to meet the practically insuperable burden of 
showing that his or her district would have been competitive but for 
the incumbent-skewed redistricting. For it is the collective interests of 
all voters throughout the state who would seek to support challengers 
- as well as the would-be challengers themselves - whose interests 
are violated by a redistricting plan designed to protect all incumbents. 
There are of course practical difficulties in piercing the veil of dis­
cretion in redistricting cases, a judicial exercise that has proven to be 
fraught with peril in the most recent series of racial-gerrymandering 
cases.539 There is certainly a strong counterargument that judicial 
policing of incumbent gerrymandering is an area in which judicially 
manageable standards would be so difficult to fashion that courts 
should stay out entirely. The difficulties of determining whether a 
scheme benefits incumbents did not, however, stop the SEIU court 
from taking a hard look at Proposition 73. It is not immediately clear 
that policing redistricting schemes drawn to systematically advantage 
incumbents presents practical difficulties on a different order of 
magnitude from those faced by the SEIU court. At the very least, an 
approach to incumbent gerrymandering that borrows from First 
Amendment equality cases like SEIV warrants further consideration. 
3. Peremptory Challenges 
A final area in which First Amendment Equal Protection might 
inform assessment of inequalities in the realm of political participation 
concerns the exercise of peremptory challenges to exclude from juries 
those with disfavored viewpoints. Courts and scholars have heretofore 
assumed that, whatever other forms of discrimination litigants are pre-
539. See Gerken, supra note 414. 
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eluded from acting upon in the exercise of peremptory challenges, it is 
perfectly appropriate for such challenges to be exercised against those 
who harbor certain viewpoints, political or otherwise. For example, 
prosecutors may not exclude all blacks from a jury trial involving a 
black defendant, but can certainly choose their peremptories to 
exclude the most liberal members of the venire. So too, defense attor­
neys may not exercise their peremptories to exclude whites, but are 
free to exercise their peremptories against the most conservative 
members of the venire. Where such a scenario plays out, the net effect 
is to exclude the polar ideological extremes from the jury ultimately 
selected. 
If we simply view the jury as nothing more than an objective fact­
finder, then such exclusion does not appear especially problematic so 
long as both sides are allowed an equal number of challenges. Indeed, 
excluding people at the extremes from juries is likely to increase the 
likelihood of reaching a decision, especially where unanimity is. 
required, by decreasing the possibility that there will be one or two 
holdouts. If, however, we view jury service as an opportunity for 
democratic participation comparable to voting, then such exclusion 
raises serious concerns. 
Consideration of Vik Amar's analysis of jury service as a form of 
political participation brings this problem to light. Tracing the histori­
cal pedigree of the jury, Professor Amar persuasively argues that jury 
service should be treated as a form of political participation, subject to 
the same protections from discrimination as that of the franchise .540 
Linking jury service to voting, he suggests, provides a limiting princi­
ple upon the antidiscrimination rule that the Court has articulated in 
the Batson line of cases. If the exercise of peremptories is subject to 
the same antidiscrimination limitations to which the vote is subject 
and only to those limitations, Professor Amar argues, then litigants 
would be precluded from striking jurors based upon race, sex, eco­
nomic class, and age.541 Because such classifications are also prohibited 
bases for denying the right to vote, they should also be prohibited 
bases for denying the right to participate on juries. 
Professor Amar is quite right to align jury service with voting. But 
if we follow his line of analysis, it seems doubtful that constitutional 
limitations on the exercise of peremptories can ultimately avoid the 
"slippery slope" problem - that is, the concern that if race, age, and 
gender are impermissible bases for exercising peremptory challenges, 
then other forms of group status should also be forbidden bases. As he 
notes with respect to the jurisprudence of jury exclusion, "slippery 
slope problems have plagued courts because the doctrine at present is 
540. Amar, supra note 305, at 217-54. 
541. Id. at 251-52. 
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not informed by a workable theory to identify protected groups. "542 As 
stated by one circuit court: " [I]f the age classification is adopted, 
surely blue-collar workers, yuppies, Rotarians, Eagle Scouts, and an 
endless variety of other classifications will be entitled to similar treat­
ment. "543 The slippery-slope problem becomes even more pronounced 
if we examine First Amendment limitations upon whom may be 
excluded from voting. 
This becomes evident by considering a hypothetical scheme 
allowing election officials to deny the franchise to those with political 
views at the ideological extremes. Suppose, for example, that the gov­
ernment had discretion to prevent (or keep from having their votes 
counted) "Naderites" with views to the left of the Democratic Party 
and "Buchananites" with views to the right of the Republican Party 
from voting in the presidential election. Or, to draw a closer analogy, 
suppose that Republican and Democratic party leaders in each pre­
cinct were allowed to strike from voter rolls one hundred individuals 
whose political views they found most objectionable. This is analogous 
to what prosecutors, defense attorneys, and civil attorneys do all the . 
time when exercising their peremptories to exclude prospective jurors 
with political views they believe to be against their client. Such denial 
of the vote, however, would surely fail constitutional scrutiny even if 
applied in such a way as to exclude equal numbers of Naderites and 
Buchananites. Thus, if we apply the same test to exclusions from the 
jury box that we apply to exclusions from the voting booth, then the 
present system according to which peremptory strikes are exercised is 
patently unconstitutional, for viewpoint-based exclusions would 
clearly be impermissible in the voting context. 
These dangers are magnified in the area of juror exclusion, given 
the overlap between racial and viewpoint discrimination. As noted 
above, the Court since Batson has counted as a "race-neutral" justifi­
cation for striking black jurors the fact that the prosecutor "did not 
like the way they looked."544 As it stands, then, litigants may strike 
jurors for ostensibly nonracial reasons that shroud hidden racial bias. 
Take, for example, a black juror's articulation of skepticism about 
whether police officers are generally truthful during voir dire, or, con­
versely, a white juror's articulation of the view that police officers are 
generally more honest than the average person. It is impermissible to 
strike jurors because of their race, but perfectly acceptable to strike 
them because of expressed viewpoints. But to the extent that such 
views tend to predominate among one racial group or another, view­
points may easily serve as a surrogate for race discrimination in the 
exercise of peremptories. 
542. Id. at 215-16. 
543. Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982, 999 (1st Cir. 1985). 
544. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 766 (1995). 
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If the same protections from discrimination that apply to voting 
also apply to jury service, then viewpoint discrimination must be 
added to the list. This would seem to leave us with no choice but (in 
Professor Amar's words) to ride the slippery slope to the bottom and 
abolish the peremptory challenge altogether.545 For it is virtually 
impossible to imagine any system in which a court could possibly hope 
to prevent litigants from exercising peremptory challenges based upon 
a prospective juror's political or other viewpoints. Accordingly, if 
we apply the teachings of First Amendment Equal Protection to the 
exercise of peremptory challenges, it would appear to leave no choice 
but to eliminate discretion in this area by getting rid of peremptories 
entirely. 
An obvious criticism of this argument is that it proves too much. It 
is, however, at least worth considering how First Amendment Equal 
Protection analysis might play out, if we think of jury service as a form 
of political participation, as both the First Amendment Equal Protec­
tion and Unconventional Equal Protection cases would seem to sug­
gest. If jury service is understood as a form of political participation, it 
would provide further ammunition to the argument made by Justice 
Marshall and others for eliminating peremptory challenges entirely.546 
The post-Batson cases have demonstrated just how difficult it is to 
police racial discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges. 
As in the case of incumbent gerrymandering, the overlap between 
issues of race discrimination and viewpoint discrimination would seem 
to call for particular skepticism of official discretion in this area of 
democratic participation. 
CONCLUSION 
For too long, we have failed to acknowledge the relationship 
between the First Amendment and rights of political participation 
traditionally examined under the lens of the Equal Protection Clause. 
The special First Amendment doctrines regarding precision, standing, 
justiciability, facial challenges, and appellate factfinding provide 
mechanisms designed to prevent government decisionmakers from 
suppressing disfavored viewpoints and disfavored speakers behind a 
veil of discretion. It is no accident that some of the most important 
First Amendment equality cases arose during the civil rights move­
ment, against a backdrop of racial discrimination, for it is where racial 
545. See Amar, supra note 305, at 215 n.81 ("One response to the slippery slopes would 
be to ride them to the bottom, eliminating key persons and peremptories, leaving only ran­
dom selection from recently refilled juror wheels and challenges for cause based upon an 
individual juror's demonstrated incompetence or bias."). 
546. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 107 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring); 
Alschuler, supra note 344, at 209. 
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bias threatens to distort the proper functioning of the political process 
that the dangers of discretion are most pronounced. 
The approach taken in the First Amendment Equal Protection 
cases stands in stark contrast to that taken in Conventional Equal 
Protection cases. By requiring rigorous proof of intentional discrimi­
nation, the latter cases make it relatively easy for official discrimina­
tion to go undetected. There is no simple answer to the question why 
the Supreme Court has adopted a more sensitive approach to the 
equality problems posed by official discretion in some contexts than in 
others. But at least part of the explanation lies in the special impor­
tance attached to preventing inequality in political participation. 
The Unconventional Equal Protection cases represent a third 
approach to reconciling the values of equality and discretion - one 
that is a sort of hybrid between First Amendment Equal Protection 
and Conventional Equal Protection - and help explain the differ­
ences between the standard doctrines. In its jury exclusion, political 
restructuring, and one person, one vote cases, the Court has adopted 
analytic frameworks that relax the traditional quantum of proof 
required to establish a violation. Like Conventional Equal Protection 
cases, the true focus of these cases is on preventing intentional dis­
crimination against a disfavored group. But like the First Amendment 
Equal Protection cases, these cases exhibit a distrust of official discre­
tion - and a willingness to find a violation without smoking-gun 
evidence of discriminatory intent. They also adopt special procedural 
rules and rules of justiciability that resemble those embraced in the 
First Amendment context. 
Though thinly reasoned, the Court's recent decisions in Thomas v. 
Chicago Park District and Bush v. Gore suggest the possibility that 
these dissimilar approaches to the problem of equality and discretion 
might be harmonized. More specifically, they suggest how First 
Amendment Equal Protection doctrines might inform our approach to 
inequalities in the realm of political participation that have heretofore 
escaped notice. Where official discretion threatens to deny equality of 
political participation, courts should apply heightened front-end scru­
tiny comparable to that which has traditionally been applied in First 
Amendment equality cases. 
Adoption of the approach I advocate would result in a markedly 
different treatment of issues that have not to this point been viewed as 
serious equal protection concerns. It should, for example, cause us to 
rethink such problems as intrastate inequalities in voting and registra­
tion systems; state redistricting schemes that tilt the competitive bal­
ance in favor of incumbents; and the exercise of peremptory chal­
lenges against those with disfavored viewpoints. Like the line of civil­
rights-era speech cases culminating in Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 
these present problems are prime examples of situations where the 
First Amendment imperative against viewpoint discrimination and the 
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Equal Protection Clause imperative against race discrimination may 
overlap. For in each of these areas, there is a pronounced risk of 
covert race discrimination resulting in denial of equality in the realm 
of political participation. Even where it is impossible to prove 
discriminatory intent, courts should consider adopting legal rules that 
will prevent decisionmakers from denying equality in the realm of 
participation behind a veil of discretion. 
What is still needed, and what I have only begun to suggest in this 
Article, is a better account of the relationship between the norms of 
equality in the realm of speech, race and participation than existing 
constitutional theories provide. To adequately make judgments about 
whether to sacrifice discretion in order to promote equality (or vice 
versa) in any given context, we must have a more refined conception 
of what sorts of interests are most worthy of protection. Only by 
developing such a theory can we hope to preserve official discretion 
where it is needed, and at the same time promote the constitutional 
vision of a more perfect union, one in which all citizens can participate 
as equals in the conversations of democracy. 
